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his publiCation aDDresses issues anD opportunities that 
present themselves to smallholder agricultural cooperatives in selected 
regions of Paraguay, Brazil, and Colombia. The context of the discus-
sion is how these enterprises react to confront the challenges of operating suc-
cessfully in a global economy that will reward winners and leave poor perform-
ers out of the marketplace. This process is characterized as management of 
change, an adaptation exercise all businesses and organizations must embrace 
to prosper in complicated and often rapidly changing circumstances.
In many regions of the world, cooperatives and other agribusinesses are 
flourishing because, among many positive factors, they provide products and 
services for which there is demand, they are sufficiently capitalized and have 
ready access to credit facilities, they receive substantial governmental sup-
port through favorable legal and regulatory frameworks that promote coop-
erative development instead of imposing state control on these entities, and 
there are technical and technological assistance providers locally available to 
these producer groups. Internally, successful cooperatives in prosperous regions 
can recruit professional managers and competent support staff from a robust 
human resource base, and their offices are equipped with the requisite tech-
nological tools. They possess a rich pool of strong candidates to compose in-




to strengthen farmer participation in achieving the financial objectives of the 
enterprise.
The majority of cooperatives participating in the management of change 
analysis presented in this publication can count on very few of the positive 
factors cited above to help them flourish. They do have marketable products, 
and Brazil, Paraguay, and Colombia enjoy favorable legal and regulatory atmo-
spheres for cooperative development. However, the cooperatives are located in 
remote areas of the Brazilian Amazon region and in some of the most poverty-
stricken locations in eastern Paraguay, and, in the case of Colombia, some of 
the cooperatives are located in regions where there is illegal crop production. 
One might question why this USAID-funded worldwide Cooperative Devel-
opment Program (CDP) activity (2004–2010) even targeted such locales for 
assistance and analysis.* The response is that USAID, the Bureau of Applied 
Research in Anthropology (BARA) at the University of Arizona, and the Ag-
ricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas 
Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA) prioritize worldwide efforts to help 
small farmers increase family income and quality of life, hopefully reducing the 
exodus to cities of the rural poor—especially young people.
The selection of participating cooperatives in the assessments conducted by 
BARA, all limitations notwithstanding, centered on ACDI/VOCA’s determi-
nation that indeed the cooperatives were producing marketable products and, 
crucially, that their management and boards of directors embraced the concept 
of adapting their thinking and actions to successfully confront demanding mar-
ket conditions and challenges. It is important to note that the term “marketable 
products” used here connotes that the participating cooperatives are currently 
marketing one or more products. On the positive side, they are marketing in-
ternally, and some of them have found markets abroad, including in the United 
States, Japan, Western Europe, Russia, Uruguay, and Argentina. Issues con-
fronting them on the exporting front include increasing production volumes, 
improving quality controls, and securing new markets.
*All of the cooperative experiences presented in the Paraguay and Brazil sections 
of this volume were assessed as part of the USAID-funded worldwide CDP activity 
(2004–2010). Of the cooperative experiences presented in the Colombia section, only 
that of Cuéllar and Ramírez was part of the CDP project. The chapters by Dávila and 
López are based on research at the Universidad de los Andes and the chapter by Ruiz  
is based on independent research.
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The more complex side of the equation is the management of change. While 
the leadership and management of the cooperatives selected were interested 
in participating in the BARA assessments of their history, traditions, capabili-
ties, capacities, and inclinations to survive and hopefully grow stronger, those 
statements of interest thereby engaged the leaders and managers in a process 
that could take them down a challenging path. Management measures deemed 
necessary, in some cases, might focus on management shortcomings, but it is 
recognized that many of these cooperatives are located in remote regions that 
don’t have a large presence of trained managers and other professionals. Fur-
thermore, the smaller cooperatives don’t have the financial resources to em-
ploy well-qualified professional staff or adequately equip their offices. A recon-
figuration of a dormant board of directors might be in order, but such efforts 
can be complicated; board members are recognized local opinion leaders, and 
they might not want to surrender their position of status in the community. A 
merger of two small, economically unviable cooperatives producing the same 
product in the same county might result in a stronger, competitive enterprise 
with the ability to attract more qualified staff, access credit, gain some econo-
mies of scale, and expand markets. The problem: the merger would result in the 
unwelcome redundancy of one manager and one board chairman and perhaps 
several board members.
The BARA interviewees at the village level have listed the plethora of road-
blocks in their path, several of which are mentioned above. However, these man-
agers and leaders have stated their inclination to adapt to changing circumstances 
despite the numerous limitations. The findings of BARA published here—in 
conjunction with those of ACDI/VOCA in cooperative organizational/manage-
rial strengthening and value chain enhancement in the production, postharvest 
handling, processing, and marketing with these cooperatives—will be valuable 
in instructing ACDI/VOCA’s approaches in the field during future CDP cycles. 
The program will continue to offer senior-level technical assistance to the coop-
eratives that are taking strides to modernize and compete successfully within the 
means available to them.
BARA’s efforts in delving into the minds of cooperative managers, leaders, 
and farmer-members in a research exercise was probably the first time such as-
sessments were incorporated in an ongoing technical assistance program deliv-
ering organizational and value-chain strengthening with the same cooperatives. 
The BARA component was unique, as it led the interviewees to internalize and 
process their reason for being and then look beyond such issues as whether the 
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terrible roads in their regions would be passable when their bananas had to be 
shipped to Buenos Aires within ten days. The cooperative members were proud 
to recount their histories, downturns, and near collapses, as well as the resur-
rections and restructurings that brought them through tough times. These re-
membrances fortified them and seemed to have reinforced their determination 
to fight on and succeed. They managed to navigate through severe changes and 
setbacks over the decades. Why should they stop now?
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South America: Case Study Cooperatives in Paraguay, Colombia, and Brazil
t
hrouGhout latin ameriCa, smallholder agriculture remains a 
significant part of the regional agricultural economy. There are an 
estimated 15 million family farms in Latin America occupying about 
400 million hectares. These farms have been characterized into three types: 
(a) an estimated 10 million subsistence farms that provide neither adequate 
incomes nor food security and are part of diversified livelihood strategies of 
mostly poor households; (b) around 4 million farms that have a broader asset 
base and are integrated into local markets but face significant environmental 
and institutional constraints; and (c) about a million smallholder farms with 
adequate assets and supporting institutional contexts (Berdegué and Fuen-
tealba 2011). While rural populations have declined in the face of a rural–
urban exodus, in an especially marked way in South America (United Nations 
2014), poverty remains entrenched among rural households within the fam-
ily farm subsector. Moreover, while in many countries rural households have 
benefited from social transfer programs and increased education and health 
access, public investment in smallholder agriculture through credit, input, 
and marketing incentives has decreased.
With the rise of market-based strategies for development, Latin Ameri-
can agriculture has seen its export sector increase in both traditional export 
crops (coffee, cocoa, sugar, etc.) and nontraditional commodities (fruits and 
vegetables, flowers, soybeans, and meat). The farm systems that participate in 
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export-based markets tend to be large-scale agribusiness firms and not small-
holder farms, although these latter play an exceedingly important role in the 
supply of domestic markets. These recent trends of agricultural change frame 
the basic challenge of Latin American agricultural development. Since small-
holder agriculture seems unprepared to compete in an ever-growing export 
market dominated by agribusiness firms, it remains a sink of rural poverty with 
few escape options under current models of growth. At the same time, urban, 
nonagricultural sectors have not absorbed the inflow of rural labor in ways that 
would permit a smooth transfer into the urban middle class (Ocampo and 
Martín 2003). While indicators of rural development (e.g., food production 
and commodity export) appear promising on average, these national averages 
mask deep regional and local disparities wherein the concentrations of rural 
poverty are stubbornly resistant.
Participation in expanding markets is thought to provide a pathway to agri-
cultural growth and to increases in rural incomes. It is fair to assert that many, 
if not most, smallholder producers are well integrated in local and regional 
markets and are attracted to global opportunities. Nonetheless, smallholders, 
by definition, do not achieve economies of scale and are highly vulnerable in 
the competitive environment dominated by large and corporate firms, many of 
them multinationals. In fact, entry into the global export market can present 
unprecedented levels of risk for smallholders unfamiliar with global price vari-
ability, highly demanding quality standards, rigid deadlines, government regu-
lations, and so forth. As a further constraint, such farmers seldom can generate 
the capital and credit needed to compete with larger firms. Thus, as individual 
firms, smallholders face a decided disadvantage in global markets.
The thesis of this book is that a possible avenue of inclusion lies in coopera-
tive organization. The development community widely shares the conviction 
that associativism and collective action can create pathways of access to global 
markets for smallholder producers, especially to markets for niche and specialty 
items (e.g., fair trade coffee and organic sugar). Using the strategy of coop-
eration, smallholders are able to achieve economies of scale, attract wholesale 
credit sources, and, just as important, create market visibility through brand-
ing and product differentiation. Thus, we focus here on the development role 
of smallholder agricultural cooperatives, asking in what ways and under what 
conditions do cooperatives provide smallholders access to a more productive 
and remunerative livelihood as well as a viable forum through which they can 
engage politically in the transformation of their own communities.
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The tradition of formal cooperativism reaches back over 160 years, and the 
original principles of organization represent the core values of what in develop-
ment is now called “good governance.” Cooperatives not only confer economic 
advantages (e.g., scale economies) but also provide a model of democratic and 
transparent decision making, of participation blind to social class, gender, or 
race, and of holistic well-being (i.e., improved education, health, access to infor-
mation, professional identity, etc.). These principles in the Latin American con-
text are particularly important, since the poor in Latin America are not just eco-
nomically poor, but voiceless, marginalized, and socially excluded. To examine 
smallholder cooperatives in Latin America, then, is to test whether the model of 
cooperative organization is a viable alternative to large-scale economic growth, 
to test the social inclusiveness of cooperatives, and to evaluate the comprehen-
sive social development of cooperative members and their local communities.
In this sense, we target a more specific group. It has already been established 
that in the more economically advantaged areas of Latin America, such as the 
wine country of Chile or the southern states of Brazil, cooperatives extend an 
obvious advantage, and they are widely present and active. Here cooperatives are 
gateways to world trade, well-recognized brand names, and vertically integrated 
value chains. In the smallholder and more impoverished regions, however, coop-
erativism registers more moderate successes, at times even undesirable impacts 
that exacerbate the inequities woven into the social cloth. Our focus, then, is on 
the broader development potential of cooperativism as a form of social organi-
zation, as a sustainable tool for enhancing the well-being of the underresourced 
and the socially, as well as politically, excluded so as to counteract the deeply 
rooted stratification that characterizes Latin American rural society.
In the chapters presented here, we describe a set of contemporary coopera-
tives in poor smallholder regions of Paraguay, Brazil, and Colombia, examining 
their strategies for adapting to a rapidly changing world. Smallholder rural so-
cieties in Latin America are often immersed in highly complex economic and 
social relationships that are transnational and global (Kearney 1996). At the 
same time, they continue to represent values that center on place and commu-
nity, where the goal is to achieve viable and stable livelihoods in the community 
and on the land (Netting 1993; Fals Borda 2002). In each case study, we exam-
ine the history of the individual cooperative and identify the processes that 
have determined its trajectory of change. We address the central question of 
how cooperative organization in a highly stratified society is able to negotiate 
the local context of inequality and the broader context of international markets 
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and global competition. In other words, do cooperatives have the potential to 
significantly alter the unfavorable balance of power and “level the playing field” 
for so many small producers in Latin America? As these chapters show, in east-
ern Paraguay, northern Brazil, and rural Colombia, inequality has deep histori-
cal roots and manifests itself today in smallholders’ limited farm size, in their 
occupation of marginal land and insufficient access to credit, and in a general 
lack of public investment in physical and social infrastructure.
We approach cooperatives as dynamic community-based organizations that 
exist within wider social, political, and economic contexts. As collective organi-
zations, their theoretical advantage is derived from improved access to a variety 
of assets including economic capital (credit, land, and financial investment), 
social capital (networks that improve collective bargaining and marketing po-
tential), and human capital (investment in member education, health, capac-
ity building, and professionalization). In practice, however, the success of indi-
vidual cooperatives is highly dependent on a number of factors, including the 
competency of internal management and the vicissitudes of external market 
and policy forces. In order to sustain themselves, cooperatives must have the 
ability to adapt to these highly complex institutional environments while, at the 
same time, they respond to the socioeconomic needs of an often marginalized 
and resource-scarce membership.
Our interest in assembling this book stems from a multiyear research project 
that has examined agricultural, fishing, and extractivist cooperatives represent-
ing a wide variety of structural characteristics such as size, function, commod-
ity, commercial and financial stability, and ethnic composition. Within this 
diversity, we employ a common analytical framework that integrates five key 
contemporary issues:
 1. The essential trade-off between financial success and social investment in the 
membership: When the cooperative boasts a well-educated, healthy, and fi-
nancially stable membership, the role of the cooperative is fundamentally the 
commercial one of increasing market access. In contrast, our case-study coop-
eratives for the most part have a membership that is resource-scarce, under-
educated, and dominated by local power elites. In this context, the cooperative 
plays a much more complex role, involving not only market access but often 
such things as education, technology transfer, and health services. How does a 
cooperative model thus create economic success while maintaining social soli-
darity and the broader goals of empowerment and inclusion?
IntroductIon 7
 2. The critical role of the state (and state policy) in the success of cooperatives:  
Cooperatives are state-sanctioned organizations subject to a complex set of pol-
icies that either directly or indirectly affect cooperative decision making, man-
agement, investment, and outcomes. Cooperatives are also well positioned to 
represent the interests of smallholders at the national policy level. The case stud-
ies presented here explore how public policies have shaped the historical tra-
jectory of each cooperative by introducing both opportunities and constraints. 
They also examine the potential of smallholder cooperatives to take a proactive 
political role in pursuing policies in their favor.
 3. The interaction of local cultural patterns and change strategies: The stark re-
ality of social stratification is ingrained in cultural values and traditions that 
work against the democratic principles of cooperativism. Such values in Latin 
America are particularly embodied in patronage and clientelism. Cooperatives 
may be dominated by local elites, and more impoverished members may be 
reluctant to participate actively. Our analysis focuses on how such traditional 
values shape the management practices and impacts of cooperatives.
 4. The effects of international market requirements on cooperative success: Inte-
gration into the international marketplace demands a “new” way of doing busi-
ness. Particularly in the case of quality standards, certification, and product con-
sistency, cooperatives must train their membership, invest in facilities, and gain 
access to sophisticated information systems in order to achieve and maintain 
market share. How do these market requirements advance or constrain the eco-
nomic and social achievements of cooperatives?
 5. Management and local governance: Fundamentally, a cooperative must nurture 
a sense of cooperative ownership among members and create a sense of collec-
tive identity and empowerment. At the same time, the cooperative management 
must have knowledge of good business practices and promote an entrepreneur-
ial culture. Providing for the collective and acting in solidarity requires the abil-
ity to balance external advice with local capacity building, as well as the ability  
to apply internal controls, standards, pressures, and sanctions to act efficiently 
and effectively. Our case studies examine the challenges presented by this deli-
cate balance between outward linkage and internal governance.
The chapters presented here cover a range of perspectives, including those 
of practitioners working with cooperatives, cooperative leaders themselves, 
and academic researchers. While each case is unique and illustrative in its own 
right, we intend to show that the cooperatives are adapting to a new uncertain 
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environment, one which is part of the global movement seeking to integrate 
historically marginalized smallholders into regional, national, and global mar-
kets, networks, and power structures sometimes located far beyond their local 
communities. Whether these linkages can assure sustainable development or 
even guarantee participation and governance is not yet known. However, in the 
current Latin American political environment, where there has been an un-
precedented increase in the influence of civil society in public decision making 
(Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Krueker 2008), smallholder cooperatives, as state-
sanctioned institutions, can become key forms of association for strengthen-
ing Latin America’s struggle for democratic forms of participation and social 
equity. As several scholars point out, this is particularly relevant as neither the 
state nor the private capitalist sector have been capable of making the necessary 
transformations to promote a more equitable rural society in Latin America 
(Davila et al 2005; Gonzales and Phillips 2013).
AgrIculturAl cooperAtIves In  
lAtIn AmerIcA: the context
To understand the agricultural cooperatives presented in the different case stud-
ies, it is important to place them in the larger historical context of the devel-
opment of cooperatives and cooperativism in Latin America. Contemporary 
production cooperatives have their roots in European and Asian systems of co-
operation, starting with the waves of European and Japanese immigrants that 
arrived in the region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Cooperatives 
were often created by immigrant communities and were instrumental in allow-
ing them to re-create their own forms of social and economic organization while 
remaining detached from local populations and systems of government. Prime 
examples include the agricultural cooperatives in western Paraguay founded in 
the 1930s by Mennonites from northern Europe as well as the Japanese coop-
eratives in southern Brazil formed even earlier. Similar histories apply to the 
immigrant colonies of  Italians and Germans in Brazil in the nineteenth century, 
whose contributions to the development of the agricultural economy of south-
ern Brazil are widely acknowledged.
The European cooperative model was expanded across Latin America after 
World War II. Early initiatives followed a top-down development model, and 
concerns over inequality, widespread poverty, and social unrest throughout the 
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region resulted in the promotion of production cooperatives in more marginal 
rural areas. Emphasis was placed on the need to create economies of scale by 
pooling resources and labor, expanding credit opportunities, and more equita-
bly distributing benefits (McGrath 1978). Discussions quickly became politi-
cized, however, and in many cases, rather than serving the needs of the poor, 
cooperatives became political organizations co-opted by national elites. As 
Bennett (1983, 6) notes, Western European cooperativism was “transformed 
into quite different forms” in Latin America. This was especially the case in 
marginalized regions, where democratic control was undermined by authori-
tarian and patron-client social structures in which family loyalties, class inter-
ests, or orders from local political bosses were given priority over the develop-
ment of democratic governance. As Fals Borda (1971, 12) concluded from his 
study of cooperatives in Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, “the cooperative 
movement was imposed from above as a paternalistic and authoritarian act; it 
was not the result of popular conviction based on democratic participation or 
popular enlightenment.”
In socialist countries, cooperatives were seen as political organizations capa-
ble of radically changing the status quo by empowering the poorest segments 
of society. State-controlled interventions imposed collective production mod-
els aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, such as in Cuba, where state 
farms became the predominant organizational form. The expansion of educa-
tional opportunities and of the military and construction sectors after the 1959 
Cuban Revolution led to a significant shortage of agricultural labor, resulting in 
the development of highly mechanized, state-controlled agriculture. Some of 
the major problems associated with state farms, as noted by Deere, Pérez, and 
Gonzalez (1993, 198), had to do with “low labor productivity and inefficiencies 
associated with an excessive degree of centralization and planning,” as well as 
with the lack of local participation in decision making. In countries such as 
Mexico, with a strong populist government, state intervention in the collective 
structures of production reinforced hierarchical differences in wealth and skill. 
The embezzlement of funds by cooperative directors or the use of cooperatives 
as centers of political control by national parties were common occurrences, 
as in the case of Mexican fishing cooperatives and agricultural ejidos during 
the 1970s and ’80s under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Vásquez-León 
1998).
Throughout the 1970s, the cooperative movement in general was criticized 
for its inability to deliver on promises of cooperation, development, democracy, 
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participation, equity, solidarity, and social transformation. Gabriel Gagnon 
(1976), who studied cooperatives throughout Latin America and Africa, em-
phasized that cooperatives in capitalist societies abandoned their role as social 
movements to become better integrated into the dominant capitalist system 
while cooperatives in socialist countries became little more than vehicles for 
the transmission of state policy. Despite serious criticisms, however, scholars 
still valued cooperatives as organizations with the potential to challenge the 
status quo on behalf of the “legitimate interests” of the peasantry as a social 
class (Fals Borda 1971, 146–47).
Parallel to top-down approaches were grassroots small-scale industry, artisan, 
credit, savings, and housing cooperatives and associations that developed inde-
pendently from the state (ILO 2001; Nash et al. 1976). Some of these grassroots 
organizations were influenced by the Catholic Church’s liberation theology, 
which offered critical interpretations of the complex social realities surrounding 
rural communities. Ideas about social justice became operationalized through 
the participatory action and mutual support structure of the local ecclesiasti-
cal communities (Levine 1988). Grassroots organizations that developed under 
strong military dictatorships, such as the Christian Agrarian Leagues in Para-
guay, were accused of promoting communism and were quickly silenced and 
violently repressed (Lewis 1984). Others, however, provided an important op-
portunity for impoverished producers and, despite attempts at repression, par-
ticularly in Brazil, remain viable today.
In the mid-1980s, the structural adjustment policies deployed by most Latin 
American governments began to have significant impacts on state farms and 
cooperatives. States promoted free trade and the privatization of productive 
and financial sectors, and significantly reduced economic protections once pro-
vided by subsidies, market protections, and export and tax privileges. In coun-
tries such as Mexico, large cooperative federations lacked the flexibility to ad-
just to new pressures and collapsed once external government assistance was 
withdrawn. Cooperatives were also dramatically affected by increases in trans-
portation costs and input prices and the loss of basic social services (Kroeker 
1996; Vásquez-León and Liverman 2004). In Cuba, the collapse of the social-
ist trading block led to the decentralization and dissolution of the state-farm 
sector. Collective organization, however, continued as Cuba’s primary structure 
when state farms were converted to cooperatives. Even though state agencies 
continue to be the main buyers of outputs and suppliers of inputs, limiting 
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cooperatives’ management authority, there is still much greater member par-
ticipation and on-farm decision making than in the past (Royce 2004). In Nic-
aragua, which adopted the cooperative model after the 1979 Sandinista revo-
lution, cooperatives have continued to be important organizations despite—
and to some extent because of—the decline in state support after the end of 
the Sandinista government in 1989. Ruben and Lerman (2005) attribute the 
continuation of the cooperative sector to the importance of social capital as a 
risk-sharing mechanism that ensures access to a variety of services no longer 
provided by the state.
For the more independent grassroots small-scale cooperatives and associa-
tions throughout Latin America, the withdrawal of state intervention was not 
as devastating (ILO 2001). Nonetheless, their ability to adjust to and transform 
their socioeconomic landscapes continues to be limited by more pervasive is-
sues related to mass poverty, armed conflicts, political and economic instability, 
unemployment and underemployment, and environmental degradation. Con-
cerns about these issues and the growing contradictions between the neoliberal 
globalization model and the claim to social rights (Eckstein and Wickham-
Crowley 2003) are being addressed in the literature through innovative con-
cepts of the economia solidária (social or solidarity economy),* which De Sousa 
Santos (2006) calls an alternative, counterhegemonic form of globalization, 
and of alternative arrangements for trade and exchange. For example, fair trade 
and various agricultural certification schemes constitute a growing movement 
that sees environmentally and socially responsible trade as a way in which small 
producers may successfully compete in international markets (Page-Reeves, 
1998; Hernández Castillo and Nigh 1998; Grimes and Milgram, 2000). At the 
center of these efforts are collective organizations (i.e., cooperatives, producer 
associations, responsible consumer groups, ethical banks) perceived as the seeds 
of a fairer, more democratic, and more sustainable economy through which 
global capitalism can be transformed to address concerns for social justice and 
*The idea of the economia solidária is that economic efficiency is measured not  
entirely by profitability but also in terms of quality of  life (Laville and García Jané 
2009, 1). Singer (2006, 3) defines solidarity economy as one in which those who work 
are also the owners of a particular enterprise, and there are no owners who are not also 
workers. In addition, all members have an equal voice in the decision-making process, 
property is equally divided, and the enterprise has broader goals of empowerment and 
inclusion. However, legal definitions vary across Latin America.
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environmental sustainability (Healy 2001; Mutersbaugh et al. 2005). These vi-
able alternative models of development foreground a renewed emphasis on the 
importance of community as well as efforts to transform community develop-
ment through civic engagement and collective action (Marshall 2010; Gonzales 
and Phillips 2013).
It is the intrinsic character of cooperatives that they generate and must navi-
gate numerous contradictions. In contrast to other social movements, such as 
the Zapatista autonomous communities in Chiapas, Mexico (Mora, 2008), or 
Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement (Vanden, 2008), which clearly depart 
from the existing legal and institutional order and often seek to destabilize or re-
place governments, cooperatives seek to work within the system that they want 
to change. As economic, social, and political organizations, they seek to bridge 
the local and the global and must be able to adjust to external policies while 
promoting self-reliance, democratic governance, sustainable generation of in-
come, and deep commitment to community as defined by members (MacPher-
son, 2002). Even the notion of market-based social change is, as Murray and 
Raynolds (2007, 9–10) point out, contradictory, in that cooperatives work both 
within markets, seeking more egalitarian trade relations between northern con-
sumers and southern producers, and against markets, looking to transform con-
ventional trade practices that perpetuate inequalities. Mooney (2004) argues 
that these contradictions must be perceived as positive and functional char-
acteristics that facilitate the development of dynamic, flexible, and responsive 
organizations.
In effect, two models of cooperativism in Latin America have emerged, and 
they form the backdrop of the messages contained in this volume. From a more 
politically conservative perspective, the role of the cooperative is restricted to 
the expansion of economic opportunity; once achieved, the social ameliorations 
(education, health, equity, and participation) will follow. The case studies in this 
volume, however, assert a more progressive analysis of this role: that cooperatives 
are seldom able to achieve economic goals without simultaneous improvements 
in education, health, social learning, and empowerment. These are interwoven 
and inextricable components of the dynamic that determines the ultimate suc-
cess of cooperatives as development organizations for the smallholder commu-
nities. It is hoped that the reader, after reviewing the case studies presented here, 
will agree with our conclusion that the vast theoretical potential of coopera-
tive action can only be realized in the practice of effective participation, shared 
learning, and solidarity.
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Book orgAnIzAtIon And A note on methods
This volume documents the stories of smallholder cooperatives in three Latin 
American countries—Paraguay, Brazil, and Colombia. Read as a whole, these 
stories convey the immense opportunities and challenges faced by small- 
producer cooperatives. The cooperatives profiled here were selected because they 
represent the unfiltered reality of cooperative development in a highly stratified 
society, because they reveal important “lessons learned,” and because they have 
faced struggles adapting to a changing social, economic, and natural environ-
ment. Each major section is organized around a country, and for each country 
an introductory chapter is presented that provides a national context. Each sec-
tion also contains contributions by practitioners working with cooperatives 
(Cox, Echagüe, Marinho Nogueira and Alves Nogueira, Cuéllar Gómez and 
Ramirez Anaya, and Ruiz Marín), academic researchers (Vásquez-León, Finan, 
Burke, Rentería-Valencia, Piekielek, Barros, Ladrón de Guevara, and López 
Cerón), and, in one case, a cooperative leader (González Aguilera).
In the Paraguay section, after a brief introduction, four case-study coopera-
tives are included. The case study presented by Burke details the story of a long-
standing credit and agricultural cooperative, focusing on the lessons that can 
be learned from the cooperative’s decline after almost three decades serving as 
a dynamic social and political force at the local and regional levels. The second 
case study, by Vásquez-Léon and González Aguilera, explores a sugar coopera-
tive that, in a relatively short period of time, managed to obtain organic and 
fair trade certifications to enter global markets, break the abusive monopoly of 
the local sugar mill, and achieve greater control over the value chain. Rentería-
Valencia’s chapter describes the struggle of a banana cooperative seeking to sta-
bilize production by entering Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common 
Market—MERCOSUR) markets and addressing the larger structural problems 
and internal shortcomings that impact product quality. The final case study re-
fers to a credit and agricultural cooperative that is trying to diversify agricultural 
production and target a variety of markets in order to address concerns about 
rural outmigration. This section ends with a concluding chapter by a Paraguayan 
cooperative practitioner, Echagüe, who provides a thoughtful reflection on the 
challenges currently facing smallholder producer cooperatives.
In Brazil, the contextual description is followed by four case studies. Piekielek 
and Finan tell the story of a highly diversified Japanese-Brazilian cooperative in 
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the Amazon rain forest. By paying close attention to the cooperative’s history, 
they highlight the achievements of the cooperative after it confronted multiple 
significant obstacles. Barros presents the case of an aquaculture cooperative rais-
ing tilapia for a regional market, an initiative started through state support for 
displaced sharecroppers. In the next chapter, Finan details a success story of co-
operation in action by focusing on a small pineapple and cupuaçu cooperative 
located deep in the Amazonian region. In the final chapter of the Brazil sec-
tion, Burke analyzes an indigenous cooperative processing and marketing Brazil 
nut products under an international agreement. He highlights considerations of 
power and history in analyzing the role of cooperativism as a form of collective 
organization that might transform local political economies.
The case studies presented in the Paraguay and Brazil sections are the result 
of multiyear research projects (2004 to 2009) conducted by a team of anthro-
pologists from the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology (BARA) at 
the University of Arizona in collaboration with Agricultural Cooperative De-
velopment International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance 
(ACDI/VOCA), a Washington-based private nonprofit organization that pro-
motes economic development by offering a wide range of technical assistance 
to cooperatives in developing countries. The strategy used to collect data was 
based on standard ethnographic methods and a team-based approach (see 
Vásquez-León, Burke, and Rádonic 2009). Throughout the project, the team 
collected primary data during several seasons of summer fieldwork. Initially, 
open-ended interviews were conducted with officials in public agencies, coop-
erative managers, and support institutions. Snowball sampling techniques were 
used to develop a research sample representing key economic and public service 
sectors. The data gathered at an institutional level allowed us to create a com-
prehensive framework that traced the institutional linkages between coopera-
tives, public institutions, and other economic agents.
To conduct research at the community level, we surveyed a statistically valid 
sample of at least 30 cooperative member households in each community. House-
hold surveys focused on livelihood diversification strategies, views on coopera-
tive performance, and impacts of the cooperative on household decision making. 
Qualitative methods (participant observation, semistructured key informant in-
terviews, focus group interviews, and oral histories) were used to capture the range 
of perceptions about cooperative history, organizational structure, performance, 
change strategies, impacts, articulation with public and private sectors, and market 
integration. An ethnographic method allowed for a comprehensive approach that 
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was comparative (across countries and different types of cooperatives), multilevel 
(local, regional, and global), and sensitive to historical dimensions.
In the Colombia section, the contextual chapter is followed by Cuéllar Gó-
mez and Ramirez Anaya’s analysis of the coffee cooperative sector and the im-
pact of specialty coffees on the transformation of smallholder cooperatives. In 
the second chapter of this section, Ruiz Marín describes how a small and vola-
tile cooperative became a significant economic force capable of transforming 
the national milk market. In the final chapter, López Cerón assesses savings and 
loan cooperatives established in the region of southern Santander with the assis-
tance of the Catholic Church. The case studies presented in the Colombia sec-
tion are also based on long-term research but follow a different methodological 
approach, one based more on economic analysis and long-term practitioners’ re-
flections, as specified in each chapter. Throughout the book, the contributions of 
practitioners are the result of their own observations and reflections after many 
years of professional engagement with smallholder cooperatives in their respec-
tive countries.
In the conclusion, Vásquez-León and Burke synthesize the experiences 
across these three countries and identify the broader insights and lessons that 
can be scaled up and widely applied. These insights touch on several critical is-
sues, including the need to translate economic gains into transformative social 
investments, the role of the state in instituting supportive policies and promot-
ing an environment of solidarity, the importance of tailoring change strategies 
to local cultural patterns that must often also be challenged, the need for flex-
ible strategies to ensure successful participation in international markets, and 
the importance of achieving effective leadership with strong participatory gov-
ernance. They end by anticipating the challenges and opportunities that Latin 
American rural cooperatives will confront over the next few decades.





araguay is the most agrarian of Latin American countries. 
Approximately 40 percent of its 6.5 million residents live in rural areas. 
Of these, 60 percent are smallholders who cultivate between 1 and 
10 hec tares of land, often practicing swidden agriculture and using animal 
traction to till the soil. Even though they occupy only 4 percent of the total 
agricultural land, these nearly 230,000 small farms generate over one third of 
the total value of national agricultural production and produce around 75 per-
cent of the country’s staple foods, making a significant contribution to food 
security (Sorrenson et al. 1998; IICA 2004; GIZ 2016).
Paraguay also stands out for its low socioeconomic indicators, ranking 
among the poorest countries in Latin America and Africa. In 2006, mater-
nal and infant mortality rates stood at 186 per 1,000 live births compared to 
the regional average of 19.8 per 1,000 (World Bank 2006). Even though social 
spending increased during the 1990s, it amounts to only 6 percent of the coun-
try’s GDP, compared to twice that for Latin America as a whole. In addition, 
Paraguay has the highest population growth rate in the region (2.5 percent), 
with 97 percent of the population concentrated in the country’s eastern region 
(DGCE 2002). This region is composed of fertile plains with extensive valleys 
and lowlands where 98 percent of the farms are located, mostly smallholders 
who only occupy 4 percent of the total agricultural land (IICA 2004). The west-
ern region, a vast plain with large arid expanses known as El Chaco, accounts 
the paraguayan Context of 
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for 63 percent of Paraguay’s total surface area and contains only 3 percent of 
the population (DGCE 2002). The region has the largest cattle ranches in the 
country, extending up to 50,000 hectares.
In order to understand the current situation of the four Paraguayan small-
holder cooperatives presented here, as well as their members and the rural com-
munities they serve, it is important to first provide a brief historical background 
of key agrarian policies that impacted the development of cooperatives and 
smallholder producers in Paraguay. Understanding this history is important to 
explain Paraguay’s adverse and unequal socioeconomic indicators today, and 
to better appreciate the internal and external structural challenges that Para-
guayan cooperatives have had to confront as they strive to become agents of 
socioeconomic transformation and local development. In the final chapter of 
this section, Echagüe places these cooperatives within the larger institutional 
context of cooperativism in Paraguay and provides a thoughtful reflection on 
the challenges facing smallholder producers.
A HistoricAl PersPective on cooPerAtives  
And AgrAriAn develoPment in PArAguAy
Historians date the first cooperative systems in Paraguay to the Jesuit reduccio-
nes of the seventeenth century, when work collectives were organized in indige-
nous communities to undertake agrarian activities. This type of collective work, 
known as the minga, dominated rural life for more than 100 years, until the 
expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. In 1927, the Paraguayan state granted lands to 
Russian Mennonite immigrants in El Chaco. In exchange for colonizing this 
inhospitable frontier, Mennonites were left to organize and establish them-
selves independently from the rest of Paraguay. They created three agricultural 
cooperatives, which, up to the present, are well-known for their agricultural pro-
duction and processing of dairy products and beef (Stoesz and Stackley 2000). 
Local indigenous populations were used by the Mennonites as a ready source 
of labor, and eventually, as Mennonite-Indian relations became more complex, 
the Mennonites formed the Association of Indian-Mennonite Cooperative 
Services (Asociación de Servicios de Cooperación Indígena-Mennonita— 
ASCIM) to proselytize and assist indigenous peoples in the region.
The first agricultural cooperative based on Rochdale principles, which pro-
vide the basic cooperative guidelines of democratic cooperative membership, 
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cooperative education, autonomy, and concern for community, was established 
in 1941, when the Dirección General de Cooperativismo (Cooperativism’s Cen-
tral Committee), under the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Livestock—MAG), was created and the first Cooperative 
Law was formulated. The Cooperativa Ideal del Paraguay Limitada, as it was 
named, was established in the central area of the eastern region by a group of 
Paraguayans and German, Brazilian, and Arab immigrants for the production 
of grapes and the elaboration of wines (Rodriguez Silvero et al. 2005).
During the 35-year military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989), 
the state endorsed cooperative organization, with strong government interven-
tion, as part of a larger agrarian reform. During this time, core agrarian policies 
focused on agro-exports that benefited the state, intermediaries, and Paraguayan 
and foreign latifundistas at the expense of peasant farmers (Lernoux 1982, 20–23; 
Formento 2003, 63–64). One of the first policies implemented in 1954 was the 
sale of large extensions of agricultural lands to multinational agribusinesses, par-
ticularly Brazilian and North American firms. These lands were primarily used 
for soy production, extensive cattle ranching, and timber extraction. The Para-
guayan state assured these large farmers access to subsidized credit and the road 
infrastructure that would take crops, markets, and labor away from traditional 
routes and toward Brazilian ports, connecting remote areas with major markets. 
About one million hectares, or 30 percent of Paraguay’s arable land, had been 
transferred to Brazilian settlers and multinationals by the beginning of the 1980s 
(Lernoux 1982, 21). The Stroessner government openly supported the creation of 
large cooperatives among these producers in the eastern region for the produc-
tion and marketing of livestock and soy. While such immigration stimulated an 
agro-export boom, these better-capitalized large-scale farmers found land prices 
in Paraguay to be relatively cheap. This pushed land prices up, making it very 
difficult for poor Paraguayans to buy land. During this period, Paraguay’s virgin 
forests, in a form of South-South resource colonialism, “became the new frontier 
for the Brazilian economic miracle of the 1960s and 1970s” (Weisskoff 1992, 1536).
In 1964, the Instituto de Bienestar Rural (Institute of Rural Welfare), or 
IBR, was created to plan and implement a massive internal colonization project 
called the Settlement of the Northern Axis. The project was designed to open 
the agricultural frontier to peasant farmers, reduce pressure on the overpopu-
lated and overused lands in the central departments of eastern Paraguay, and 
increase foreign exchange by integrating the peasant farmer into the export- 
oriented growth model envisioned by the state. Through the IBR, the Stroessner 
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government promised land titles, credit, and technical assistance to individual 
households. Beneficiaries, as Formento (2003) recounts, received strips of land 
measuring 200 by 1,000 meters, each plot located in engineering style along a 
road, with little regard for the social use of space. This, she notes, “determined 
a structure that threatened the communal bases by disarticulating preexisting 
relations of economic cooperation and integration among peasants” (2003, 66). 
Small farmers were left on their own to clear and cultivate the land, depending 
on highly unfavorable relations to suppliers and intermediaries for credit.
The continued impoverishment of small farmers in the newly colonized 
lands was further intensified by the lack of state investment in basic infrastruc-
ture and services such as the provision of potable water, electricity, schools, and 
health facilities. Farmers supplemented their earnings with off-farm work and 
seasonal migration, but many were eventually forced to abandon or sell their 
land illegally to work as laborers on large farms (Nagel 1999). This land was 
in turn purchased by agricultural investors, who would buy consecutive plots 
for large-scale production. Thus, while the colonization policy was distributing 
state-owned land, it was also encouraging private colonization and land con-
centration. Lernoux explains the situation of many of these farmers at the end 
of the 1970s: “Few of the peasants . . . ever learn to read or write, see a doctor, 
or know the luxury of running water or electricity. Malnutrition causes nine-
tenths of the deaths . . . These peasants explain their tragedy by quoting an old 
Guarani Indian saying: ‘No one listens to the cry of the poor or the sound of a 
wooden bell.’ Three-fifths of Paraguay’s 2.6 million people live this way” (Ler-
noux 1982, 20).
Throughout the 1970s, in tandem with the internal colonization project, the 
Paraguayan MAG promoted the creation of savings and credit cooperatives 
with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (US-
AID) and the Credit Union National Association (CUNA), a federation of 
credit unions in the United States. They envisioned cooperatives contributing 
to neighborhood improvement in small rural towns. During this period, many 
of the agricultural cooperatives, including three of the four cooperatives in our 
study, were initiated by rural schoolteachers, who incorporated a small percent-
age of local farmers. With mixed success, some of these cooperatives had a pos-
itive social impact in that they were able to finance some basic services, such as 
sanitation projects and the paving of neighborhood streets, which the state ne-
glected to provide. In this sense, cooperatives served the interests of the state by 
allowing the state to minimize social spending and avoid redistributive policies.
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In 1971 the Federación de Cooperativas de Producción Limitada (Federation 
of Production Cooperatives—FECOPROD) was created to promote the cre-
ation of new cooperatives, and a year later, a new Cooperative Law was issued 
that expanded the definition of cooperatives to include service cooperatives. In 
1979 the Central Nacional de Cooperativas, CREDICOOP, was established 
with the fusion of 44 credit and agricultural cooperatives. Its primary objective 
was, and continues to be, the provision of financial and technical assistance 
to its members. By 1980 there were 166 registered cooperatives, of which 98 
were agricultural producer cooperatives. There were also 50 savings and credit, 
10 consumer, and 8 service cooperatives (MAG-INCOOP 1997).
As part of the overall strategy to expand agro-exports, the state deployed a 
policy of full control over cooperative associations in rural areas, which prohib-
ited small farmers from organizing in any form that “sought to counter the mo-
nopsonistic power of the purchasers and intermediaries” (Weisskoff 1992, 1537). 
Thus, despite the existence of agricultural cooperatives, the bulk of the benefits 
from agro-exports did not go to the hundreds of thousands of peasant families, 
but to intermediaries, multinational agribusiness, and the state. As perceived 
during the Stroessner period, collective organization among peasant farmers, 
other than in state-sponsored cooperatives, threatened the control big landown-
ers had over communities and over the labor of smallholders (Lernoux 1982).
To counteract the drastic control measures implemented by the state and the 
growing level of inequality in rural Paraguay, the Catholic Church, in conjunc-
tion with students at the Catholic University of Asunción, promoted the estab-
lishment of cooperatives in the hinterland centered on grassroots communities 
known as Comunidades Eclesiásticas de Base (CEBs).* These were created in 
the poorest departments of eastern Paraguay and were the result of the experi-
ence of the Ligas Agrarias Cristianas (Christian Agrarian Leagues) initiated in 
the 1960s. By 1986 there were around 400 CEBs in the country with more than 
15,000 members. Their main objectives were to achieve equitable land redistri-
bution and gain access to credit and technical assistance for their members. In 
addition, they promoted community development such as the establishment 
of schools and health centers. These organizations, however, were perceived by 
the Stroessner regime as a “communist conspiracy” and were quickly destroyed 
*CEBs, or church-based communities, emerged in Brazil and spread through other 
parts of  Latin America in the 1960s, largely inspired by liberation theology with a focus 
on social justice and the Christian preferred option for the poor.
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by the military through the murder of cooperative leaders (Lernoux 1982, 21). 
In fact, as Fals Borda aptly puts it in reference to the cooperative movement 
of the 1960s in other Latin American countries, “the very idea, if carried to its 
logical conclusions, could constitute a threat to a system that is based upon a 
completely different philosophy and way of life” (Fals Borda 1971, 15).
In sum, except for cases of large, technologically sophisticated agricultural 
cooperatives such as those of the Mennonites, sanctioned cooperatives in Para-
guay did not make a real effort to instill the Rochdale principles of democratic 
cooperative membership, cooperative education, autonomy, and social justice. 
As Cohn et al. point out, “leadership and trust could not develop in that atmo-
sphere. Meetings were considered conspiracies and a casual remark might lead 
to arrest” (2013, 97). Far from promoting cooperation, the legacy of the Stroess-
ner regime within the smallholder agricultural sector was one of suspicion and 
distrust toward fellow farmers and those in power.
Throughout the Stroessner years, agricultural exports grew continuously and 
nearly tripled during the decade of the 1980s. By 1989, 96 percent of total exports 
consisted of livestock, agricultural, and forest products. The agricultural popu-
lation increased by 134 percent, going from 835,000 in 1955 to nearly 2 million by 
1988 (Carter et al. 1996). According to land tenure data based on the 1981 agricul-
tural census, 36.2 percent of farmers had less than five hectares of land, while 
80 percent of the farms controlled 12 percent of the land, and the largest 0.6 per-
cent of the farms occupied 61 percent of the land (Weisskoff 1992).
tHe trAnsition to democrAcy And  
new exPectAtions
After the Stroessner regime, the country went through a period of political in-
stability and recession exacerbated by Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis, which 
impacted Paraguay’s financial sector and regional commerce (Fernández Val-
dovino and Monge Naranjo 2004). According to Rodríguez Alcala and Otter 
(2008, 147), poverty rates increased from 32 percent in 1997 to 41 percent in 2003. 
The end of the Stroessner regime also initiated a period of transitional democ-
racy in which elements of old dictatorship mixed with a new Paraguay that was 
trying to solidify democratic processes and strengthen its geopolitical position 
vis-à-vis its much stronger neighbors, Brazil and Argentina.
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For small producers, this period of transitional democracy generated tre-
mendous expectations, particularly after the election in 2008 of the former 
Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo, also known as the “bishop of the poor,” ended 
62 years of conservative rule. Small rural producers in Paraguay felt that, for 
the first time, they had an opportunity to participate in the definition of the 
new Paraguayan democracy and its integration into the global economy. New 
expectations, however, continue to clash with a rural reality that lacks basic 
infrastructure and retains elements of the old Paraguayan social structure, in 
which 48 percent of the total cultivated area belongs to large soybean farmers 
and private corporations. Moreover, the hope embodied in Lugo’s presidency 
was shattered four years later when the Paraguayan conservative elite removed 
him from office through an impeachment process that most Latin American 
countries perceived as a coup d’état.
Thus, the collective struggle in Paraguay presents a number of contradictions. 
On the one hand, smallholder Paraguayan cooperatives share a fairly entrenched 
and indisputable view that someone else—international markets, the state, the 
industrial sector, or large wealthy agricultural producers—define the expecta-
tions and livelihood strategies of small farmers. On the other hand, by modify-
ing those same expectations, cooperatives and their members are beginning to 
participate in the making of their own destiny. These contradictions are shown in 
the cooperatives presented in this section, as their leaders and members attempt 
in different ways to facilitate smallholder participation in larger movements that 
seek structural change by publicly challenging conditions that threaten members’ 
subsistence.
L
atin american progressives have often hoped that cooperatives 
might unite peasants in the pursuit of social, economic, and political 
transformation. Allied with land reform, collectivism, liberation theol-
ogy, and leftist politics, cooperatives were supposed to provide an organiza-
tional form to support campesinos’ political dynamism and the more general 
transition from semifeudal conditions to economic democracy. History has 
rarely borne out these hopes. As early as 1971, Orlando Fals Borda reported 
on the many roadblocks that turned cooperatives into mere palliatives that 
helped campesinos adjust to new forms of socioeconomic marginalization but 
not build more just societies (Fals Borda 1971; Fals Borda et al. 1976). In coun-
try after country, scholars have found similar stories.
In this chapter, I examine the case of a cooperative that served for almost 
three decades as a dynamic social, economic, and political force in Paraguay, one 
of Latin America’s most unequal countries. By organizing small farmers into 
rural community committees, the cooperative created cohesion among a rural 
base that was intentionally fractured during the Stroessner dictatorship. The 
committees allowed it to deliver technical assistance and marketing services 
that significantly improved the socioeconomic conditions of small farmers and 
challenged some of the structural disadvantages that reproduced their margin-
alization. Unfortunately, a series of crises and changes within the cooperative 
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have led to the decline of rural organization, mobilization, and participation 
and the reversal of much of this early progress. Here, I discuss the lessons that 
can be learned from this decline and the cooperative’s efforts to reinvigorate its 
rural activities.
From Golden AGe to rurAl neGlect
Founded in 1971 by a small group of teachers and farmers who overcame fears 
of organizing during the Stroessner dictatorship, the Coronel Oviedo Coop-
erative for Agro-Industrial Production and Services is one of the largest and 
most successful cooperatives in Paraguay. The cooperative quickly accumulated a 
majority urban membership and has provided urban and rural services through 
much of the department of Caaguazú. Successful savings and loans programs 
have made the cooperative a major player in the regional economy. Up to 2005, 
it held almost $2 million in personal savings accounts; provided millions of dol-
lars in loans each year for production, commerce, and consumption; and had 
loaned more than $39 million over the course of its history.
These financial services and production and marketing support have been 
extremely important in Caaguazú, an “eminently campesino” department that is 
the country’s second most important agricultural region (Campos 2003; Casa de 
Cultura n.d.; Última Hora/DGEEC 2001). The department’s population grew 
rapidly in the 1950s and ’60s with expansion of the agricultural frontier and the 
“March to the East”—a mass migration from the central region to the eastern 
border promoted during the Stroessner regime—and continued to outpace the 
national growth rate until the mid-1980s. Today, two-thirds of its population 
resides in rural areas and more than 60 percent is engaged in the primary sec-
tor (agriculture, ranching, hunting and fishing, mining, and forestry). In the last 
thirty years, sugarcane and soy production expanded rapidly to complement 
traditional cash crops like corn, cotton, and tobacco. Ranching has also grown 
significantly, in concert with increases in large land holdings, inequality, and rural 
wage labor. Caaguazú is disproportionately important to the national agricultural 
sector: though accounting for only 11 percent of cultivated land and 9 percent of 
the national population, the department employs 14.8 percent of the nation’s ag-
ricultural workers and farmers and produces 12.3 percent of the total value of na-
tional primary production (Última Hora/DGEEC 2001; Casa de Cultura n.d.).
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This high productivity is accompanied by high population densities relative 
to the rest of the country and problems of rural poverty, soil erosion, and defor-
estation. Many families lack the 10 hectares deemed necessary for household self-
sufficiency. In 2001, 61 percent of Caaguazú households lived below the poverty 
line, and the average household income reached only 49 percent of the national 
average (Última Hora/DGEEC 2001). Poverty rates surrounding the city of 
Coronel Oviedo were slightly better, with a 46 percent overall poverty rate and 
an average income 50 percent higher than in the department as a whole. The 
department had an unemployment rate of 18.9 percent. Although 67 percent of 
the population had completed some primary education, 14 percent had no formal 
education and 12 percent of adults were illiterate. More than 75 percent of resi-
dents lacked access to running water and sewage, though most had electricity in 
their homes. In this context of small landholdings, low levels of capital, ecological 
deterioration, and relatively high population densities, one might expect coop-
eratives to play a leading development role.
In the 1980s and ’90s, the Coronel Oviedo Cooperative began to expand its 
rural development programs. Working through 57 rural community commit-
tees, the cooperative provided technical assistance for production, crop quality 
improvement, sophisticated marketing, and the export of a variety of crops. It 
also promoted significant participation by rural members who were isolated 
by poor communication and transportation infrastructure (Moran and Villalba 
1989). Rural members met weekly in the committees to discuss cooperativism, 
learn about and provide feedback on cooperative programs, and plan monthly 
meetings with cooperative administrators about local needs and issues. They 
received regular training and frequent technical assistance. Significantly, the 
committees united, organized, and mobilized small farmers who were regularly 
ignored or repressed during the Stroessner dictatorship. One of the coopera-
tive’s first major rural development programs, a partnership with the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency to export high-quality specialty fruits and 
vegetables, provided an important new income source when cotton and other 
traditional cash crops were underperforming. By 1998, 30 percent of the rural 
members were selling fruits and vegetables to Argentina and Uruguay, and a 
new market in Chile was soon to open. According to cooperative agricultural 
extension agents and members, this “golden era” was made possible by commit-
tees that facilitated communication, participation, and active engagement with 
rural members.
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At the height of its rural activities, the Coronel Oviedo cooperative suf-
fered two unexpected crises that caused rural membership to decline sharply, 
led to the dissolution of many rural committees, and threatened the coopera-
tive’s development program. The first occurred in 1996, when an attempt to re-
structure cooperative management and elect new, more professionally trained 
leaders sparked internal conflict. In the end, the leadership remained the same, 
but several highly qualified young agricultural technicians who had supported 
the change and who were deeply committed to participatory rural development 
were fired or resigned. As a whole, the institution recovered from this crisis 
fairly well, but the rural sector suffered. The cooperative lost the momentum 
it had gained through several years of grassroots mobilization and export-led 
development, and its advisory board even discussed eliminating agricultural pro-
grams altogether to focus exclusively on more economically efficient urban pro-
grams and rural lending.
The second crisis, of much greater consequence, resulted from a 1999 law 
that forgave all public debt to the agricultural sector (for more on this, see 
Burke and Piekielek 2011). Rural members of the Coronel Oviedo cooperative 
expected substantial benefits from this law, but the fiscally conservative coop-
erative had already repaid virtually all of its public debt and was therefore not 
obliged to forgive members’ debts. Rural members saw their neighbors’ debts 
vanish and felt cheated by the cooperative. The cooperative offered to renegoti-
ate the terms of  loans but failed to resolve misunderstandings about why mem-
bers did not qualify for debt forgiveness. In Caagauzú, there is a long history 
of campesino mobilization (Campos 1993), including organizing by the Feder-
ación Nacional de Campesinos (FNC), a campesino political organization that 
helped negotiate debt forgiveness. FNC representatives encouraged Coronel 
Oveido members to protest by refusing to repay their loans to the cooperative. 
Approximately 500 of the cooperative’s 1,200 rural members made the difficult 
decision to leave the organization that had been their most consistent support 
over the years. Many others stopped repaying their loans and were expelled from 
the cooperative.
Although new rural members continue to join the cooperative, the impact 
of the debt forgiveness law cannot be overstated. The loss of confidence, com-
munication networks, and rural members and community leaders effectively 
ended farmers’ organization through rural committees, reversed most of the 
gains made through the vegetable and fruit marketing project, and damaged 
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the cooperative’s ability to provide effective and efficient services in rural ar-
eas. The cooperative director called the debt forgiveness conflict the greatest 
challenge the cooperative has faced: “That is precisely where we fell. . . . It was 
our fault, but the debt forgiveness caused everything to disintegrate.” In our 
interviews, long-term cooperative members regularly recounted the extent of 
cooperative assistance prior to the crises of the 1990s, using it as a point of com-
parison for the low levels of organization and interaction today. Many farmers 
felt left behind by the cooperative and said this was only made worse by the co-
operative’s all-urban advisory board. Cooperative staff and the board members 
themselves recognized that the board was ill-equipped to make informed deci-
sions about rural issues. Farnan also described farmers’ sense of betrayal and 
outrage at the cooperative as a “sea change” from the excitement and optimism 
she witnessed from 1996 to 1998 (Farnan 2007, 49). Because the cooperative has 
seemed to abandon rural development activities in favor of lending, the next 
generation of farmers and virtually all of the new members we interviewed are 
learning to see the cooperative as a bank rather than a leader in social organiza-
tion and rural development.
In addition to the two crises mentioned above, the cooperative’s financial 
success and expansion have contributed to this sense of neglect. The coopera-
tive has expanded its zone of action based on its financial capacity but without 
regard for its capacity to provide personalized and labor-intensive technical as-
sistance. Lack of transportation and a poorly maintained road infrastructure 
aggravate the problem, especially during the rainy season, when many rural 
roads are impassable. Despite its significant resources, the Coronel Oviedo co-
operative does not have enough agricultural extension agents to provide the 
quality and duration of assistance that the region’s small and medium-sized 
producers need. As a result, the technical assistants focus their efforts on those 
producers who have credit with the cooperative, and especially on making sure 
that the credit is repaid. While this is certainly important, it is not adequate for 
reinvigorating rural development. This not only limits rural members’ ability to 
access services, but also limits their participation in cooperative decision mak-
ing, exacerbating the underrepresentation of the agricultural sector in coopera-
tive management.
With that said, the Coronel Oviedo cooperative remains an important re-
source for small and midsize farmers. It continues to provide some technical as-
sistance, low-cost agricultural inputs, and health services, and the cooperative’s 
credit lines are its most important service. While rural members face difficulties 
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accessing many of the cooperative’s urban-based services, they typically receive 
a disproportionate amount of the cooperative’s credit. As multiple cooperative 
staff people informed us, “the urban members practically subsidize the rural 
ones.” Cooperative loans are also highly favorable: as low as 12 percent for agri-
culture, compared with rates of 20 to 50 percent at commercial banks. Providing 
credit at favorable rates can make substantial contributions to rural members’ 
livelihoods and to the sustainability of the cooperative itself. Rural members 
use loans for on-farm investments (land, machinery, inputs, storage facilities) 
and off-farm activities (stores, taxi cars, commercial photography equipment) 
and as family supports in the form of salary advances and education loans. By 
providing millions of dollars in loans each year for production, commerce, and 
consumption, as well as personal savings accounts totaling almost $2 million, 
the cooperative is a critical economic force in the region.
The importance of credit for farming and nonfarming households has en-
abled the Coronel Oviedo cooperative to use credit to retain old members, re-
cruit new members, and maintain organizational stability. In response to the 
global economic recession at the end of the 2000s, they have increased their 
maximum loans from 10 billion to 40 billion guaranís. This has caused the coop-
erative to expand dramatically from 10,656 members in 2004 to 22,000 in 2010. 
Of these, 2,000 to 3,000 are farmers with an average landholding of 20 hectares, 
and another 5,000 are “mixed members,” who farm as part of their livelihoods. 
The cooperative now works in nine districts in Caaguazú and two in the neigh-
boring department of San Pedro, where it has opened a satellite office. New 
cooperative leaders—including the first new director in nearly 35 years—have 
made significant changes to the administrative structure, have facilitated mem-
ber participation and benefits, and are now seeking ISO 9001/08 certification.
reinviGorAtinG the rurAl
During our first season of field research in 2005, cooperative leaders were 
already aware of the decline in the rural sector and the need to bring rural 
members on to the advisory council, to reinstitute rural community commit-
tees, and to develop more rural leaders. They initiated several projects to rein-
vigorate development activities, each of which combined agricultural and mar-
keting assistance with community organizing. These projects also fit within a 
broader strategy of combining agro-industrial specialization with smallholder 
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diversification. Agro-industry is meant to move Paraguayan farmers up the 
value chain so they can find bigger markets, better prices, and avoid competi-
tion with large, mechanized Brazilian farms, but it entails large capital costs 
and can generate substantial risks through dependencies on single crops and 
markets. Industrializing and specializing as a cooperative shifts some of these 
costs off the individual farmer, but farmers remain heavily invested in their spe-
cialty crop. In contrast, smallholder diversification tends to favor subsistence 
production over income generation and local over distant markets. Diverse 
smallholders are less dependent upon a single crop or market, but also less 
likely to earn substantial incomes.
The Coronel Oviedo cooperative attempts to provide farmers with higher 
incomes through specialization, industrialization, and links with distant mar-
kets while also building resilience through small-scale diversified production 
for local markets. As the former director of production explained, “The spo-
radic income [provided by agro-industry] is for development. The continuous 
income is for survival.” In the last six years, the cooperative has established sev-
eral resilience-building projects while devoting the bulk of its resources to the 
production of ethanol and sugar for export via organic and fair trade markets.
The granja escuela (farm school) project began in 2000 with nine rural 
households to demonstrate techniques for efficient and sustainable production. 
Cooperative leaders hoped that these model farms would be “poles of attrac-
tion” for other rural members, informal community centers where the coopera-
tive could share strategies for converting family farms into efficient agribusi-
nesses. The cooperative works with each family to develop a farm production 
plan that seeks to maximize productivity and ecological sustainability while 
balancing diversification with industrialization or the creation of high-value 
products. Twice a year the cooperative also invites the wives/mothers to the 
cooperative offices for a special program designed to provide instruction about 
family health and household finances, as well as to solicit their feedback. The 
cooperative is careful not to give anything to these families free of charge and 
not to provide special credit lines for them. It insists that each family have daily 
income from products such as milk, cheese, and eggs, which can be sold locally. 
The goal is for each family to serve as a realistic and replicable model for other 
farmers in their district. The program has been a modest but important success. 
By 2005, six of the nine families had already bought additional land with their 
increased earnings, and by 2010 the program had expanded to include 15 farms, 
each of which served about 20 local community members. Cooperative tech-
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nical assistants visit the farm schools every two weeks to meet with all of the 
members.
To capitalize on the heterogeneous urban-rural membership of the coopera-
tive and resolve the marketing problems faced by rural members, they also ini-
tiated twice-weekly farmers’ markets in Coronel Oviedo. In 2005, cooperative 
leaders were also considering the construction of a cooperative supermarket 
to provide a permanent local market for all member farmers and benefits to 
urban consumers, but this idea was not pursued further. By 2010, four farmers’ 
market groups consisting of campesinos living near the city had assumed pri-
mary responsibility for running markets on Saturdays, Tuesdays, and Wednes-
days. They decide who can sell at the market and ensure that prices are fair. The 
NGO Alter Vida helped initiate the farm schools and farmers’ markets, and 
also provided organic certification for sugarcane.
In addition, the cooperative has supported aquaculture, beekeeping, the pro-
duction of goat’s milk and related products, and orchards. The small-scale aqua-
culture project has proceeded through a committee of 32 farmers with a total 
of 150,000 fish. The beekeeping project developed through a broad partnership 
with government and nongovernmental organizations to prepare farmers to 
export honey. The goat’s milk project began with 12 farmers and 200 animals in 
2005 and has expanded to 43 households that are raising more than 4,500 goats. 
Working with an NGO, the cooperative identified and bred a brucellosis- 
resistant stock of goats and provided favorable credit to farmers who wanted to 
purchase animals, fencing, and other supplies. It also built an education center 
and purchased computers for farmers’ children. The fruit orchards are a rela-
tively new project in response to a government initiative to make Caaguazú a 
major fruit-producing region. The cooperative built a plant nursery with over 
30,000 plants that it provides to members at cost, and it plans to construct a 
fruit-processing factory once the ethanol factory (discussed below) is paid for, 
to enable local producers to earn more for their fruit. These projects have suc-
ceeded—despite the obstacles of funding and human resources experienced by 
most cooperatives—because they have capitalized on alliances with the gov-
ernment and nongovernmental organizations and because they have involved 
intensive focus on relatively easy products with tested markets. Products like 
honey are especially safe because they can be saved until prices are high.
The cooperative’s largest rural initiative, however, is the organic sugar and 
ethanol production project. Ethanol production was meant to sustain farmers 
during the three- to four-year transition to certified organic sugar for export. 
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It also responded to the cooperative’s need to invest a significant amount of 
money, and to a rapidly growing domestic biofuel market. Approved in an extra-
ordinary assembly in 2005, by 2010 the ethanol project was a controversial issue. 
In the words of one cooperative director, the project has passed through a pro-
found crisis at the level of the administration and the cooperative members, and 
the technical assistance department will suffer as well. The stakes are higher than 
ever: as one cooperative director said, “The factory has to be our priority. It has 
to work optimally because of the debt that the cooperative took on for its con-
struction and the crisis that it has generated with members.”
What sparked such controversy? When members first approved a $2 million 
ethanol plant that would begin production in just over a year (by January 2007), 
hundreds of farmers signed up and began to modify their farm plans to include 
organic sugarcane. The cooperative, in turn, was supposed to move quickly on 
the factory so that farmers could receive a relatively high price for their new 
crops, but when we returned to Coronel Oviedo five years later, the factory was 
still only 70 percent completed. The cooperative’s decision to double the plant’s 
capacity compounded financing problems and led to an initial delay that trou-
bled farmers. In response, farmers demanded a review of the entire project that 
concluded favorably but postponed construction further. All told, these expan-
sions and setbacks caused costs to balloon from between $1 and $2 million to 
between $10 and $12 million. The cooperative had organized farmers into 34   
sug arcane production committees, expanded sugar production with a preferred 
variety, provided loans to enable farmers to change their production systems, and 
began the organic transition and certification process, but many farmers felt 
cheated. The cooperative did not keep up its end of the bargain, and the farm-
ers suffered through multiple years of low profits; many farmed sugarcane at a 
net loss.
Today, the cooperative is working with 500 farmers responsible for 1,500 hect-
ares of sugarcane, about half of the plant’s total capacity. It plans for the proj-
ect to benefit 1,000 small farmers, employ 136 people directly in the factory, and 
provide indirect benefits to 8,000 to 10,000 people in total. Cooperative em-
ployees said that the plant would be finished before the end of 2010, but as one 
grower noted, it is very hard to believe this now, after five years of waiting and 
losing money on sugar production. Moreover, the cooperative has recently learned 
that they need to balance their cane crop with at least 20 percent early-yielding 
varieties. After taking loans and spending large sums of money to plant sugar, 
members are resistant to another change. The cooperative is distributing early- 
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variety seeds for free and has agreed to refinance all of the sugar production 
loans that it made.
To make matters worse, the cooperative’s intensive dedication to the sugar-
cane project has hurt other initiatives. Some members feel that the farm schools 
have been shunted aside, and others agreed that for the last five years nearly ev-
erything else has been neglected. Only two extension agents have remained to 
work on the smaller livelihood diversification projects, and this staffing decline 
is not likely to improve. Sugar production and the ethanol plant will continue 
to absorb large amounts of the extension agents’ time. The ethanol plant may 
pay off nicely, but it could easily become a third blow to rural members’ trust in 
the cooperative.
conclusions: GrAssroots orGAnizinG And 
AGro-industriAl Production
The recent history of the Coronel Oviedo cooperative has been marked by ups 
and downs. Many members’ household economies continue to improve as a 
result of the help they receive from the cooperative. Support for production, 
marketing, and especially credit—which has been a key constraint on rural de-
velopment throughout the cooperative’s history—have enabled the majority 
of members to acquire more land and increase and diversify their production, 
rather than selling land, shifting to rural wage labor, and migrating to the cities 
as many other Paraguayan peasants have done. But, as one cooperative director 
noted, “The cooperative has still not recovered from the crisis of 1998 and has 
not managed to refocus.”  There is still much work to be done if the cooperative 
is to become an agent of change promoting a new, more just society. Rural mo-
bilization will need to be part of that effort.
Much of the cooperative’s early success was due to the organization of cam-
pesinos in active community committees. In alignment with core cooperative 
principles, these committees united small farmers in the pursuit of their own 
development goals and permitted economic dynamism that would have been 
impossible separately. Over the last six years, the cooperative has tried to rees-
tablish these committees in tandem with their new development projects. They 
have created 34 sugarcane committees, 15 farm school committees, 4 farmers’ 
market groups, and 3 committees for producers of goat’s milk, honey, and fish. 
One of the committees consists exclusively of women, after they decided to 
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remove the men from their group for being disruptive. Several of these com-
mittees demonstrate the importance of organization: the sugarcane committees 
set their own rules and have held the cooperative accountable to its rural base; 
the farm school committees permit the flow of information across communi-
ties; and several others have initiated their own projects, independent of the 
cooperative, in partnership with government agencies and NGOs. The farm-
ers’ market organizers are also nearly autonomous. By putting these dynamics 
in place, the cooperative is creating the foundation for a self-organizing rural 
society that is no longer dependent on cooperatives, banks, and the government 
but can now work to hold those entities accountable. By contrast, many of the 
problems with the sugarcane project are due to the cooperative’s effort to force 
a highly technical and capital-intensive project onto producers with little faith 
in their capabilities.
Strong rural social organization can also benefit the cooperative and rural 
members by permitting effective and efficient outreach where geography and 
infrastructure hamper regular contact with cooperative extension agents. Per-
haps most important, community committees can facilitate communication 
between the cooperative and different segments of Paraguay’s increasingly het-
erogeneous rural society. As our survey results revealed, not all rural dwellers 
and not even all small farmers are the same. A farmer with 10 children who bor-
rows 5 hectares of land from his in-laws has very different needs than a farmer 
with 2 university-educated children who works 150 hectares with machines. A 
family of two rural teachers with a small garden parcel will have a third set of 
needs and interests. In order to effectively serve such disparate groups, coopera-
tives need to maintain strong participation by and communication with their 
members. They also need to continually investigate the self-expressed needs of 
their members. This approach might even enable Coronel Oviedo to work with 
the poorest farmers in the region, something that cooperatives often fail to do.
In the process of reestablishing these committees, however, cooperative di-
rectors and rural members have learned that it is far easier to undo social orga-
nization and active participation than to restore them. Several small farmers 
and cooperative employees noted that many of the committees are weak and 
confidence in the cooperative is wearing thin, especially due to the difficulties 
with the ethanol plant. Participation in cooperative decision making continues 
to be a challenge due to the cost and difficulty of travel to the city, the timing 
of cooperative meetings, and in some cases an attitude of justified indifference 
on behalf of campesinos. As one dairy farmer told us, “I am very ill informed 
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about the cooperative because the cooperatives leaders don’t understand what’s 
happening with its rural members.” Five years after the cooperative leaders said 
that they understood their own deficiencies and wanted more rural representa-
tion, they still faced many of the same problems.
If the Coronel Oviedo Cooperative wants to be more than a bank, if they 
want to return to being a dynamic cooperative with broad impacts on the so-
cial development of rural Paraguay, they will need to return to emphasizing the 
social aspects of cooperativism—including solidarity, participation, mutual sup-
port, and self-organization—alongside the productive and marketing aspects of 
rural development. This is an important lesson for other large rural cooperatives 
as well. Agro-industrial production may help promote trust, solidarity, and par-
ticipation if it can generate economic gains efficiently and without jeopardiz-
ing farmers’ already vulnerable household economies. However, when the path 
to agro-industry requires major changes to farm systems and when it meanders 
through lofty hopes and unfulfilled promises, the damage is likely to be both 
economic and social.
A
s you enter the town of Arroyos y esteros, in Paraguay’s 
department of Cordillera, you can’t miss a sign on the main highway 
that greets visitors: “Welcome to the organic valley of Arroyos y Este-
ros. The world’s organic sugar cradle.” The sign is appropriately jubilant, but the 
region’s path to organic success has been complicated. Much of their success 
has depended on the Cooperativa de Producción Agroindustrial Manduvirá 
Ltda. and its ability to channel individual initiative into collective action.*
In a period of fewer than 15 years, the Manduvirá cooperative transformed 
itself from a bankrupt agricultural cooperative to one of the largest global pro-
ducers and exporters of organic sugar for international fair trade markets. By 
following an alternative development model based on principles of environ-
mental sustainability and social equity, the Manduvirá cooperative has secured 
a space for its growing number of producers in the global economy. It has done 
so by building alliances with international buyers and nongovernmental orga-
nizations while managing to maintain independence from state bureaucracies 
and Paraguay’s large industrial private sector.
Cooperative leaders, with strong support from members, have been able 
to use organic certification and fair trade to enter global markets, break the 
*This chapter is an updated and modified version of a previously published journal 
article (Vásquez-León 2010).
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abusive monopoly of the local sugar mill, and achieve greater control over the 
value chain. In less than a decade the cooperative went from dependence on 
the abusive practices of the sugar mill, called OTISA (Oficina Técnica Indus-
trial, S.A.), which paid below-market prices for the cooperative’s sugarcane, to 
renting the use of Censi & Pirota, a sugar mill 90 kilometers south of town, 
and creating their own brand of sugar. Today all rural cooperative members are 
certified organic producers and their sugarcane is processed by the coopera-
tive’s recently inaugurated sugar mill. The cooperative exports and markets its 
sugar directly to buyers all over the world. At the same time, it returns earn-
ings to cooperative members in the form of direct cash and through social ser-
vices for members and the community. This chapter examines the strategies of 
the Manduvirá cooperative to empower marginalized producers by asserting 
independence vis-à-vis the rural elite and global competitors while achieving 
autonomy, self-governance, and long-term stability. Examining the strategies 
of its leaders and members reveals that participation in global markets requires 
active involvement in debates on globalization and democracy, the redefini-
tion of production processes to satisfy external markets, and recognition of the 
needs of small producers to make a reasonable living and define their own de-
velopment path.
The CooperaTive: BaCkground and SeTTing
Manduvirá is a mixed-service cooperative that serves 950 small farmers, who 
typically own 3 to 5 hectares of land, as well as 750 urban residents of the town 
of Arroyos y Esteros (DGCE 2002). Arroyos y Esteros is essentially agrarian, 
with the town’s population of 4,300 people dwarfed by the rural population 
of 22,000. However, soils are fragile and fertility is low as a result of histori-
cally high population pressures and poor soil management. The region has a 
long tradition of sugarcane production for household consumption and lo-
cal markets in the form of sugarcane syrup and alcohol. In the past, the re-
gion also depended on the production of pineapple and bananas, crops that 
became unfeasible due to soil degradation and unstable markets. Lack of soil 
productivity was one of the main factors that contributed to the out-migration 
of entire communities during the 1970s, when Paraguay’s military dictator Al-
fredo Stroessner undertook a massive internal colonization project known as 
the Settlement of the Northern Axis. Although this out-migration reduced 
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pressure on the overpopulated and overused lands in the central departments, 
including Cordillera, it also left the rural district of Arroyos y Esteros essen-
tially abandoned by the state.
Like other rural districts where small farmers predominate, and despite its 
location only 54 kilometers from Asunción, Arroyos y Esteros remained iso-
lated through much of its history. Communication and transportation difficul-
ties limited farmers’ access to modern agricultural technologies and inputs, in-
cluding chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Thus, productivity remained low and 
farming was, and still is, mostly organic. The region’s isolation, however, ended 
as the twenty-first century began. A new highway connecting Arroyos y Este-
ros to Asunción, which also traverses eastern Paraguay, has made the town a 
high-transit zone for cargo trucks and passenger vehicles. Roadside businesses 
have multiplied, and faster communication with Asunción has opened the pos-
sibility of accessing the largest urban market for agricultural produce. Whereas 
in the past, organic production signified poverty and marginalization, today it 
facilitates a new social identity of environmental stewardship, social justice, and 
global interconnection. Since 2000, sugarcane has became the most important 
income-generating crop in Arroyos y Esteros. In addition, farmers also culti-
vate fruits and vegetables for household consumption and local markets.
CooperaTive hiSTory: From Failure To 
unpreCedenTed SuCCeSS
Manduvirá was established during the military dictatorship in 1975, when 39 
schoolteachers and farmers decided to participate in a national plan to cre-
ate savings and credit cooperatives under close scrutiny by the state. During 
its first years, the cooperative became the only source of affordable credit and 
membership grew quickly, reaching over 400 members by the beginning of the 
1980s. To expand credit services, the cooperative borrowed from the National 
Federation of Savings and Credit Cooperatives, CREDICOOP, created by the 
state in 1979.
By the mid-1980s, however, the cooperative was facing financial crisis. Easy 
access to CREDICOOP loans led to the issuing of credit without regard for 
members’ repayment capabilities. As one of the original members explains, “We 
lived through a long period of crisis from 1983 to 1989. Loans were authorized 
based on political criteria and debts accumulated. Cooperative officials were 
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irresponsible and illegal transactions, as well as the embezzlement of funds, be-
came the normal state of affairs.” By 1985, with an accumulated debt-to-asset 
ratio of 105 percent, the cooperative went bankrupt. Membership dropped, and 
a new manager was assigned by the state to recover and liquidate cooperative 
assets. With the end of the military dictatorship in 1989, expectations of new 
economic and political opportunities encouraged the cooperative’s board of di-
rectors to try to salvage the organization. After successfully renegotiating its 
debt, the cooperative began to market sugarcane syrup from members, who 
processed it in the 150 home-based artisanal sugar mills located throughout 
the district. Manduvirá transformed from just a savings and credit cooperative 
to one that would include an agro-industrial component, and sugarcane syrup 
became its most important source of earnings until the mid-1990s, when prices 
began to decline.
In 1992, the Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO),† an international NGO 
that sets fair trade and organic certification standards, visited Arroyos y Esteros. 
FLO’s marketing pitch persuaded one of Paraguay’s largest private-sector in-
dustrialists, who was also the president of the Paraguayan Industry Confedera-
tion, to purchase OTISA, a local sugar mill and distillery that had been built in 
the 1950s. The new owner retrofitted the mill to process organic sugar, and the 
mill was certified by FLO in 1997.‡ As sugar syrup prices plummeted, artisanal 
sugar mills went into disuse, and the cooperative was forced to discontinue sales 
of sugar syrup. Cooperative members turned to OTISA to market their prod-
ucts, and the cooperative reverted to a savings and credit organization, continu-
ing to offer credit for agricultural purposes and to rent machinery for land clear-
ing, soil preparation, and sugarcane.
The relationship between producers and OTISA was filled with tension 
from the beginning, and, because farmers entered into direct contracts with 
OTISA, the cooperative had no power to negotiate on behalf of its members. 
†FLO mediates the fair trade market. According to its website, http://www 
.fairtrade.net, the Fair Trade label guarantees that products conform to fair trade 
socioeconomic and environmental standards.
‡Certification requires third-party verification. It consists of an initial inspection 
of facilities and the production process, a review of the industry’s regulations and 
production standards, and inspection of all certified producers within the cooperative. 
If certification is granted, an organic label is awarded. The certification process may 
take between two and three years as producers shift from conventional to organic 
methods.
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As one of the founding members said, “At that time the cooperative didn’t 
intervene, didn’t have an opinion, farmers were really on their own.” Despite 
FLO’s guarantee that OTISA’s sugar conformed to fair trade standards and 
despite OTISA’s claims of alleviating poverty in this “very isolated region . . .  
with no communication with the rest of the world” (OTISA 2005), prices paid 
by OTISA to producers were at least 25 percent lower than those paid by other 
refineries ($12 per ton as opposed to $16 at other mills). The only immediate 
benefit for the producer was an assured buyer that was conveniently located. In 
the longer term, producers could look forward to the benefit of the fair trade 
premium, a bonus paid on top of an agreed minimum price, which amounts to 
$60 per ton for conventional sugar and an additional $20 per ton for certified 
organic sugar. OTISA, however, often kept most of the premium.
This created a dilemma for FLO. Because their partner showed little con-
cern for the rights of local producers, “fair” trade was re-creating old hierarchi-
cal relations of power instead of fostering social justice. However, sugarcane re-
quired processing facilities that no small Paraguayan smallholders could afford.
underSTanding The CooperaTive advanTage 
and The need For auTonomy
Despite their rough entry into fair trade, the small producers of the Manduvirá 
cooperative have achieved substantial gains. One of the greatest trials has been 
changing the balance of power in relation to OTISA. In the late 1990s, produc-
ers began to meet in local agricultural committees, which were organized by 
family groups from different compañias (smaller rural units that form a district). 
Meetings dealt with social, political, and economic issues relevant to particular 
localities, including farmers’ dissatisfaction with OTISA. Agricultural commit-
tees, however, were isolated from one another and, as one member put it, “We 
were complaining to each other all the time and getting our anger out on our 
families, feeling that we were not getting anywhere.” Committee leaders began 
to identify the cooperative as a possible unifying institution that could make 
their demands heard and, ultimately, break OTISA’s monopsony control.
Representatives from various local committees approached the cooperative’s 
manager. As one committee leader explained,
We went to his house and invited him [to represent us], and we told him about 
our idea. And he said yes, but that we had to help him because he didn’t know all 
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the producers. And we said that we needed the cooperative to lead our struggle 
and we would invite every producer to participate. So we worked for five or six 
months, inviting producers, talking to them, knocking on people’s doors, one by 
one, convincing everyone that if we acted together we had a better chance. People 
were afraid of OTISA, they were afraid of everything, of the government; people 
had been terrorized for so many years. But all the time, the manager of the coop-
erative and the board of directors were at our side.
After several months of community organizing, a meeting was set to negotiate 
with OTISA’s owner at the cooperative. As the manager remembered, “There 
were more than five hundred producers at the meeting; it was the first time in 
history. We started negotiating but [OTISA’s owner] didn’t take us seriously.” 
The meeting ended without a resolution, but the cooperative members con-
tinued to mobilize. The cooperative manager continued, “When the sugar mill 
gave producers the order to start cutting the cane, no one cut. . . . Despite fears, 
we decided to wait for several days until the mill agreed to raise prices by twelve 
thousand guaranís.§ That was very significant; people realized that in an orga-
nized way we could accomplish things.”
This modest gain made members aware of the strategic importance of col-
lective action. Producers began selling their sugarcane to OTISA via the coop-
erative, and in 1999 the cooperative was able to gain control over the distribu-
tion of the fair trade premium.
The second step towards breaking OTISA’s monopsony was through the 
creation of viable competition. In 2002, cooperative officials successfully ne-
gotiated the reopening of Censi & Pirota, a small sugar mill located 70 kilo-
meters south of Arroyos y Esteros, by guaranteeing the delivery of a specified 
volume of sugarcane. Despite the greater distance and lack of certification, the 
new mill offered better prices and was willing to absorb transportation costs. 
Even though OTISA raised prices once again, most producers shifted to the 
new mill. In the words of a woman producer, “We knew that OTISA exploited 
us and that with the cooperative we were going places. In the cooperative we 
could talk and argue and say what we thought and we were not afraid anymore. 
That was worth the risk of going against the powerful.” This shift was further 
encouraged when Censi & Pirota obtained FLO certification, allowing it to 
pay better prices for certified sugarcane. Without producers, OTISA has had to 
buy land and produce its own sugarcane.
§One U.S. dollar equals approximately 5,000 guaranís.
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For the 10 years following this battle, cooperative members processed their 
sugar in the Censi & Pirota mill, increasing production of their own brand, 
Azucar Manduvirá, and selling directly to international buyers. Through these 
years, the cooperative’s vision of autonomy and empowerment of its producers 
continued to grow, and in 2011 the cooperative embarked on what a few years 
earlier had seemed like a faraway dream: the construction of its own sugar mill. 
The cooperative decided to build its own mill partly to gain independence and 
lower production costs, but also because Cenci & Pirota were unable to process 
the high amounts of sugar provided by members. This vision of autonomy and 
empowerment started to form after the cooperative won its first battle with 
OTISA, but it became stronger and better defined with each successful step at 
controlling the value chain.
In the spring of 2014, with the financial backing of long-term international 
buyers, credit from the Inter-American Development Bank, and the technical 
support of long-term volunteer consultants, the cooperative inaugurated its own 
sugar mill in the outskirts of Arroyos y Esteros. This $15 million project is “the 
world’s first producer-owned Fairtrade organic sugar mill” (Fairtrade Interna-
tional 2014). The new mill, which started production in 2014, has the capacity to 
process 200,000 metric tons of sugarcane and produce 20,000 met ric tons of or-
ganic sugar per year.
growTh and The STrengThening oF 
CooperaTive valueS
The new sugar mill required the cooperative to hire and train 170 new em-
ployees. To increase production in a sustainable way, the cooperative also hired 
50 employees to work with producer-members in different capacities. Most of 
those hired are sons and daughters of cooperative members, and many of those 
are returning migrants who had left the area in search of work opportunities in 
Asunción or Argentina. The hiring and training of young people from the com-
munity reflects a conscious commitment made by the cooperative since it hired 
its first agricultural extension agent in the mid-2000s. This extension agent is a 
producer’s daughter who received funding from the cooperative to get a bache-
lor’s degree in agricultural sciences at a Costa Rican university and to specialize 
in organic farming. Today she heads the cooperative’s agricultural department, 
overseeing organic certification programs that also include vegetable produc-
tion for household consumption and sale in regional markets.
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An emphasis on capacity building has been at the core of the cooperative’s 
strategy to grow without losing sight of cooperative principles. To prepare for 
the opening of the sugar mill, the cooperative funded several training programs 
for new employees and new member-producers. With a grant from the Inter-
American Development Bank, the cooperative hired technical experts from 
Cuba, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, and Brazil to train new employees. 
Trainings, however, were not limited to learning about sugar processing and 
working and managing the mill. In addition, the cooperative provided work-
shops on cooperativism, fair trade, organic certification, food security, quality 
control, and financial management. The cooperative invested $100,000 to train 
its new workforce, paying minimum wage throughout the four-month training 
period.
inTernaTional Sugar markeTS: Fair Trade 
verSuS Free Trade
Despite the challenges related to organic certification, choosing a fair trade 
strategy has been fundamental to the cooperative’s success, as small producers 
have no realistic possibility of competing in the highly competitive interna-
tional free market for conventional sugar. Paraguay’s sugar industry, which is 
constituted by the country’s largest producers, provides only about 1 percent of 
the sugar that enters MERCOSUR and is in direct competition with Brazil, 
the largest exporter of sugar in the world. World sugar prices are also highly 
volatile and have been on a downward trend since the 1980s (Illovo Sugar 2007).
In contrast, Paraguay has become an important producer of organic sugar 
for fair trade markets. Sugar, however, is only a sideline commodity, with an 
approximate total production of 190,000 tons as predicted by the International 
Sugar Organization for 2005 (Gudoshnikov 2001). The share of organic sugar 
for fair trade markets is even smaller, though it has shown significant growth 
according to several measures: European demand expanded by 120 percent in 
2003, from 650 tons to 1,430 tons (Transfair USA 2009); Fairtrade Internation-
al’s sugar sales increased from 16,523 tons in 2007 to 211,600 tons in 2013; and 
FLO has significantly increased the number of producer associations it works 
with, from 16 associations in 8 countries in 2007 to 100 associations in 19 coun-
tries only 6 years later. The Manduvirá cooperative is one of the lead produc-
ers of organic certified sugar, with an average production of 7,500 MT. The co-
operative, however, is now expecting a production of 12,000 MT for 2015 to 
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meet increasing demand, and it expects to reach the sugar mill’s total capacity of 
20,000 MT. The cooperative currently exports sugar to 24 countries, including 
most European countries plus Brazil, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico, 
Canada, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and South Korea. It is 
now also working through other certifying agencies like Trans Fair and Trans 
Aid. Demand comes not only from anonymous consumers but also from food 
producers, supermarkets, and cacao cooperatives that directly contract the co-
operative to supply them with fair trade sugar for use in their organic choco-
lates, ice cream, jams, and baked goods.
Price differentials also make organic sugar more attractive to producers. 
According to the International Sugar Organization, organic sugar commands 
about one and a half to two and a half times the factory price of conventional 
sugar (Gudoshnikov 2001). The president of Paraguay’s largest sugar mill esti-
mates that, whereas conventionally produced sugar fetches about $260 per ton, 
organic sugar sells for about $330 per ton. In his opinion, the organic sugar in-
dustry “is a way to compete on the international markets against Brazil’s cheap 
sugar” (Sciscioli 2005).
For cooperative members, production for fair trade has increased and stabi-
lized annual household incomes. According to the Fairtrade Foundation, the 
fair trade minimum price guarantees “sustainable production” costs and acts as 
a safety net for farmers when world market prices fall below a sustainable level. 
When the market price is higher than the fair trade minimum, buyers must pay 
the market price. Also, the cooperative can request partial prepayment of the 
contract, and it is in fact exempt from prefinance requirements (FLO 2009). 
This assures the cash flow to pay farmers when they deliver their crop.
In addition, the premium has steadily increased as more farmers become 
certified. For the 2007–2008 season, for example, when 60 percent of the pro-
ducers had received fair trade and organic certification, the cooperative received 
a total premium of $600,000 for the production of 7,500 tons of sugar. Half 
of this amount goes directly to the producer, yielding an average of $360 per 
producer during the 2007–2008 season. According to producers, adding the 
premium to higher prices per ton yielded a 30 to 40 percent price increase com-
pared with when OTISA was the only buyer. The other half of the premium, 
following fair trade requirements, is invested in community projects, allowing 
the cooperative to extend solidarity networks beyond the cooperative. In 2004, 
for example, money from the premium was used to construct a community 
health care center.
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manduvirá Today and FuTure ChallengeS
The rapid success of Manduvirá has, in a little over a decade, turned the coop-
erative from a futile organization to a highly dynamic one that is constantly 
changing as it seeks to expand its economic activities, provide benefits to a 
rapidly growing membership and the community in which it resides, and ob-
tain full control over the production and processing of its members’ sugarcane. 
With the new sugar mill, the cooperative is enjoying higher prices and paying 
lower transport costs. Also, cooperative farmers are 100 percent fair trade and 
organic certified. And by creating new employment opportunities for commu-
nity members, the cooperative is ensuring that benefits remain in the commu-
nity. Farmers also expect that the quality of the sugar will increase, since the 
new mill allows freshly cut cane to be processed immediately.
Success, however, has brought new challenges as well as new strategies to deal 
with those challenges. Despite growing demand, fair trade organic producers 
around the world continue to increase, and the end result in terms of markets is 
unknown. This problem magnifies when one considers the fact that overreliance 
on sugar led to an initial decline in agricultural diversification. The cooperative 
has tried to address the problem by looking for new markets, such as sesame 
seed exports to Japan, but, so far, market entry has been difficult. It has been 
more successful in consolidating strategic alliances with external organizations 
interested in sustainable agriculture. Alter Vida, a Paraguayan nongovernmen-
tal organization whose primary objective is to “promote agroecology as part of 
the Paraguayan culture,” provided technical assistance to certified producers for 
the establishment of organic gardens for household consumption and sale in an 
organic farmers’ market. The amount of organic produce has increased substan-
tially; today every household in the cooperative is producing for consumption, 
and regional produce markets have become a regular event. With these initia-
tives the cooperative has already placed food security as a priority.
As a long-term strategy, the cooperative continues to build capacity by in-
vesting in education. Since the mid-2000s, the cooperative provides school 
supplies, computer classes, and English and music lessons, and has an intern-
ship program for high school students to learn about business management, ac-
counting, marketing, and agronomy. The cooperative’s agricultural department 
has expanded, offering a variety of opportunities for farmers. As one member 
explained, “We get workshops, we learn new ways of doing things and we mix 
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them with the old ways, we feel more secure that we can take a step forward.” 
The cooperative is continuously training young men and women from the com-
munity to learn new skills and become part of the larger project. One 18-year-
old high school graduate explained, “The truth, I feel proud, the cooperative is 
a big family. . . . We are not just producers, we are also manufacturers of sugar, 
marketing agents, agronomists. Before, the only thing was to be a sugarcane 
farmer to be exploited by the rich. Were it not for the cooperative I would 
be looking for work in Argentina.” Even though the cooperative has not had 
women in top leadership positions, the cooperative’s extension agent today is a 
young woman whose parents are cooperative members. Today her leadership 
is fundamental to the inclusion of women farmers in cooperative programs, 
including support for subsistence farming as well as for farmers’ markets, where 
women tend to be the ones who sell.
Up until 2013, the cooperative had an open door policy, but with all mem-
bers acquiring organic certification, new members entering the cooperative, and 
greater benefits accruing, the cooperative went into what the manager calls a 
“growth crisis.”  To deal with the crisis, cooperative managers have decided to 
halt the entrance of new members until the cooperative stabilizes. However, the 
cooperative already has a good foundation for continuous growth, which under-
scores the need for governance and transparency. Besides holding regular meet-
ings where producers are able to voice their opinions, the cooperative has created 
a complex decentralized structure in which local producers in the different com-
pañias take turns coordinating the harvest and transportation from local collec-
tion sites to the sugar mill. Managing buyers has also become an overwhelming 
task: e-mails arrive from all over the world in different languages, challenging 
cooperative leaders to learn English and become computer literate.
A barrier to growth that seemed significant was lack of support from Para-
guayan state and industrial sectors. In Paraguay, Manduvirá has generated dis-
trust because it has used the cooperative model to break a cultural and political 
economic paradigm. Without the permission, investment capital, and mar-
keting assistance of the state-industrial elite, the cooperative has successfully 
linked small-scale, resource-poor producers with international consumers, pro-
viding the means by which these producers, rather than the traditional elites, 
fully benefit from their labor. They have also succeeded in taking control of the 
value-chain without destroying the character of small-scale agriculture. Instead 
they have strengthened solidarity networks. In the words of one small producer: 
“We have embarked on a great adventure, and our most important objective is 
ColleCtive Challenges and the Fair trade alternative 49
to keep our institution on the right track, to find new markets, achieve greater 
benefits for our families, and we are getting there; health, education, autonomy, 
and all the things that are important to us.”
This is one of the most important lessons that Maduvirá, its leaders, and its 
members have to offer. This cooperative is successfully assembling and repre-
senting the voices of marginal people in discussions of globalization. By defy-
ing the status quo and stubbornly maintaining a path of self-definition and 
empowerment, this cooperative illustrates how grassroots development can en-
gender a culture of solidarity and a sense of shared purpose that goes beyond 
the local. The cooperative is having a global impact on conversations regarding 
alternative markets and the participation of small producers in international 
markets. Manduvirá, as a formally recognized collective organization, has be-
come an avenue through which marginal producers find new ways to construct 
an identity while making a reasonable living and exercising a certain level of 
control over the conditions in which they work.
Despite difficulties, the future looks promising. The various gains that the 
cooperative has made in such a short time have led to a widespread feeling of 
solidarity and shared purpose, as cooperative leaders and producers solidify a 
common strategy that is compatible with the cooperative’s mission of social 
justice. Even though overreliance on sugarcane is a risk that Manduvirá pro-
ducers have taken and that they know they need to address, the key for contin-
ued success lies in the cooperative’s ability to figure out how to address its new 
challenges with the same sensitivity and attention to the grassroots level with 
which it addressed the sugar monopsony.
A 
criticAl Aspect of the AnAlysis of small-scale grassroots coopera-
tives consists of documenting and explaining the strategies that pro-
ducers pursue to create economic niches within transnational land-
scapes that are otherwise dominated by larger organizations with stronger 
political, economic, and technological capital. A common strategy emphasizes 
the resilience that results from diversification (see Piekielek and Finan, and 
Vásquez-León in this volume). Yet many smallholder cooperatives do not 
diversify their production and opt instead for a monoculture approach. This 
chapter sheds light on the social processes responsible for this persistent bet on 
monoculture (rather than diversification).
A central argument behind this analysis proposes that a number of social 
considerations (such as social prestige) may play a fundamental role in deter-
mining the internal drivers of a cooperative. This chapter thus aims to incor-
porate a larger anthropological consideration of social domains that may prove 
crucial in determining the goals and strategies followed by small agricultural 
cooperatives. To illustrate this, I document the achievements and perils of the 
Paraguayan cooperative Guayaibi Unido in its effort to export bananas to Ar-
gentina. Paradoxically, while the bananas produced in the region of Guayaibi 
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“Bananas are a type of fruit that shows everything in their skin; one can take a 
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are the object of pride among their producers, in Argentina bananas are consid-
ered a second-quality product—often consumed by the lower socioeconomic 
classes. Yet the very act of exporting these bananas to Argentina provokes in 
many producers a tangible sense of prestige that reinforces the will to continue 
exporting their product despite attendant adversities.
Guayaibi unido: The SeTTinG
The cooperative Guayaibi Unido is located in the region of Guayaibi, 250 kilo-
meters to the north of Asunción, in the department of San Pedro, Paraguay’s 
most contentious political state. San Pedro has a highly skewed land tenure sys-
tem consisting of soy farmers and ranchers with between 5,000 and 20,000 hect-
ares of land, a smallholder sector (about 40 percent of producers) with 5 hectares 
of land or less, and a considerable number of landless peasants who, although 
not accounted for in census data, are highly visible through conflicts with large 
landowners (Vásquez-León 2010). Up to the mid-1980s, the Guayaibi region re-
mained isolated. Despite its 14,000 residents, the road connecting Guayaibi to 
the closest urban center, the city of Coronel Oviedo 120 kilo meters away, was 
only built in the second half of the 1980s. Basic services such as water and elec-
tricity began to be provided in the 1990s, but residents of the communities around 
the cooperative only gained access to running water after 2000 through the aid 
of a nongovernmental organization. San Pedro is the main banana-producing 
region in Paraguay, where small farmers dedicate about 2,000 hectares of  land 
to banana production. The cooperative’s 80 farmer-members have slightly more 
than 200 hectares in banana production. On average these producers cultivate 10 
hectares of diverse crops, including banana and pineapple, for market sale, and 
cassava, beans, and corn for household consumption.
Shortly after its founding in 1999, Guayaibi Unido managed to enter the Ar-
gentine market through a strategic alliance with the Central Paraguaya de Co-
operativas (CEPACOOP), the only central cooperative in Paraguay that groups 
smallholder cooperatives, including six other small fruit and vegetable coopera-
tives (see Echagüe, this volume, for more details on the institutional context 
for Paraguayan cooperativism). Through the intermediation of CEPACOOP, 
these small cooperatives were able to expand their markets beyond the Central 
Market of Asunción and gain access to MERCOSUR countries. Selling ba-
nanas in the international market, however, requires that the cooperative follow 
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strict quality standards, since it faces harsh competition from larger and more 
technologically sophisticated banana producers who also serve MERCOSUR 
consumers. This puts enormous pressure on cooperative members to adopt new 
production and quality-control measures.
Although Guayaibi Unido membership represents two-thirds of local ba-
nana producers, the cooperative is responsible for only 20 percent of banana 
exports from the area. Many producers are not able to place their product in 
the international market, because, as Vásquez-León points out, “even though 
everyone in Guayaibi appears to want to export, few have an understanding of 
who determines quality standards, why, and what must be done to meet those 
standards” (2010, 55). Despite the difficulties, the cooperative continues to focus 
on exports to Argentina. What explains this persistence, and what are the costs?
This question is important because it places Guayaibi Unido in a bind where 
expanding exports becomes a source of exclusion within the membership and 
thus affects the essential solidarity and reciprocity that characterize a successful 
cooperative. To understand this dilemma and its consequences, we must con-
sider larger social considerations around prestige.
hiSTorical backGround
The first wave of farmers to settle in the region of Guayaibi arrived in the early 
1970s as part of the rural colonization project implemented during the military 
dictatorship (1954–1989) of Alfredo Stroessner. Despite government promises, 
few social or structural supports were granted to these early peasant migrants. 
There were no production loans, technical training, or infrastructural improve-
ments such as paved roads or electricity. These meager conditions forced farm-
ers to focus on subsistence agriculture. It was not until marketing agents arrived 
in the zone in 1977 that farmers were able to start selling products like cotton, 
peanuts, beans, soybeans, and, later on, pineapple and bananas. The lack of pub-
lic support created a strong dependency on market intermediaries, who soon 
became the only source of financing for local producers.
Seeking alternatives to achieve some level of independence, in the early 1980s 
a group of producers in Guayaibi organized Comités Agrários, or agrarian com-
mittees. These committees, lacking any type of legal recognition, where none-
theless encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ranching (MAG) as a 
way to facilitate access to credit and enable producers to market their products 
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without an undue presence of market intermediaries. With the end of Stroess-
ner’s regime in 1989, the MAG attempted to restructure the agricultural sector 
by consolidating already existing agrarian committees into larger units. In this 
context, in 1990, the more than 190 committees in Guayaibi fused into a single 
entity, forming the Asociación de Productores de Banana y Piña del Norte (As-
sociation of Banana and Pineapple Producers of the North). As an association, 
these producers were able to obtain a sales stand in Asunción’s Central Mar-
ket. At the same time, much needed improvements in infrastructure were finally 
introduced in the region—over the following decade access to water, electric-
ity, and a paved road was consolidated. Today, the highway from San Pedro to 
Asunción connects the region to important domestic and international markets.
It soon became evident to cooperative members that legal recognition was 
imperative to access production loans. Thus, in 1997, the cooperative Guayaibi 
Poty registered as an official cooperative sanctioned by the Instituto Nacional 
de Cooperativismo (National Institute of Cooperativism), or INCOOP. How-
ever, the almost immediate emergence of internal conflicts provoked the expul-
sion of a section of its members, who readily formed the cooperative Guayaibi 
Unido. After obtaining legal recognition in 1999, Guayaibi Unido received a 
loan from the government’s Fondo de Desarrollo Campesino (Peasant De-
velopment Fund), or FDC, which allowed it to expand banana and pineapple 
production and hire an agronomist and an accountant. The FDC’s Technical 
Assistance Unit, funded by the International Fund for Agriculture, provided 
marketing assistance and leadership training from 2000 to 2005. The loan and 
training convinced members that the Guayaibi Unido leaders were capable of 
networking at different levels in order to develop a more viable commercial 
strategy. The technical assistance program was designed to develop a marketing 
strategy implemented under the umbrella of CEPACOOP. Midway through 
the project, however, a group of discontented cooperative members decided to 
separate and create the San Gabriel cooperative. They argued that Guayaibi 
Unido was favoring only one group of producers within the cooperative and 
particularly failing to fulfill its social responsibility toward those who needed 
more support in understanding the new production standards. When the pro-
gram ended, the cooperative was unable to retain the agronomist and accoun-
tant and was left without access to credit. The relationship with CEPACOOP 
thus became of paramount importance for the future of the cooperative.
CEPACOOP was created by the FDC’s Technical Assistance Unit to increase 
the resilience and marketing success of its member cooperatives by providing 
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a stronger voice in price negotiations with Argentinean buyers. CEPACOOP 
therefore played a crucial role in Guayaibi Unido’s development as a cooperative 
and its ability to transcend local markets. Nonetheless, CEPACOOP’s strategy 
is entirely focused on international marketing, which requires the maintenance 
of export-quality standards. CEPACOOP left aside broader quality of life is-
sues that are critical for the well-being of cooperative members, including mat-
ters related to social equity, solidarity, and the development of management and 
administrative skills that are essential to the functioning of the cooperative it-
self. Thus, while CEPACOOP has operated as an intermediary between Gua-
yaibi Unido and Argentinean buyers, it has not provided basic social services and 
training to cooperative members.
To harveST bananaS on a ChaCra
To appreciate the basic challenges faced by the cooperative, it is important to 
understand the process of selecting and packaging bananas destined for the 
Argentinean market. One of these challenges is the lack of basic harvesting 
and transportation infrastructure. San Pedro banana producers work chacras 
(small farms) with an average banana crop of three hectares each. Harvesting 
of bananas occurs throughout the year, although peak production takes place 
between March and August. The quantity of bananas harvested from each cha-
cra depends, first, on negotiations between CEPACOOP and Argentine buy-
ers. Cooperative managers and the production technician then set per-farm 
goals based on detailed records of maturation dates, quality requirements, and a 
fair rotation among producers. Harvesting decisions thus represent a multiscale 
process that involves all parts of the value chain.
Once the order is given by the cooperative’s leaders, the selected produc-
ers harvest a determined amount of bananas from their chacras; the next day, 
workers wash, pack, and load the bananas onto a three-ton truck. A load for 
export is equivalent to three or four three-ton trucks or 1,050 banana boxes. In 
this first stage, there are a number of factors that contribute to the final quality 
of the exported bananas. Poor road infrastructure and excessive handling of ba-
nanas can impact quality. Farmers in Guayaibi lack the overhead cable system 
commonly used to transport bananas across large plantations. High-quality ba-
nanas start bruising as they are boxed by hand, then as boxes are moved into 
the truck, and again as they are driven over several kilometers of dirt roads to 
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the cooperative. Once there, the boxes are once again moved by hand into a 
larger truck that carries them an additional 10 kilometers on dirt roads before 
reaching the highway. At the peak of the harvest season it is common to find 
loaded trucks stuck in the dense clay mud that forms on these roads after a few 
hours of rain, contributing to further bruising and delays. In addition, produc-
tion per hectare is comparatively low. As stated by the cooperative’s president, 
“In 2009 Brazil produced 70 tons of  bananas per hectare and we produced 22 tons 
per hectare. Getting 30 tons would be so great, but we have not managed to 
increase production density.” Thus, from the start, the best and “sweetest” ba-
nanas, as Guayaibi farmers proudly refer to their product, are doomed. Lack of 
advanced harvesting and transportation technologies means that these bananas 
will enter the international market as a second-rate product.
To exporT bananaS To arGenTina:  
a race aGainST Time
Exporting bananas involves a series of bureaucratic processes that essentially 
constitute a struggle against time in which the quality of bananas and their 
final presentation is further affected. This is a function of both temperature and 
the time it takes to transport the cargo. Bananas are harvested prior to reach-
ing maturity and must be transported to a temperature-regulated storeroom 
where the fruit reaches maturity under controlled conditions. This acclima-
tization process uniformly transforms a starchy, astringent fruit into the soft, 
sweet product that consumers look for in the market. From Guayaibi to the 
Paraguay-Argentina border, the banana must travel 300 kilometers to the town 
of Alberdi and an additional 1,350 kilometers from the Paraguay-Argentina 
border to the city of Buenos Aires.
Aside from the considerable distance that must be traveled in trucks that 
have no climate control, the bureaucracy at the international crossing consti-
tutes an even greater risk since trucks are forced to wait anywhere between 
24 and 48 hours at the border. This delay has to do with a two-stage, identical 
inspection process that occurs on both sides of the border. Before crossing into 
Argentina, a sample of the content of the truck is unloaded for inspection, and 
a precinto (aluminum band) is affixed to the tarp covering the truck’s load to 
indicate that the merchandise is fine and will not be altered. Once all paper-
work is completed, submitted, and approved, the truck is allowed to cross into 
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Argentina. On the Argentinean side the first precinto is cut, a sample of the 
merchandise is again unloaded for inspection, and if everything meets expecta-
tions, a second precinto is sealed around the tarp. Once all paperwork is com-
pleted, submitted, and approved, the truck is given the green light to continue 
its journey.
The placement of the second precinto significantly complicates the trans-
port of bananas in trucks that lack air-conditioning systems. The driver is for-
bidden to cut the precinto to open the tarp to regulate the temperature of the 
load according to weather conditions. For this reason, truck drivers are forced 
to take the least possible time transporting the bananas. Losing part of the load 
to overmaturation translates into lower earnings for everyone, including the 
driver. As one transportation agent put it, “Bananas are a product that won’t 
wait. It is heavily damaged at each [border] inspection and, considering it’s our 
responsibility to transport it in time and proper condition, we are constantly 
fighting for the border [crossing] to become more consistent.” When the mer-
chandise finally arrives at its destination, the importing company cuts the pre-
cinto and the banana is promptly transported to air-conditioned chambers for 
a few hours or days, then distributed to regional markets where they ripen in 
special chambers until marketed by smaller distributors.
Despite these tremendous marketing difficulties, Guayaibi Unido was able 
to increase its banana exports from only 66 tons in 2003 to around 3,000 tons 
in 2007. However, unexpected delays can have devastating consequences. This 
happened in 2007 when, as described by Vásquez-León (2010), angry Argen-
tinean banana producers, backed by local police and Argentina’s federal agency 
for agro-sanitary enforcement (SENASA), stopped banana imports from 
Guayaibi at the border, arguing that the bananas were infected with Yellow 
Sigatoka, a fungal disease. Even though all phytosanitary documents showed 
that the Guayaibi bananas were clean, the Paraguayan Ministry of Agriculture 
failed to assist Paraguayan producers in what turned out to be a political move 
to stop exports to Argentina. Without government support, Guayaibi farmers 
quickly mobilized a roadblock that lasted five hours and eventually resulted in 
the opening of the border. However, several tons of bananas were lost, farmers 
were not compensated, and Argentina ended up introducing additional regula-
tory inspections. This event contributed to the building of internal solidarity 
among cooperative members who felt proud of their ability to mobilize, but it 
also revealed the risk of heavy reliance on MERCOSUR markets.
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To compeTe in The Global banana markeT:  
The role of preSenTaTion
When the challenges to banana exports to Argentina are cast in a larger con-
text, the pervasive constraints that characterize the reality of small producers 
in Paraguay (from lack of basic infrastructure, training programs, and access 
to production loans) become even more salient. Bananas are the most widely 
marketed fruit in the world with more than 120 producing countries making 
up the global supply. In the context of MERCOSUR, the small farmers from 
Guayaibi Unido must compete with highly technified producers from Brazil 
and Ecuador. Ecuador is the largest producer of bananas in the world with close 
to 30 percent of global exports controlled by five major multinational corpora-
tions, such as Dole and Del Monte. In addition, as one Guayaibi Unido farmer 
points out, “Banana markets are so unpredictable that when there is too much 
production from other countries, prices are so low that the wooden packing 
boxes end up being more costly than the bananas that we put in them.” Para-
guayan bananas constitute only seven percent of the Argentinean market. In 
addition to competing with Ecuador and Brazil, Guayaibi Unido producers 
also compete with the Argentinean banana producers from the northern prov-
ince of Formosa, the region whose farmers staged the protests described above.
The challenges to maintaining a niche in a highly competitive international 
market are even greater when quality standards are considered. The producers 
from Guayaibi Unido proudly characterize their bananas as the sweetest in the 
Argentinean market. Nonetheless, international standards do not define qual-
ity in terms of taste but appearance. In this context, within the Argentinean 
market, Paraguayan bananas suffer a lower grading because of their appearance. 
This is a direct result of the conditions of production, harvesting, and trans-
portation in Guayaibi. In contrast, Brazilian and Ecuadorian bananas are pro-
duced, harvested, and transported by transnational corporations in plantations 
with what is internationally considered optimal technology at each step of the 
chain from production to transportation and final market sale.
Furthermore, despite the constant characterization of Guayaibi Unido as an 
export cooperative, most of the bananas produced by cooperative members are 
sold domestically in Asunción’s Central Market. Two-thirds of Guayaibi Unido’s 
members market their bananas in Asunción, because so many of them cannot 
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meet the quality standards required for export and must instead sell their ba-
nanas locally to middlemen. Despite the actual dependency on national mar-
kets, cooperative leaders emphasized that “the objective of the cooperative is to 
increase production for export and achieve better quality . . . better quality and 
more production. We will only reach that goal if fifty percent of our member-
producers achieve good-quality product on a consistent basis. Right now we are 
producing eight hundred to one thousand [20-kilogram] boxes per hectare. The 
minimum that we should be producing is fifteen hundred boxes.” Leaders also 
admit that the educational and solidarity aspects that are fundamental to the 
workings of the cooperative have been neglected. As one of the leaders stated, 
“When members see the profitability of international markets they will begin 
to see the cooperative as an enterprise that belongs to them.”
Social imaGinarieS of preSTiGe
The reigning and pervasive desire to export bananas to the Argentinean market 
is driven by more than economic incentives. To understand underlying mo-
tives, it is necessary to tap into the configuration of local imaginaries—where 
objects, actions, and people are placed along shared ideals, aspirations, and eco-
nomic need. Simple material conditions like unimproved dirt roads and the 
considerable distances between households make motorcycles a necessity for 
rural households (being by far the most effective mode of transportation in the 
region). Although motorcycles are a significant economic investment beyond 
the reach of many families, most people find a way to acquire one, perhaps even 
diverting part of a production loan. Such commodities as television sets and 
gas stoves also have great desirability for rural consumers, and the resources 
acquired to improve the productivity and quality of banana plantations are not 
always invested toward their original purpose. Moreover, when basic quality 
standards (set by CEPACOOP) are not met, the cooperative responds by lim-
iting production credit to those producers who have applied the management 
practices that guarantee quality. Such rationed credit creates friction among 
those members who feel discriminated against and those who are able to take 
advantage of the export opportunity.
The production of bananas in the region originally emerged from opportu-
nities perceived in the national market in Asunción, a market without interna-
tional quality standards. When Guayaibi Unido became part of CEPACOOP, 
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bananas traditionally destined for the national market became characterized 
as an export product for the MERCOSUR markets. This shift had a strong 
impact on the social imaginaries of the region. After all, Argentina constitutes 
the closest representation of modernity in the Paraguayan imaginary. This is a 
notion that reaches even the most remote regions of the country through the 
strong presence of Argentinean TV soap operas and the large-scale migration 
of rural youth into Argentina in search of employment. In effect, to send ba-
nanas to Argentina was desirable because it was modern.
The idea of exporting bananas to Argentina (despite the intrinsic challenge 
of competing in a market completely dominated by Brazil and Ecuador) se-
duced many producers in Guayaibi in terms of the social prestige implied by 
such an endeavor. A recurrent theme among cooperative members was “the 
pride” that resulted from exporting bananas to Argentina. The fact that small-
scale banana producers could successfully export their crops despite technolog-
ical constraints, the lack of basic infrastructure, an overburdened bureaucracy at 
the international crossing, and competitive market pressures alongside Brazil-
ian and Ecuadorian bananas signified that they were hard-working farmers no-
bly surviving against all odds. This sense of satisfaction, however, confronts the 
unyielding reality of increased vulnerability in the international market, where 
factors are often beyond the members’ control.
The most obvious solution to this paradox—product diversification—can-
not supplant this push to export, because, I argue, the desire for modernity is 
too strong a motivation. With such natural advantages such as fertile soils and 
the availability of water, a place like Guayaibi could produce a wide range of 
fruits for the national market, but the desire to establish a prestigious interna-
tional presence and thus portray the face of modernity is too attractive. It is in 
this context that the challenges faced by Guayaibi Unido as a cooperative are 
not only external (that is, the challenge of placing their products in a competi-
tive market) but also internal, in terms of social identity and the sense of pres-
tige associated with being an international player. Tackling such issues involves 
major structural and ideological changes among cooperative members.
concluSion
The success of Guayaibi Unido as an exporting cooperative has been ambigu-
ous. At this point, most cooperative members cannot meet the quality standards 
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of the Argentinean market and the competition of Brazilian and Ecuadorian 
bananas. The cooperative’s product, like that of regional Argentinean growers, 
is sold as an inferior grade at a lower price. In addition, the specific risks and 
uncertainties of exporting from Paraguay to Buenos Aires are exceedingly high, 
increasing the vulnerability of Paraguayan producers. I argue here, however, 
that the pride and prestige in “exporting bananas to Argentina” constitutes a 
critical social imaginary for Guayaibi Unido producers and underlies the co-
operative’s desire to continue expanding into this “modern” market despite the 
risks.
The actual effects of these imaginaries have greatly impacted the cooperative 
internally. They have introduced divisiveness within the membership between 
those producers who have support of the leadership and the means to produce 
an exportable product and those who do not. In other words, to become part 
of the exporting impetus of Guayaibi—as desirable as it is for everyone—is not 
something everyone in the cooperative can aspire to. As a result, two different 
types of members have emerged: a select few who take part in the exporting 
activities and those who are not able to access the social, economic, or techno-
logical resources to participate in the export market.
The experience of Guayaibi Unido exemplifies the intrinsic challenges faced 
by smallholder cooperatives seeking to strike a balance between local material 
realities and local and global expectations. This is a story where adverse material 
conditions are partially transcended by the will to fulfill larger imaginaries of 
prestige and modernization. It is sadly ironic, however, that the same banana 
proudly shipped off by this Paraguayan cooperative is received in Argentina 
as a lower-grade commodity. How the cooperative is able to overcome these 
intrinsic technical, bureaucratic, and economic constraints while maintaining a 
sense of solidarity within the membership will determine the future of both the 
extant imaginary of modernity and the sustainability of the cooperative.
O
ne Of the mOst significant prOblems affecting the Para-
guayan countryside is an ever-increasing process of out-migration. 
During the last two decades, large numbers of Paraguayan produc-
ers have left their agricultural fields in search of labor opportunities in the 
construction and manufacturing sectors in Argentina and, to a lesser degree, 
in Paraguay’s capital city of Asunción. Confronted with soil degradation and 
low prices for agricultural products, many farmers see no other option but to 
sell their land to outside investors seeking to expand industrial soy produc-
tion. In the past 20 years, the area planted in soybeans in eastern Paraguay 
has tripled, reaching over 3.5 million hectares (USDA 2015). As a result, this 
region of Paraguay is progressively losing its small farmers and its forests, 
as it becomes incorporated into what has been called the “United Soybean 
Republic” or “Soylandia.”*
In the state of Caazapá, where the Capiibary cooperative is located, the 
problems of out-migration and deforestation due to the rapid expansion of in-
dustrial soybean production are severe. Unable to compete, the young are forced 
*This refers to the five South American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Bolivia) that, through the contiguous establishment of industrial soy 
production as a technologically standardized agro-ecosystem across borders, account 
for 58.3 percent of global exports (Oliveira and Hecht 2016).
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to out-migrate, and the adults left behind are unable to carry on sustained pro-
duction, leading them to eventually sell family farms. This chapter tells the 
story of how, over the past 15 years, the Capiibary cooperative has engaged in 
a multipronged strategy to transform the rural political economy, supporting 
collective and individual action to increase the profitability and sustainability of 
small-scale farming and reduce land sales and out-migration among its 1,800 
rural members.
A central element of the cooperative’s strategy is the diversification of pro-
duction from a mostly cotton-based farming economy to an economy based on 
an estrategia agro-fruti-forestal, a strategy that combines crop production, fruit 
orchards, and forestry. In addition, this strategy integrates the household as a 
unit of production and consumption by paying attention to all phases and types 
of agricultural production, including those where women have a predominant 
role. This allows farmers to produce year-round and combines the production 
of cash and subsistence crops. By extending credit lines along with continu-
ous technical assistance and better access to reliable markets, the cooperative 
intends to reverse the rural exodus of small-scale producers and address issues 
of food insecurity and environmental degradation at the regional level. This 
case study illustrates how cooperative organization and cooperative-led devel-
opment has the potential to convert small-scale farming into a viable and stable 
source of livelihood, making farming attractive to young men and women and 
also enticing migrants to return to the countryside.
Cooperative History
The Capiibary cooperative was first established in 1988 by a group of local 
public-sector educators who needed a reliable source of credit at a reasonable 
interest rate in order to deal with the chronic economic instability caused by 
inconsistent payments from the state (see parallels with the Coronel Oviedo 
cooperative, described by Burke in this volume). Thus, in its beginnings, the 
Cooperativa de Producción Agropecuaria e Industrial Capiibary (Agricultural 
and Industrial Cooperative Capiibary) was primarily conceived as a credit and 
savings cooperative to provide assistance to urban members working as public 
functionaries in the small city of San Juan Nepomuceno, located 250 kilometers 
southeast of Asunción. Despite its being called an agricultural cooperative, for 
the first 12 years of its existence cooperative leadership tended to come from the 
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urban sector and rural members received only minor assistance to allow them 
to produce cotton for a sluggish domestic market.
From the beginning, however, Capiibary had a strong cooperative ethic and 
dedication to cooperative education. Besides developing into an important sav-
ings and credit institution at the local level, in the early 1990s the cooperative 
founded a school (kindergarten though eighth grade) for children of members 
and nonmembers, where cooperative principles of mutual aid and solidarity 
were taught alongside the standard Paraguayan curriculum. The idea behind 
the school was to expose children to the ethics of cooperativism at an early age 
and produce a new generation of cooperative leaders. In addition, one of the 
cooperative founders, a now-retired teacher, also began a cooperative education 
program, which she continues to offer. Through weekly talks and workshops, 
she recruits new members and emphasizes the importance of understanding 
the rights and responsibilities of cooperative membership. While in the past 
her talks were mostly carried out in the cooperative building, today cooperative 
educators go to rural areas upon request in order to reach agricultural produc-
ers who find it difficult to travel to town. This has been a particularly important 
strategy to bring rural women into the cooperative and to include them as pro-
ducers and economic actors. To complement the weekly talks, the cooperative 
also has a community radio station.
In addition to credit and educational programs, Capiibary provides medical 
services to its members through a clinic located within the cooperative build-
ing, including pediatrics, gynecology, dentistry, and ophthalmology, as well as 
a clinical laboratory. These services are offered by doctors hired by the coop-
erative to assist patients once a week. The cooperative also offers a “solidarity 
service” for those members who may need cash because of an unexpected emer-
gency, such as illness or death in the family.
In 2002, the cooperative changed its name to Cooperativa de Ahorro y 
Crédito, Producción y Servicios Capiibary (Savings and Credit, Production, 
and Services Cooperative Capiibary) and began to focus attention and re-
sources on its rural sector, considerably expanding support in the areas of ag-
ricultural production, extension, and marketing. Prior to that, cotton was the 
main cash crop produced not only by cooperative members but also by small 
farmers throughout Paraguay. Cotton, however, did not provide adequate in-
come nor did it contribute to food security, leading instead to a spiraling cycle 
of poverty that, at best, allowed farmers to survive when they could count on 
remittances from migrating children.
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Today the cooperative has approximately 6,000 members, which are di-
vided between an urban sector (around 70 percent of members) and a rural sec-
tor (about 30 percent). Even though most rural members are small producers 
with 10 or fewer hectares of land, there are also medium-size producers who 
own up to 150 hectares. The cooperative’s small-scale farmers have reduced the 
amount of land dedicated to cotton and are instead cultivating citrus fruits as 
cash crops. Medium producers are combining the production of citrus fruits 
with grains and forestry. The cooperative’s urban members often work as teach-
ers or own private establishments such as retail stores and restaurants in San 
Juan Nepomuceno, which has a population of around 7,000 people and is con-
sidered to be the “economic capital” of the department of Caazapá. The district 
of San Juan Nepomuceno, however, is mostly rural, with a rural population of 
about 17,000.
tHe Context of rural inequality
Caazapá has one of the highest poverty rates in Paraguay. Although the co-
operative’s small-scale producers benefit from fertile red soils, they must con-
front the challenges of living along a rapidly expanding agro-industrial frontier 
for the production of transgenic soybeans primarily by Brazilian farmers who 
have settled in Paraguay (better known as Brasiguayos) and multinational agri-
business. Caazapá, like other rural regions of eastern Paraguay, was negatively 
impacted by the Paraguayan agrarian policies of the 1970s, which favored the 
expansion of agro-industrial production of grains for export at the expense of 
small-scale farming (Galeano 2003).
The soy boom, which began in the 1990s, resulted in the gradual decimation 
of Paraguay’s Atlantic forest and the displacement of thousands of small pro-
ducers. Since then, Paraguay has become the world’s fastest-growing producer 
of soybeans and the world’s fourth-largest soy exporter (Abramson 2009). In 
2014–15, Paraguay grew 8.5 million tons of soy per year (USDA 2015) under a 
model that is incompatible with small-scale farming. Most of the soy is geneti-
cally modified and grown for export for animal feed and biofuels. The indis-
criminate use of highly toxic agrochemicals has had grave consequences for 
both environmental and human health. In addition, rapid expansion of soy cul-
tivation has required the cutting of more than 1.2 million hectares of forest. This 
has led to the dislocation of more than 100,000 small-scale producers who have 
since been forced to migrate to urban areas as a result of the loss of land and 
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water rights, resulting in a significant decline in the production of foodstuffs 
for domestic and local markets (Abramson 2009). As Oliveira and Hecht (2016, 
252) aptly put it, the soy boom in South America has “converted huge tracts of 
some the world’s most complex ecosystems, some with as many as 600 species 
per ha, into a monoculture . . . The social life of agriculture and livelihoods in 
many places has been equally depleted.”
This process of out-migration creates greater vulnerabilities for women. 
Many young women who out-migrate end up as domestic workers in Argen-
tina or Asunción, where they often suffer abuse by employers. They also earn 
less on average than men for similar work and are the first to be let go during 
economic crises. Women who have young children are either left by themselves 
while the male head of household looks for work opportunities elsewhere or 
are also forced to migrate, leaving younger children in the care of older rela-
tives. With less household income, expenditures on healthcare are usually re-
duced, further burdening women as caregivers (Floro and Pichetpongsa 2010).
In the rural districts that surround San Juan Nepomuceno, this transforma-
tion is evident. Driving across the region, it is striking to see a monotonous 
sea of soybean fields occasionally broken by tiny islands of native forest. These 
large fields of hundreds and thousands of hectares are mostly owned by Bra-
siguayos and a few wealthy Paraguayans. Although Caazapá produces only 6 per-
cent of the country’s soy, most of this production is concentrated in and around 
the district of San Juan Nepomuceno, which borders the largest soy-producing 
departments in Paraguay. At an average expansion rate of 6 percent per year 
(USDA 2015), this agro-industrial frontier continues to encroach onto the lands 
of poor Paraguayan producers and the little remaining native forest. The small 
agricultural settlements where most cooperative members live are old commu-
nities of Guaraní speakers located in the region’s rolling hills, where there are 
larger sections of forest. Some settlements are close to what remains of the 
largest extensions of Atlantic forest in the area, home of Mby’a and Guayaiki 
indigenous groups who farm corn, cassava, and yerba mate.
tHe Cooperative’s sHift
As cooperative leaders began to recognize the economic struggles of small-
scale producers and the danger posed by the relentless expansion of the agro- 
industrial frontier, both in terms of triggering the out-migration of young adults 
and precipitating the destruction of native forests, the cooperative transformed 
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its vision to incorporate a broad and bold strategy of rural development. Dur-
ing the times that we visited the cooperative between 2006 and 2008, cooper-
ative leaders and members were already implementing the cooperative’s new 
vision of becoming an agent of change in an agrarian context of deep economic 
inequality by strengthening their focus in the areas of agricultural production, 
technical assistance, and marketing.
Cooperative leaders began by encouraging producer-members to reduce 
cotton production, which in 2002 suffered a crisis due to a harsh drought com-
bined with plummeting international prices (Galeano 2003). The cooperative 
advised farmers to shift to the new agro-fruti-forestal strategy at the urging 
of the cooperative’s dedicated and charismatic agronomist, who spent several 
years in Brazil learning about what he calls “conservationist agriculture.” The 
cooperative established credit lines exclusively for agricultural producers, in-
cluding the provision of credit to women’s committees, and developed an ongo-
ing program of technical support to help farmers transition to new crops and 
technologies and eventually increase the quality and quantity of their produc-
tion. Five years after initiating the agro-fruti-forestal transition, the coopera-
tive’s 1,800 rural members were collectively cultivating a total of 1,200 hectares 
of soy, 700 hectares of maize, 300 hectares of cotton, 80 hectares of passion 
fruit, and 160 hectares of citrus (grapefruit and orange), in addition to cassava, 
corn, yerba mate, and other products for household and local consumption. Di-
versified production started to generate a stable income throughout the year, 
and in several of the homes we surveyed, young adults had returned to the re-
gion to work with their families.
tHe estrategia agro-fruti-forestal
The estrategia agro-fruti-forestal, with its three components (citrus production, 
grain production, and forestry), pairs the ecological principle of crop diversifica-
tion with the development principle of livelihood diversification, introducing 
new cash crops in order to reduce ecological stresses and assure year-round in-
come. Through its estrategia agro-fruti-forestal, the cooperative recognizes the 
importance of developing a diversified model to respond to the various needs of 
its constituency, since it represents a heterogeneous membership in which land 
ownership is highly varied in terms of quantity, soil quality, and historical use. 
After assessing soil conditions, field size, topography, and capital availability, the 
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cooperative presents each member with a custom-made agricultural package. 
This has allowed the cooperative to serve smallholders and larger producers.
In general, the cooperative encourages and assists small-scale farmers (fewer 
than 50 hectares) to invest in a diversity of citrus fruits (mainly grapefruit and 
orange) and passion fruit to allow for year-round income, while also produc-
ing subsistence crops like cassava, beans, and corn, and forest products. For ex-
ample, pairing grapefruit and passion fruit production permits a year-round 
income and multiyear planning, thereby reducing farmer indebtedness and vul-
nerability. Passion fruit matures earlier than grapefruits and can be collected 
twice a year for four to five years. Just as the yield of passion fruit starts to 
decrease, grapefruit trees reach maturity, providing an income that replaces that 
from passion fruit until a new cycle begins.
Similarly, the cooperative works to diversify production on medium-size 
farms (between 50 and 150 hectares) by combining grains, including soy and 
several varieties of corn,† with fruits that have different maturation periods and 
seasons. The cooperative also has a reforestation program that provides native 
and nonnative tree seedlings for those producers whose property has an ap-
propriate layout for forest stocks; this provides conservation benefits, wood for 
household use, and a long-term income source. In addition, through the estab-
lishment of public-private alliances and the construction of grain storage infra-
structure, the cooperative started to provide marketing options that otherwise 
would not have been available to the smallest producers of the region.
A key contributor to the growing success of the cooperative is the imple-
mentation of a technological package that the cooperative extension agents 
refer to as conservationist agriculture. This package pursues soil improvement 
and mechanization as its pillars. To improve production, farmers are trained 
in the use of green fertilizers and crop rotation, and can access credit for ma-
chinery. In order to improve the quality of the soil and prevent erosion, the 
cooperative’s technicians recommend growing green fertilizers (e.g., black oats) 
together with cash crops. These green fertilizers reduce soil erosion, fix nitro-
gen, and control the spread of weeds, which reduces farm labor requirements. 
Green fertilizers are cultivated in experimental plots in the cooperative’s green 
house. This allows the cooperative’s technicians to improve their own recom-
mendations through data collected by cooperative extension agents, and gives 
†Although soy is a legume, in Paraguay and many other parts of  Latin America it is 
described as a grain by farmers and consumers. 
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producers the opportunity to observe firsthand the recommended crops. Al-
though heavy machinery can damage soil, the cooperative’s senior technician sees 
mechanization as a necessary and unavoidable part of this technological package, 
because it allows for the development and sustenance of small-scale agricultural 
production, especially for the production of grains. At the time of our visit in 2008 
the cooperative was negotiating a new credit line to help producers buy machinery.
A second aspect of the cooperative’s strategy is to assist in the storage and 
sale of grains. Its strategy consists of closely accompanying producers from 
technical assistance in the production and harvesting phase, all the way to mar-
keting. To improve the terms of commercialization, in 2006 the cooperative 
built a silo to offer local grain producers the possibility to store their grains 
until they could command higher prices or producers needed the income. This, 
together with technical support and broader access to cooperative credit, has 
allowed Capiibary’s small farmers to enter soy production, an enterprise that 
was thought to be exclusive to wealthy large landholders.
In the midst of heated debates regarding the deleterious environmental and 
social impact of extensive soy production, Capiibary decided to support and en-
courage the production of soy by some of its largest members. Under criticism 
from environmental NGOs, cooperative leaders made a bold decision that has 
generated positive economic impacts. Cooperative extension agents, however, 
are aware of the potential environmental problems caused by irresponsible soy 
production and are working to minimize negative impacts. Through the imple-
mentation of its “conservative agriculture” approach, cooperative technicians 
are working with producers to maintain soil productivity over time and reduce 
agrochemical inputs by using green fertilizers.
Another fundamental aspect of crop diversification has been the establish-
ment, in 2003, of a public-private alliance between the cooperative and Frutika, 
a Paraguayan firm that produces fruit juice for sale in Paraguay and Europe. This 
alliance has been encouraged and supported by the GTZ (German Technical 
Cooperation) and the departmental government. Frutika was founded in 1977 
by a German immigrant family, and its factory, which continues to be run by 
the family, is located in the neighboring state of  Itapúa. Frutika encouraged the 
production of citrus and passion fruit among small-scale producers by offering 
a guaranteed market contract and reasonable prices for producers organized in 
cooperatives. Capiibary was one of the first cooperatives in the region to en-
ter into a formal agreement with Frutika. In the first year, Frutika provided the 
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cooperative with grapefruit and passion fruit seedlings, the required agricultural 
inputs, and training.
For most cooperative producers, these are new crops. However, an increas-
ing number of farmers have decided to take the risk of trying them out with the 
understanding that they would be guided along the way by the cooperative’s 
extension agent. Today, the alliance has proven to be a success, benefiting both 
the producers and the industry. On one hand, small-scale producers have a 
guaranteed market for their product and a source of steady income for most of 
the year. On the other hand, Frutika has a constant supply of fruit to maintain 
its export agreements with the European Union. Frutika perceives the Capii-
bary cooperative as a responsible organization capable of organizing indepen-
dent producers and guaranteeing the supply it needs to maintain operations. 
The downside of this partnership is that Capiibary is relying on only one buyer.
In terms of social organization, the cooperative underscored the importance 
of establishing local producer committees, especially among those working in 
fruit production. This type of social structure has proven to strengthen the ag-
ricultural sector because it facilitates the delivery of information and technical 
assistance, and creates an organic system of local collaboration and consulta-
tion (see also Burke’s chapter on Coronel Oviedo, this volume). Committees 
have their own structure but are nested within the cooperative, working in close 
contact with the cooperative’s extension agents. By working on committees, 
producers can also reduce supply, transportation, and marketing costs. For ex-
ample, producers coordinate their fruit collection schedules and share shipping 
costs to Frutika.
Emphasis on subsistence production through the support of women’s com-
mittees, particularly in the small-scale sector, has also been part of the coop-
erative’s new vision. Women have played important leadership roles in the 
cooperative’s history. Several professional women founders, like the woman in 
charge of education described above, continue to be very active. Similarly, at the 
time of our visit, the manager of the cooperative was a very dynamic and well-
respected female professional. The cooperative has been working closely with 
women committees to provide credit and training to develop viable projects, 
like community gardens, chicken and pig production for household consump-
tion and sale, and cassava production for processing into flour. It has also em-
phasized the creation of microenterprises like the sale of  bread, cheese, and jam, 
as well as support for farmers’ markets, where women play an important role.
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Finally, the estrategia agro-fruti-forestal also includes the production of 
trees. Farmers who are interested and able receive native and nonnative tree 
seedlings from the cooperative. At the time of our visit, nonnative trees like 
eucalyptus were primarily destined for household consumption, but the co-
operative was in the process of venturing into the production of yerba mate, 
eucalyptus, and native trees for the processing and sale of a variety of forest 
products. As is the case with soy production, the planting of eucalyptus trees by 
small farmers has raised eyebrows among environmental NGOs in Paraguay. 
The cooperative, however, decided to encourage eucalyptus production mainly 
for consumption as firewood, which is used for cooking in rural households.
lessons from Capiibary:  
tHe searCH for sustainability
The Capiibary cooperative, in its search for a sustainable model to empower 
small-scale producers who face devastation from ever-expanding agro-industry, 
offers a number of lessons to smallholder cooperatives elsewhere. Through the 
development of its agro-fruti-forestal strategy, it illustrates how a cooperative 
can be a learning organization with the capacity to generate and share knowl-
edge in the pursuit of long-term sustainability. Defining sustainable develop-
ment is difficult and the subject of much debate. Typically, it is defined by a 
model that balances economic, environmental, and social factors. Sustainability, 
however, can also be defined by action, by the flexibility, innovation, and adap-
tation of social and environmental systems over the long term.
As a collective organization, Capiibary has developed a strong cooperative 
ethic through its multiple cooperative education programs. This ethic comes 
from the convictions of founding members who are still active in the coopera-
tive and are primarily interested in bringing up a new generation of cooperative 
leaders with a clear understanding of the principles of mutual aid and solidarity. 
This is reflected in the cooperative’s shift from the urban sector to focus on the 
agricultural sector, even though the cooperative’s leadership has always been 
and continues to be largely urban. It is also reflected in the importance given 
to the participation of women as both cooperative leaders and rural producers. 
The inclusion of women in the cooperative’s strategy of rural development not 
only improves the resilience of women, but also the adaptive capacity of small-
holder farming households to all sorts of stressors. In addition, the importance 
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that the cooperative places on supporting young farmers in order to reduce and 
even reverse the trend of out-migration, as well as supporting rural committees, 
bodes well for the future of the cooperative’s rural sector.
The cooperative’s leadership and the charismatic extension agent are bring-
ing innovations in crop types and production systems to the region. In addi-
tion, by opening up the possibility of participation in markets from which small 
farmers have been traditionally excluded (through both the Frutika partner-
ship and soy production), Capiibary can serve as a model for other cooperatives 
seeking to establish long-term working relationships with national industries 
in order to find more secure ways to access stable markets. In that sense Capii-
bary has demonstrated its capacity to share information, respond to interests 
that go beyond the bottom line, and plan long term with the clear objective of 
reversing the trend of out-migration.
It is also an organization that is firmly rooted in the district of San Juan 
Nepomuceno, which means that it understands the predicaments that its mem-
bers are facing, and as a result, it is more likely to provide viable solutions. It 
also means that it can be held accountable in terms of its impacts on both the 
communities and the natural environment on which those communities de-
pend. The cooperative has recognized the importance of developing a diversi-
fied model to respond to the various needs of its heterogeneous constituency.
Capiibary also constitutes a rich case study that brings insight into the mean-
ing of grassroots collective sustainable development. Diversifying agriculture 
among small producers who for decades only produced cotton has required sub-
stantial investment in agricultural education and technical support through the 
implementation of a “best practices” approach, as well as (and equally important) 
through building social and economic supports to give small farmers a reason 
to be receptive to these changes. Through implementation of the technologi-
cal package it calls “conservationist agriculture,” the cooperative’s development 
strategy follows important agroecological principles of crop diversification, use 
of green fertilizers, crop rotation, soil conservation, and reforestation of native 
species. However, other aspects of Capiibary’s rural development model may be 
perceived as being at odds with the ideology of many peasants’ rights and envi-
ronmental NGOs, who expect small-scale producers to foreground environmen-
tal and social responsibility over profitability. At the heart of this disagreement 
is the cooperative’s position vis-à-vis mechanized agriculture, soy cultivation, 
and nonnative reforestation. As part of its strategy to reduce land sales by small 
producers and thus contain the expansion of the “soy republic,” Capiibary 
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encourages its members to produce soy and also to plant eucalyptus trees. In this 
context, Capiibary challenges practitioners and academics to question their own 
often romanticized notions of sustainable development among smallholders.
One of the key challenges that the Capiibary cooperative faces is the abil-
ity to go beyond its focus on sustainable economic development and begin a 
process of political engagement. The expansion of the agro-industrial frontier 
for the production of soy and the rural exodus of young adults are problems that 
impact most of Paraguay. The next step for Capiibary would be to begin to ac-
tively create a policy environment that supports its goals and strategies for rural 
development (see also Burke and Piekielek 2011). Engagement in policy discus-
sions about the role and future of the small-scale agricultural sector requires an 
organization that has robust internal cohesion, a quality that Capiibary has been 
able to foster and strengthen with its strategy of integrating small producers.
S
mallholder cooperativeS in paraguay are very heterogeneous 
organizations, as the different case studies from this section illustrate. 
In this chapter, I share my particular vision and experience, which I 
have accumulated over many years working with the smallholder Paraguayan 
cooperative sector. This experience includes seven years as the director of 
ACDI/VOCA’s Cooperative Development Program in Paraguay coordinat-
ing volunteer technical assistance for Paraguayan cooperatives, including those 
discussed in this volume. My objectives here are, first, to place these coopera-
tives within the larger institutional context of cooperativism in Paraguay and, 
second, to highlight the great difficulties facing small-producer cooperatives 
in general. My intention is to begin a dialogue conducive to the development 
of support systems that these cooperatives need in order to become indepen-
dent, long-lasting organizations, with a leadership and membership capable 
of defining and creating their own development path.
The InsTITuTIonal ConTexT  
for CooperaTIves
Coronel Oviedo, Manduvirá, Guayaibi Unido, and Capiibary are part of a 
much larger institutional context that is particularly Paraguayan. The National 
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Institute of Cooperativism, the supervising organ of cooperatives in Paraguay, 
estimates that in 2010 the number of cooperatives in Paraguay reached 982, 
with 1.24 million people associated with the cooperative sector out of a total 
population of 6.5 million. In other words, around 19 percent of the Paraguayan 
population belonged to a cooperative association, one of the highest rates of 
membership in the world. Of the total number of cooperatives in the country, 
61 percent are classified as savings and loans, 26 percent are agricultural produc-
tion cooperatives, and the remaining 13 percent cover a variety of sectors such 
as labor, medical, and transportation (Carosini 2012). Within these classifica-
tions, however, there is a particular character to Paraguayan cooperatives in that 
the vast majority are multidimensional; that is, a cooperative can simultaneously 
engage in savings and loan activities, agricultural production, industrial produc-
tion, and services. Such is the case of the Coronel Oviedo (see Burke this vol-
ume) and Capiibary (see Vásquez-León this volume), cooperatives that have a 
large urban sector and multiple productive activities.
In the case of agricultural production cooperatives, they provide an impor-
tant contribution to Paraguay’s economy, associating approximately 18,000 pro-
ducers and generating employment for at least 13,000 people (Carosini 2012). 
In addition, data from the Confederación Paraguaya de Cooperativas (CON-
PACOOP) indicate that in 2010 agricultural cooperatives generated between 
40 to 45 percent of the country’s agricultural output and more than 85 percent 
of milk and milk products, and contributed to 40 percent of the country’s ex-
ports, 18 percent of Paraguay’s GNP, and 26 percent of the agrarian GNP. This 
is significant given that soybean and beef make up 40 percent of Paraguay’s 
total exports (World Bank 2015). In addition, 24 percent of the credit issued 
within the country was provided by the cooperative sector, which also housed 
16 percent of savings (Colombo and Oxoby 2013).
Production cooperatives in Paraguay are organized into three levels: the first 
corresponds to individual cooperatives with their parallel areas of activity and 
membership; the second corresponds to central cooperatives (that group a min-
imum of three cooperatives) and confederated cooperatives (that group a mini-
mum of seven cooperatives). These, in turn, make up the alliance that represents 
the third and most encompassing organizational level of cooperatives, CON-
PACOOP. There are currently seven central cooperatives in Paraguay, which 
are represented by either savings and loan cooperatives or production coopera-
tives. Central cooperatives must provide a variety of services to affiliated coop-
eratives, including the organization of common administration services and the 
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joint use of such services; the provision of appropriate marketing mechanisms 
and the most advantageous conditions possible for acquiring required goods 
and services; and the management of support and operations finance services 
required by associates.
There are three confederations of cooperatives in the country: two savings 
and loan confederations and one confederation of production cooperatives 
(FECOPROD). Confederated cooperatives defend affiliates, coordinate ac-
tions, and reconcile differences; lend or contract technical assistance as well as 
support scientific research applied to the activities carried out by the affiliated 
cooperatives; promote the specialized education of their members; and spread 
the principles and practices of cooperativism.
Like the agricultural sector in general, Paraguay’s agricultural cooperatives 
are highly heterogeneous and can be broadly divided into (1) those coopera-
tives with a large membership, agro-industrial infrastructure, and highly so-
phisticated producers, and (2) those cooperatives that are composed of mainly 
small-scale, low-technology farmers who belong to relatively small coopera-
tives, like those discussed in this volume. Both FECOPROD and central pro-
duction cooperatives tend to be represented by highly developed production 
cooperatives that receive significant benefits from affiliation. According to the 
FECOPROD, which groups 33 cooperative organizations, large production 
cooperatives are responsible for 60 percent of livestock production in Paraguay. 
These cooperatives count among their members large soy, milk, beef, and pork 
producers. Their members are primarily Paraguayans of foreign descent, like 
the Mennonite cooperatives who settled in the Chaco region during the early 
1900s and the large cooperatives promoted during the Stroessner government 
for the marketing of soy. The 2009 annual report of the Inter-American Insti-
tute for Cooperation on Agriculture highlights that the production-based co-
operative sector in Paraguay is primarily responsible for the dynamism of the 
agro-industrial sector, as well as that of multinational agro-industrial ventures.
For their part, small-producer cooperatives are located in Paraguay’s eastern 
region. These focus on sesame, fruit, and vegetable production in the northern 
and central parts of the eastern region and on yerba mate and grains in the east-
ern and southern parts of the eastern region. The agricultural systems of these 
producers are characterized by low technology with limited use of mechaniza-
tion, little or no agricultural inputs, limited credit access, challenges in market-
ing, and low management skills. CEPACOOP, to which the Guayaibi Unido 
cooperative belongs (see Rentería-Valencia in this volume), is the only central 
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cooperative that unites a handful of small fruit and vegetable production co-
operatives. This central cooperative faces tremendous challenges in supporting 
affiliated cooperatives.
CharaCTerIsTICs of The small-produCer 
CooperaTIve seCTor
My role as a technical representative to small producers in Paraguay, especially 
in the northern region of the country, allowed me to better comprehend the 
reality and challenges of small-scale producers. The arduous, dogged work done 
by these men and women deserves to be recognized as an important way of 
life for many families in the country. Nonetheless, much needs to be done to 
improve, shore up, and strengthen small-producer agriculture and the standard 
of living it can provide.
Only a fraction of small farmers belong to a cooperative organization; and 
even though cooperatives provide important services such as savings and loans, 
not all of them provide services that specifically target improved agricultural pro-
duction, processing, and marketing. This makes it difficult to provide an accu-
rate estimate of the proportion of small producers that benefit directly as grow-
ers from cooperative membership. Nevertheless cooperative affiliation improves 
possibilities for accessing markets, getting technical and financial assistance, and 
advocating for rights and development. There is a need for small producers who 
are not part of production cooperatives to join forces and begin by forming their 
own groups or associations.
Still, the expansion of small-producer cooperatives requires an awareness 
of the variability in cooperative models. Producer cooperatives whose property 
and management are owned and run by members themselves are fundamentally 
different from the multiactivity (or multiservice) cooperatives run by profes-
sional management staff that include, for example, a livestock and agricultural 
department. In small-producer cooperatives, usually one-third of the members 
do business with their cooperative, and in Paraguay, they are called active mem-
bers. Their capital resources are minimal, for which reason they must turn to 
external sources, whether banks or public projects, to access production and 
marketing financing or links to savings and loan cooperatives. The availability 
of in-house capital is quite reduced, and the attempt to increase institutional 
capital is challenged by the membership’s overall scarcity of resources.
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These small-producer cooperatives do not have the financial ability to pay 
for the services of a professional who might exercise managerial, accounting, 
and technical assistance duties. Generally, external accountants are contracted 
for operational bookkeeping while one or more directors manage daily opera-
tions. Some of these cooperatives are also linked to the central cooperative that 
does most of the marketing work. Currently, however, the one central coopera-
tive that represents small producers does not generate sufficient resources to 
ensure its own sustainability and is highly dependent upon public subsidies.
For their members, small cooperatives provide minimal and irregular ser-
vices and are often unable to assist all members. Nonetheless, these small co-
operatives represent an important alternative for resource-scarce farmers who 
would otherwise be subject to the discretion of market intermediaries able to 
manipulate market conditions for their own benefit. Cooperatives constitute a 
meeting forum for farmers to engage in situational analysis, and as such, they 
are a valid representational organ for small producers to connect with local, de-
partmental, and central government agencies. Because, however, they are weak 
and emerging institutions, small cooperatives often lack adequate operational 
systems and processes and, as a consequence, tend to depend upon external 
support.
Where leadership in small-producer cooperatives is concerned, the people 
elected to serve in such posts normally possess a heightened spirit of volunteer 
service. Although they tend to receive some reimbursements for the costs of 
their activities in the name of the cooperative, the time they dedicate to such 
tasks is significant and comes at the expense of personal, family, and work pri-
orities. They are individuals who are recognized in their communities for their 
social awareness, honesty, academic training, and trustworthiness—all attributes 
important to effective management. These leaders are clearly committed to the 
growth of their cooperatives and the improvement of members’ quality of life, 
but for their organizations to grow, they also need a better understanding of 
basic business concepts and communication skills. In effect, small-cooperative 
leaders must often play multiple roles—manager, accountant, and secretary—
and are thus more consumed by daily tasks than involved in fulfilling the true 
functions of a cooperative director. This lack of in-house expertise also estab-
lishes a significant dependence on external agents contracted by the cooperative.
In most cases, cooperative directors have completed elementary school, and 
in some exceptional cases, ten or more years of school. They have computing 
equipment in their offices, but they remain reluctant to learn how to use it from 
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their side of the digital divide. On the other hand, the directors participate ac-
tively in the core agricultural and marketing functions of the cooperative and 
work closely with the membership. Often, they accompany goods to market, 
negotiate payment, communicate back to members, and in general make key 
decisions with external agents, such as market intermediaries, input suppliers, 
warehouse managers, trucking companies, and so forth.
There is a tendency for a limited group of individuals to concentrate power 
within the cooperative, so that they maintain control over many years. In part, 
this occurs because most members do not actively seek a director or manage-
ment position, but where there is a small circle of leaders, there is a risk that the 
group will become effectively isolated from the larger membership, creating an 
“us-and-them” environment.
Without a doubt, the membership is the motor that drives the cooperative. 
It is made up of producers who expect their representatives to do the best pos-
sible job directing and negotiating when needed, while they focus on tasks re-
lated to the management and care of their land and crops. In general, it can 
be said that members often display a weakness practicing effective cooperative 
principles. While a cooperative cannot survive without providing services and 
benefits to its membership, it is necessary that individual members understand 
the responsibilities associated with ownership, because they are in fact the own-
ers of the cooperative. In this spirit of ownership, every member must contrib-
ute to strengthening the overall cooperative enterprise. However, differences in 
socioeconomic status can foster tensions when individual members fail to meet 
their financial obligations or comply with contractual obligations regarding, for 
example, product quality. In such cases, the entire collectivity is threatened by 
the actions of individual members. Member loyalty to their organizations is 
also associated with faithful observance of cooperative principles. In order to 
market their products at the best offering price, members juggle several differ-
ent sources of information and connections to their markets. In this context, 
they can sometimes treat their organizations as one more selling alternative 
without considering that it is in fact their own business or that their actions 
determine its success or failure.
In every group, there is a diversity of people with different knowledge and 
skills. In the Paraguayan context, those people who have little formal education 
but stand out for the work they do are valued for their ka’aty knowledge—a 
Guarani term that denotes knowledge born of experience. Within the coop-
erative context, we see that most members do not have a full understanding of 
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financial or business concepts, but some stand out in terms of skills and experi-
ence. This allows them to sustain decent living standards that contrast with 
those of their neighbors.
At the level of production, the system that characterizes small-producer ac-
tivity in Paraguay is entirely dependent upon nature. The use of irrigation or 
other types of infrastructure, such as shade cloths, is very limited. Generally 
speaking, small-producer agriculture is extractive, with minimal return of nu-
trients to the land. The work that takes place on producer plots is mostly man-
ual labor. In some cases, soil preparation is carried out through mechanization, 
as is the application of insecticides, especially when it comes to banana produc-
tion. Harvesting and weed control are done manually.
It could be said that some producers are “true crop specialists.” Given that 
they are in direct contact with their land for hours every day, they know many 
aspects and characteristics of their crops firsthand, and they carry out corre-
sponding management practices as appropriate. However, very few producers 
manage their plots according to the established technical criteria for fertiliza-
tion and prevention and control of infestation and disease. Such external inputs 
represent costs to the producer and challenges for application. Sometimes, be-
cause of economic limitations or by independent decision, producers apply only 
one of the two or more recommended measures; alternatively, the application 
of these measures may be ill-timed, or the amount used below what is needed. 
In these ways, the results are not effective, which in turn generates distrust 
among producers vis-à-vis the products used. Small producers usually turn to 
government or project specialists for technical assistance, or specialists from 
commercial firms provide this support.
analyzIng The CooperaTIve seCTor:  
The CooperaTIve model for small produCers
The cooperative model was incorporated into Paraguay with the arrival of Eu-
ropean immigrants. As such, it is an extremely successful system among pro-
ducers of foreign background living in the country. Cooperativism is a model 
that may provide tremendous benefit to the thousands of small producers work-
ing in Paraguay, but it is necessary to analyze certain required aspects of its op-
eration so that the system might more effectively serve them. In fact, current 
experiences indicate that this is possible by connecting more widely developed 
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cooperatives with smaller and emerging ones. Still, if the goal is for a coopera-
tive to be completely independent and self-sufficient, members—whether they 
are regular members or directors—require training and improvement of busi-
ness management skills.
Organizational weaknesses among cooperatives and associations of tradi-
tional Paraguayan small producers appear in two main areas. First, producers are 
traditionally individualistic as a result of their lack of access to institutional sup-
port. Second, the Paraguayan educational system in rural areas tends to neglect 
students’ self-development by not including organizational, administrative, fi-
nancial, and responsive training for dealing with the realities of rural production. 
To launch a cooperative enterprise, one needs not only political will but also the 
conviction that, through this organizational model, problems affecting small pro-
ducers can be resolved. In the past, the formation of cooperatives in Paraguay 
has been promoted and encouraged based on the social benefits that coopera-
tivism generates, sidestepping another very important part of the cooperative 
experience, which is its business side and the reality that cooperative members 
are owners, users, and beneficiaries of their own businesses and must generate 
sufficient income to cover operational and service costs.
Currently, directors and members show heavy dependence on external sup-
port in the country. The future of the small cooperatives is threatened by the 
dearth of strong cooperative education and conviction among members, lack of 
sufficient financing that would permit autonomous operation, and lack of basic 
business knowledge and skills. As organizations, producers have the strength of 
their production, but they lack the organizational and commercial skills re-
quired for maintaining a successful enterprise.
Small-scale producers have their dreams but also a limited vision for their 
organization. Producers should place more value on the strengths and resources 
available and establish the groundwork for defining a clear vision and mission 
toward autonomous development of the cooperative. Given their current re-
alities, they have focused mainly on daily tasks and much less on long-term 
objectives.
The value and importance of cooperative education is fundamental to strength-
ening production cooperatives. Government programs for promoting cooperative 
education are currently lacking, particularly in the agricultural sector. Specialists 
in agricultural outreach are not necessarily experienced in cooperative training. 
For its part, the cooperative sector itself is implementing at least two support 
programs for small producers through larger cooperatives who lend them aid 
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and technical assistance. One such program is promoted by the National Insti-
tute of Cooperativism and involves assigning support professionals experienced 
in administration and marketing to small cooperatives. These, in turn, will be 
linked to cooperatives covering a wider area that will assist growers in working 
toward ultimate self-sufficiency.
Another area that greatly impacts the economy of small producers is the lack 
of supportive state policy. It is well-known that smallholder agriculture is highly 
diversified, but there is a lack of institutional support in the areas of research, 
infrastructure, and technical assistance that takes the smallholder farm into ac-
count. In the areas of marketing and administrative professionals, in Paraguay 
there is a large number of professional accountants trained to work in commer-
cial agriculture, but the availability of specialists who can work with small pro-
ducers is very limited. Such professionals must not only use the knowledge that 
comes from their formal training but also obtain an understanding of the reality 
of small producers. In other words, they must handle group and organizational 
dynamics, along with knowing the experiences of rural life. Only by doing so are 
they able to interact with producers, guided by a heightened spirit of service and 
effectiveness.
To conclude, I summarize the main challenges facing small producer coop-
eratives. First, small-producer cooperatives need to be strengthened in order 
to reduce their heavy dependence on external assistance. Second, cooperative 
education is fundamental and necessary for these small producers. Third, the 
business, financial, and administrative skills of directors and members must be 
enhanced. Fourth, the widespread availability of skilled human resources in co-
operative administration and education is crucial to this sector of agricultural 
production. And fifth, Internet and computing technologies need to be incor-
porated into the work of cooperative offices. Some of these challenges have been 
addressed in the Paraguayan case studies described here, but others require fur-
ther investigation.
As the director of ACDI/VOCA in Paraguay, I had the privilege of work-
ing with the directors, members, and staff of these cooperatives. They opened 
their organizations to us, sharing their problems and needs, showing us their 
fine human qualities, and participating in that great cooperative spirit that ex-
ists in Paraguay. Working with all cooperatives was very satisfying, but it was 
particularly gratifying to follow such worthy and important efforts like those of 
the cooperatves that are presented here—the cooperatives of Coronel Oviedo, 
Manduvirá, Guayaibi Unido, and Capiibary. The Manduvirá cooperative, as 
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explained by Vásquez-León and Gonzalez Aguilera in this volume, recently 
finished the construction of its own factory in order to extraer el oro (extract 
the gold [from their sugarcane]). In the words of  Jackie Theriot, the first volun-
teer with the Cooperative Development Program assigned to that cooperative, 
“You all are sitting on a gold mine.” These and many other cooperatives are the 
source of inspiration for envisioning the possibilities of cooperatives as true 
agents of change.




razil has always presented a development enigma. It is the 
ninth-largest economy in the world (by nominal GDP) and an eco-
nomic giant in Latin America. The country has almost 9 million square 
kilometers and a massive endowment of natural resources. Yet fully one third 
of its nearly 200 million people, and more than half the rural population, live 
beneath the international poverty line. The major development issue in Bra-
zil has been inequality—both regional inequality between north and south 
and income inequality between rich and poor. According to the 2006 World 
Development Report, Brazil is one of the most inequitable societies in the 
world—in effect, a country that continues to battle widespread poverty in the 
midst of extensive wealth.
Much of Brazil’s poverty is concentrated in the north and northeast regions 
of the country, where the economies have been based primarily on agriculture, 
fishing, and extractivism. Although Brazil’s demographic structure has shifted 
from 65 percent rural 30 years ago to 70 percent urban today, industry in the 
north and northeast has not flourished, and rural areas have experienced little 
change in agrarian structure or production technology. In sum, poverty and par-
ticularly rural poverty are major development challenges in Brazil’s northern re-
gions. This poverty contributes to and is exacerbated by massive environmental 
change of local and global consequence.
Cooperativism in Brazil
The Development Context
Timothy J . Finan
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In this context of inequality and poverty, the role of cooperativism as a 
development strategy has both historical and current significance. The prin-
ciples of cooperativism promote democracy, justice, transparency, and oppor-
tunity through association. Cooperativism in Brazil, as elsewhere in the world, 
emerged as an institution of civil society that would protect the market position 
of resource-scarce farmers and support small-scale entrepreneurship through 
force of association. Thus, cooperativism—through its institutional and legal 
strength—would combat the inequity that left large segments of the rural pop-
ulation marginalized. While the cooperative would be perceived in the market-
place as a capitalist economic entity engaged in production and exchange, it was 
perceived by the membership as a vehicle for justice and opportunity. This dual 
role for the cooperative in a development context—successful economic agent 
and agent of social justice—is what makes cooperativism both unique and chal-
lenging in stratified societies like that of Brazil.
Cooperativism in Brazil: an overview
Cooperativism in Brazil is as varied as the country itself. Most historians see the 
seeds of Brazilian cooperativism in the indigenous communities established by 
Jesuit missionaries in the early seventeenth century, a model of social collectiv-
ism that endured for 150 years. The first cooperative organized under the Roch-
dale Principles appeared in the state of Paraná in 1847, and agricultural coopera-
tives were instituted first in the state of Minas Gerais in 1907. Today in Brazil, 
there are more than 2,000 agricultural and credit cooperatives with over 2 mil-
lion members. The cooperative movement in Brazil is supported by an estab-
lished organizational structure at the national and state levels. The Organização 
das Cooperativas Brasileiras (Organization of Brazilian Cooperatives, or OCB), 
located in Brasília, represents the official face of cooperativism in the country. It 
has a strong lobbyist function and advocates for national policies favorable to co-
operative interests. Through its private foundation, SESCOOP (Serviço Nacio-
nal de Aprendizagem do Cooperativismo, the National Service for Cooperative 
Learning), OCB sponsors national programs in support of cooperativism, such 
as cooperative promotion among youth groups. State-level cooperative orga-
nizations (Organizaçãoes das Cooperativas Estaduais—OCEs) are part of the 
OCB network and also support local cooperatives with advocacy and training 
activities, although state resources tend to be limited. The local cooperatives pay 
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annual fees that help fund these national and state offices. The Ministry of Agri-
culture in Brasília has a national department of cooperativism (DENACOOP), 
which has a mission and an annual programmatic budget to foment cooperative 
development.
Thus, there has been a traditional partnership between government and the 
cooperative sector. Although the two are officially separate, they are closely in-
terlinked and, in many ways, interdependent. The Brazilian state has accepted 
the cooperative model as a legitimate mechanism of development, not only in 
agriculture but in many sectors of economic and social action. The philosophy 
of cooperativism is publicly endorsed, and cooperative institutions have received 
significant government support. At the same time, cooperatives are meant to 
provide the more vulnerable segments of society access to greater economic 
well-being and to promote social justice in ways that meet national goals. For 
their part, cooperatives understand that national policy—especially with regard 
to pricing, investment, and credit—has a vital impact on the success of their 
organizations.
While this partnership is long-standing, it is also subject to tensions. As is 
detailed in the four cooperative case studies presented in this section, there are 
times when government policies have either directly targeted cooperative in-
stitutions or indirectly supported their activities through favorable macro and 
sector-based policies. At other times, national policy decisions (e.g., tightening 
agricultural credit) have created tremendous barriers to success for cooperatives. 
Because of their weak institutional development and often precarious financial 
footing, cooperatives in the north and the northeast have been particularly sus-
ceptible to policy impacts. In these regions, it is clear that the government’s per-
ception of the role of cooperatives in regional and national development can be 
a critical variable in determining cooperative success.
The tropical rain forest and cerrado regions of  Brazil still retain a strong sense 
of the frontier. Relatively small population clusters tend to be dispersed across 
a large landscape, and local infrastructure—roads, electricity, and communica-
tions—is often inadequate. Periods of intense rainfall impede the movement 
of goods by land, especially to distant markets. In other periods, searing heat 
increases the postharvest losses of important crops. Nonindigenous human 
settlement in these regions is relatively recent, and populations of relatively re-
cent arrivals have often not quite adapted to the unique characteristics of their 
sometimes fragile environments. Technologies transferred from other regions 
often do not favor sustainable management of local natural resources. On the 
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socioeconomic side, local institutions are also young and often unstable, and 
local politics appear more volatile. Educational levels tend to be low, and there 
is only a small pool of skilled labor. Particularly, management skills are in short 
supply. Under these formidable contextual constraints, cooperatives are severely 
challenged to meet their development objectives.
Three of the four case studies presented in this section were initially selected 
to participate in this comparative study based on several criteria. First, the par-
ticipating cooperatives were relatively small and were located in areas of high 
poverty. Also, each one sought to provide their membership an alternative de-
velopment model. Second, each of the cooperatives had a strategy of economic 
improvement through greater participation in local, national, and international 
markets. Third, as stated above, three of the four cooperatives had an existing 
relationship with ACDI/VOCA, in that they had received technical assistance 
through the worldwide cooperative development program. The cooperative in 
Altamira, Pará (see Burke, this volume), was included because of its unique sta-
tus as an indigenous cooperative integrated into the international cosmetic and 
health product market. In the following case studies, key determinants of change, 
including environmental and socioeconomic context, impacts of the broad na-
tional policy, dependence on external support, and professional management, are 
examined within the historical evolution of each cooperative and broader con-
textual detail. In each, one or another determinant has had a more or less prom-
inent role in the success of the cooperative.
T
he beginnings of cooperaTivism in brazil are traced to the 
late nineteenth century in the central-south regions that were mostly 
inhabited by European migrants with an appreciation for collective 
action. Sporadic attempts to establish a cooperative institution are documen-
ted in the Brazilian states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do 
Sul, the latter being the site of the first German-inspired credit cooperative, 
brought to Brazil in 1902 by the Swiss cleric Padre Theodor Amstad and 
founded under the name Pioneira (Mladenatz 2003). Other historical exam-
ples of collective action include a cooperative for telephone workers in São 
Paulo and a consumer cooperative for public employees in Ouro Preto, Minas 
Gerais (Panzutti 1999, 2). In fact, however, these evolutionary precursors of the 
cooperative movement in Brazil lacked two essential characteristics of mod-
ern cooperativism. First, there was no body of legislation that had institution-
alized collective action and given it a formal identity. Second, early Brazilian 
cooperatives were not yet imbued with the Rochdale Principles, developed by 
the Rochdale Pioneers in the 1840s and inspired by Robert Owen, the Brit-
ish social reformer widely considered the “father of cooperativism” (Noronha 
1976, 16).
It is important to recognize that cooperativism, as we know it today, began 
as an alternative to the negative social impacts of the Industrial Revolution, in-
famous for its wretched working conditions. In Brazil, cooperativism arose first 
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in urban centers but gained its foothold in the rural areas—different from the 
British experience. From 1906 on, cooperativism became increasingly strong 
among agricultural producers, many of them immigrants from Japan, Germany, 
and Italy, where a culture of community action and collective problem-solving 
was common. These early rural cooperatives embodied the essential elements of 
the Rochdale philosophy: free and voluntary association, democratic manage-
ment, economic participation of the membership, autonomy and independence, 
training and skill building, collective action, and community well-being. These 
guiding principles gave the cooperative movement its roots and sustained pres-
ence in Brazil as in the rest of the world.
InstItutIonal FoundatIons oF  
CooperatIvIsm In BrazIl
The principles of equality and democracy differentiate the cooperative enter-
prise from private business firms, but these values carry legal challenges in a 
complex society. According to Perius (2001), Brazilian cooperativism went 
through three stages: the defining of status within the legal apparatus (1903–38), 
state interventionist phase (1938–88), and the autonomous self-management 
phase that has emerged since the Constitution of 1988. The Public Law of 1932 
(Decreto No. 22.239) established the unique character of the cooperative as a 
formal institution in Brazilian society, giving it a status sui generis for all legal 
purposes (including tax laws), a decision that is still a topic of legal debate in 
the country. During the 1990s, the government created the institutional ma-
chinery wherein the regulation of cooperatives would reside, namely, in the “de-
partments of cooperative assistance” located within the state Secretariats of 
Agriculture (Pinho 2004).
Beginning in 1938, the cooperativist movement emerged as a subject of state 
intervention for 50 years, first through the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas and 
then the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. During this latter period of 
military control, the state took direct control over the movement as a means of 
maintaining social order, especially in rural areas, and combating the perceived 
threats of Cuban revolutionary influence in the poorer rural areas. The General 
Law for Cooperativism (Lei Geral do Cooperativismo—Lei Nº 5764 /71) was 
decreed in 1971, and the National Council of Cooperativism (CNC) was intro-
duced to set norms and regulations for the sector. The CNC consisted of eight 
members representing different sectors of government and was presided over by 
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the minister of agriculture. It created a national registry of cooperatives and set 
all policies and regulations by which cooperatives could operate. With the end 
of military control in Brazil, a new constitution was ratified in 1988 and remains 
in place today. Under the constitution, the CNC was disbanded and many of 
the articles of the Lei Geral were repealed, but the 1971 legislation itself has re-
mained in place.
the organIzatIon oF BrazIlIan  
CooperatIves (oCB)
Inspired by cooperative leadership in the country, the Organization of Brazil-
ian Cooperatives (Organização das Cooperativas Brasileiras—OCB) emerged 
in 1969 from the consolidation of two large representative bodies from the co-
operative sector. Its mission was, and continues to be, providing technical sup-
port to individual cooperatives and the political defense of sector interests at 
the judicial, legislative, and executive levels of government. According to law, 
OCB is the formal public representative of the national cooperative system, 
although its status is that of a civil society entity.*
A major mission of OCB is to lobby Congress in support of  legislation fa-
vorable to the cooperative sector. In 1986, during the constitutional congress that 
wrote the new constitution, a parliamentary caucus of senators and represen-
tatives supportive of the cooperative movement was formed. Called the Frente 
Parlamentar do Cooperativismo (Frencoop), it introduced language into the 
constitution that established the autonomy and independence of Brazilian 
cooperatives. Under this legislation, any group is free to establish a coopera-
tive without any state authorization and without any state intervention in its 
*in verbis: “Art. 105. A representação do sistema cooperativista nacional cabe à 
Organização das Cooperativas Brasileiras—OCB, sociedade civil, com sede na Capi-
tal Federal, órgão técnico-consultivo do Governo estruturado nos termos desta Lei, 
sem finalidade lucrativa, competindo-lhe (. . .) § 1º A Organização das Cooperativas 
Brasileiras—OCB será constituída de entidades, uma para cada Estado, Território e 
Distrito Federal, criadas com as mesmas características da organização nacional” (Lei 
5764/71, Art. 105). [The representation of the national cooperative system belongs to 
the Organization of Brazilian Cooperatives—OCB, a civil society nonprofit organiza-
tion, headquartered in the Federal District and a technical and advisory body to the 
government according to the terms of this law . . . the OCB network will be consti-
tuted of entities located in each state and territory and in the Federal District, created 
with the same characteristics as the national organization” (Law 5764/71, Art. 105).]
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management. Following the ratification of the constitution, the influence of 
Frencoop was neutralized during a 10-year period but then resuscitated un-
der President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1996, and Frencoop now has 
238 mem bers, including 215 congressional representatives and 23 senators, rep-
resenting every state in the country and all major political parties. Frencoop is 
a major political force in the defense of cooperativism in Brazil and a close ally 
of OCB.
In contrast to the tenor of cooperative legislation in the United States, 
which favors flexibility, the Brazilian legislation authorizing cooperative insti-
tutions permits only a single organizational model (Bialoskorski 2004, 16–17) 
and is generally insensitive to differences in type of cooperative and local con-
textual realities. OCB helped write new legislation, submitted in 2007 as a sub-
stitute of the General Law No. 5764/71, but the law has remained deadlocked 
in Congress. Several pieces of legislation promoted by OCB and supported by 
Frencoop have been approved in recent years, such as a 2009 law creating the 
National System of Cooperative Credit. Other legislative efforts have focused 
on tax laws involving cooperative activity and the division of annual gains.
In accordance with current law, there are 27 state entities divided into five 
regions that make up the OCB system. They are known as OCEs (Organização 
de Cooperativas Estaduais—State Cooperative Organizations), and together 
they account for 7,261 cooperatives with a membership of  8.2 million and almost 
249,000 employees (see table 8.1). The cooperatives pay annual dues to support 
the OCB.
These numbers reveal a clear pattern of regional variability in the influence 
of cooperativism accross the country. The south accounts for 18 percent of all 
the cooperatives and 38 percent of all the membership in Brazil, which reflects 
the historical influx of post–World War II farmers from Europe bringing with 
them a tradition of collective action. The southeast of Brazil, including the 
states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, and Minas Gerais, accounts 
for 37 percent of all cooperatives and 50 percent of membership. In part, the 
predominance of cooperativism in this region has historical roots in the im-
migration of  Japanese workers bound for the coffee plantations in São Paulo. 
From the 1890s to the late 1930s, over 600,000 Japanese landed in Brazil, and 
the majority soon abandoned the harsh life in the coffee fields to occupy the 
then-frontier regions where they became independent farmers. Perhaps due to 
their cultural isolation, these farmers routinely formed agricultural coopera-
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The nine states of the northeast region, on the other hand, did not experi-
ence the contribution of European or Japanese immigrants. This region has a 
large number of cooperatives (25 percent of the total) as the result of a state-led 
effort to expand cooperatives in the 1970s in response to a perceived Cuban 
threat, but cooperative membership is only around 5 percent. The poor accep-
tance of cooperativism in the region is partly due to its imposition by the state, 
the lack of a tradition of collective action, and underlying socioeconomic con-
ditions. The northeast is the poorest region of the country and is characterized 
by a semiarid environment subject to severe and frequent droughts. Until the 
last 40 years, the majority of the population lived in rural areas and made their 
living from rain-fed agriculture and livestock ranching, even though the region 
offers limited conditions for a vibrant agricultural economy. One of the case 
studies in this volume (Barros) focuses on a cooperative in the northeast state 
of Ceará.
The seven states of the north, whose combined territory includes the ma-
jority of Brazil’s Amazon rain forest, also have a weak cooperative tradition. 
Together they account for 10 percent of the cooperatives but only one percent 
of total membership. Nonetheless, the underlying potential of the region’s re-
source base provides a motive for successful collective action. The region has 
the opportunity to lead in sustainable development strategies for fragile ecosys-
tems, and cooperatives have a role to play in this process. In this volume, three 
case studies focus on cooperatives from the Amazonian north.
ImpaCts oF CooperatIvIsm
Cooperatives have a presence in 1,700 municípios of Brazil, around one third of 
the total.† Although agricultural cooperatives have dominated the sector his-
torically, Brazil classifies 13 types of cooperatives by economic activity, includ-
ing credit cooperatives (3.5 million members), consumer cooperatives (2.3 mil-
lion), infrastructure cooperatives (716,000), labor cooperatives (261,000), health 
cooperatives (226,000), housing cooperatives (110,000), and so forth. There are 
1,615 agricultural cooperatives, with 942,000 members and 138,000 employees. 
†In the Brazilian politico-administrative system, the município is the lowest level 
of administration and is led by an elected official (a prefeito) and a municipal council 
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In recent years, however, there has been a resurgence of urban labor and credit 
cooperatives. Overall, in 2009, the cooperative sector generated $44 billion in 
economic activity, including $3.5 billion in exports, primarily of the agricultural 
commodities sugar, ethanol, soy beans, and coffee. A study conducted by the 
United Nations Development Program suggests that cooperatives bring bene-
fits at the local, município level. Using the Human Development Index as an in-
dicator, those municípios with cooperatives scored consistently higher by about 
4 percent (see table 8.2). It is possible to conclude that these differences are due 
to the higher salary levels, the valued-added of local agricultural commodities, 
the regular supply of inputs and services, and the lower interest rates from coop-
erative financing. In effect, the flow of resources to cooperatives brings benefits 
both to the membership and to the local community through various multiplier 
effects.
the servIço naCIonal de aprendIzagem  
do CooperatIvIsmo (sesCoop)
SESCOOP is an agency within the national cooperative movement created in 
1998 under Provisional Law 1.715 and regulated under Decree Nº 3.017, which 
provides broad professional and technical support to cooperatives and leads the 
national effort in cooperative awareness and education. SESCOOP has local 
offices in 27 states and in the Federal District, with a central office in Brasília. If 
OCB is more the political arm of cooperativism in Brazil, SESCOOP provides 
a wide range of services to local cooperatives seeking to expand the reach of 
cooperative action through education, social assistance, and technical assistance 
to member cooperatives. In this sense, SESCOOP fills an important gap by 
offering training to managers and members, cooperative education, and direct 
monitoring of local cooperative progress.
It is characteristic of Brazilian cooperatives that a member of the governing 
board (an elected position) is also the cooperative manager. While in U.S. and 
European cooperatives the management of the organization is the responsibil-
ity of trained professional managers who carry out the policy decisions of the 
board, Brazilian cooperative managers are usually not professionals trained in 
business and cooperative principles. Thus, the main challenge of SESCOOP is 
to provide the needed professional training and to encourage the separation of 
decision making and management.
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gloBal partnershIps In  
BrazIlIan CooperatIvIsm
OCB and SESCOOP also promote partnerships that bring member coopera-
tives into wider international networks. One example has been the lasting part-
nership with the nonprofit organization ACDI/VOCA, which uses volunteer 
technical advisors to share the experience of North American cooperatives with 
local counterparts in Brazil, especially those in the north and the northeast. This 
relationship began in 1973 based on a request for assistance from the Secretariat 
of Agriculture of the state of Minas Gerais. At the same time, a program of 
cooperative assistance was created in collaboration with the state extension ser-
vices, and OCB covered the office costs of ACDI/VOCA during the period 
between 1995 and 2007. Under this partnership, 186 technical assistance missions 
were carried out from 1973 to 2007, most of them in the north and northeast 
regions.
As part of its global strategy, OCB is an active participant in OCPLP (the 
Organization of Cooperatives for People of the Portuguese Language) and 
RECM (the Special Conference of Cooperatives of the MERCOSUL). The 
OCPLP is located in Lisbon and joins the eight Portuguese-speaking countries 
in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe in a common effort to support coop-
erativism. For its part, RECM is part of the MERCOSUL common economic 
zone and consists of cooperative organizations from Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
and Argentina as permanent members, while Venezuela is pursing membership 
and Chile and Bolivia are formal observers. Since 1988, OCB is also a member 
of the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), the most important interna-
tional representative of the cooperative movement. Roberto Rodrigues, president 
of the OCB from 1985 to 1991, is the only non-European leader to ever head the 
ICA (from 1999 to 2001). The current OCB president is also the vice president 
of the regional ICA for the Americas.
ConClusIon
The Brazilian cooperative movement has gone through a dynamic process of 
development, expansion, and adjustment to the broader realities of Brazilian 
society and economy. Much of this process has involved creating independence 
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from the state while using state resources to enhance professionalism of the 
sector, not only in terms of cooperative management but also in terms of com-
mercial activities. The challenge is to create a sustainable and viable economic 
enterprise that can compete in a modernized Brazil. Cooperativism has also 
accompanied the demographic transformation of Brazil into an urban society, 
and the number of urban-based cooperatives has risen rapidly. As it adjusts 
to the flow of history, Brazilian cooperativism now occupies an increasingly 
important role in the development process. Its challenge is to lead the drive 
toward economic, social, and environmental sustainability into the twenty-first 
century while upholding and enhancing the principles that set cooperativism 
apart.
O
ne Of the best-knOwn agricultural cOOperatives in 
La tin America is CAMTA (Cooperativa Mista Agrícola de Tomé-
Açu, or the Mixed Agricultural Cooperative of  Tomé-Açu), located in 
the município of  Tomé-Açu in the state of  Pará, Brazil. Its reputation de rives 
from its unique origins, its success in the face of multiple obstacles—both 
economic and political—and its vision of discovering a sustainable agricul-
tural model for a fragile tropical environment. The story of CAMTA has been 
retold multiple times in print and film, in both academia and in global com-
merce. In 1929, a few dozen Japanese immigrant families eschewed the rela-
tive comforts of a new home in São Paulo (in the south) and departed on the 
adventure of settling virgin rain forest along a river about 260 kilometers from 
the state capital of Belém in the north of Brazil. Through periods of boom and 
bust, this colónia of Japanese farmers created a cooperative built on a base of 
social capital and identity, and today CAMTA is the Amazon’s largest exporter 
of tropical fruit pulp.
In contrast to failed attempts to exploit the fabled forest wealth (e.g., Ja-
rilândia and Fordlândia),* CAMTA has created a sustainable agroforestry 
*For Jarilândia, see Jordan and Russell (1989); for Fordlândia, see Grandin (2010). 
Both these undertakings were massive in scale and now lie as witness to the hubris of 
humankind.
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model that mimics the diversity of the ecosystem while producing economic 
benefits to farmers. As the managing director of CAMTA has stated in inter-
views, the history of CAMTA is interwoven with the history of the Japanese 
immigrant members. This chapter explores that history with a focus on how 
essential Japanese values forged a shared vision of sustainability and continuity 
among the CAMTA membership, thus strengthening the cooperative as a local 
economic institution. As the cooperative prospered, it increased the range of 
noneconomic services provided to its membership, including health, education, 
access to commerce, and cultural events, thus reinforcing the close linkage of 
local identity, welfare, and the success of the cooperative. At the same time, this 
chapter derives from the CAMTA story a lesson in adaptiveness and resilience 
in the face of internal and external stresses. This chapter is based in part on 
field research, including interviews, member livelihood surveys, and observa-
tions, conducted by the authors in the summers of 2005 and 2009. Methods 
and results from a survey of cooperative members’ livelihoods are reported in 
Piekielek (2010).
CAMTA: Origins
It is difficult to imagine the range of emotions of those first 43 immigrant fami-
lies when they disembarked at the edge of the Acará-Mirim River to open up 
virgin rain forest that had been negotiated for them by the Companhia Nipônica 
de Plantações do Brasil ( Japanese Plantation Company).† Each family received 
a plot of 25 hectares for which annual payments were made (Piekielek 2010; 
Tafner and Silva 2010). At the urging of the company, the first immigrants 
planted cocoa as a cash crop and rice and vegetables for home consumption. 
In 1931, the colony formed a cooperativa de hortaliças (vegetable cooperative) to 
market produce in the city of  Belém, 12 to 18 hours away by boat. The consum-
ing population of Belém had neither refrigeration nor a tradition of  vegetables 
in their diet, thus this venture encountered many difficulties.
†In fact, the company, known as Nantaku—its Japanese acronym—was a private 
firm subsidized by the Japanese government but motivated by the potential profits 
from colonization. Nantaku provided technical and marketing assistance to the early 
settlers but always with an eye toward reward (Tafner and Silva 2010).
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The gargantuan task of clearing the rain forest and the low return to this 
labor were further exacerbated by the incidence of malaria, which was wide-
spread and caused many deaths among the early settlers. Subsequent ships ar-
rived with their immigrants, but the difficulties of life in the rain forest be-
gan to dissipate the initial hope and enthusiasm, and many immigrants ended 
up leaving the region for São Paulo or elsewhere (Tafner and Silva 2010, 129). 
Nonetheless, between 1929 and 1937, 21 ships arrived at the settlement carrying 
a total of 361 families.
In the context of the worsening economic situation, tensions arose between 
the company and the early settlers, particularly regarding the 30 percent of all 
production that the company exacted. The company abandoned Tomé-Açu, 
and the settlers assumed all responsibility (and decision making) for their well-
being. With the fall of the formal settlement system, there was widespread 
abandonment of the region, and only 98 Japanese families remained in Tomé-
Açu in 1942.‡ A key binding factor that formed the core of this diminished 
community was the cooperative. A vegetable market had been gradually cre-
ated in Belém, and the cooperative members began to expand the diversity of 
marketed crops to the point that the vegetable cooperative was renamed the 
Cooperativa Agrícola do Acará (Agricultural Cooperative of Acará). Increas-
ingly, according to interviews with CAMTA leaders, the cooperative and the 
community became indistinguishable.§
FrOM BlACk gOld TO AçAí
In 1942, Brazil entered World War II on the side of the Allies, and all Japanese 
immigrants in the Amazon were confined to Tomé-Açu, which was converted 
into an internment camp. The Cooperativa do Acará was taken over by the Bra-
zilian government and turned into the administrative arm overseeing the camp 
residents. In effect, the cooperative was made a state monopoly (called CETA, 
‡During this time period, 288 families, accounting for around 1,600 people, left the 
region (Tafner and Silva 2010, 133).
§In interviews in 2005, older cooperative members often did not distinguish between 
the cooperative and other community organizations, attributing to the cooperative a range 
of benefits and projects that were sponsored by other Japanese immigrant com munity 
organizations. 
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Companhia Estadual de Tomé-Açu) with total control of local economic activ-
ity. At the end of the war, the camp was dissolved and the immigrants pressured 
the state to return their cooperative. In a show of great solidarity, the Japanese 
community built its own motorized boat to resume its marketing activities to 
Belém. This demonstration of independence reinforced the value of collective 
action among the remaining families of this tight-knit community.
In 1933, the fourth ship carrying immigrants to the Amazon stopped in Sin-
gapore to bury a passenger who had died, and one of the immigrants, Makinos-
suke Ussui, acquired a small number of black pepper plants (Piper nigrum L.) 
and planted them in an experimental field station run by the cooperative. At the 
end of the war, black pepper was increasing in value and importance, and the 
Japanese farmers of  Tomé-Açu were incorporating more of this cultigen into 
their fields. The community, bolstered by signs of economic improvement, met 
regularly to discuss the creation of a new cooperative, but this time a coopera-
tive that was officially recognized by the Brazilian government and complied 
with existing cooperative legislation. In 1949, CAMTA was officially founded 
under the management of  young community leaders who brought both a sense 
of history and tradition and a vision for a future of greater inclusion in the na-
tional and global context. Since its inception, the cooperative has been run dem-
ocratically, on a one member, one vote model, with management elected from 
the member base.
According to Homma (2004), the decades of the 1950s and ’60s created an 
economic windfall for the CAMTA community. With the wartime destruction 
of pepper vines in Southeast Asia, the price of black /white pepper grew expo-
nentially, from $220 per metric ton in 1945 to over $3,000 per metric ton in 1950 
(Tafner and Silva 2010, 140). One issei elder from the community told us in 
2009 that his large house had been built with pepper revenues and that, during 
this boom period, each ton of pepper purchased a truck. Tomé-Açu became the 
largest exporting region of black pepper in Latin America and provided up to 
5 percent of the global supply. CAMTA exported the pepper of its member-
ship, and the cooperative increased its economic prowess in the município of 
Tomé-Açu, whose population rapidly grew with the arrival of non-Japanese 
Brazilians in search of  work and economic opportunity.
The confluence of CAMTA and community was manifest during these 
“golden years” (roughly 1950 to 1970) in the large investment in quality of  life for 
the membership. CAMTA built a hospital, a malaria eradication clinic, schools, 
and a cultural association in which community solidarity based on shared 
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Japanese immigrant identity was reinforced and celebrated. The cooperative 
also opened and managed businesses to support members, such as a general 
store, agricultural supply store, and gas station. Later, a golf course and base-
ball stadium were built in the rain forest for leisure pursuits that are uniquely 
Japanese. In this sense, the cooperative penetrated multiple aspects of everyday 
life, and the activities of CAMTA and those of the immigrant community be-
came virtually seamless. Of equal importance, these projects benefited a range 
of members across income brackets.
The pepper boom ushered in a period of technological change among the 
producing community. Farmers adopted the widespread use of chemical fertil-
izers and other inputs, and many moved toward a pepper monoculture. In the 
1970s, a fungus, Fusarium solani, began to devastate large plantations of pepper 
vines, and with large fluctuations in the global pepper price and increasingly 
rampant inflation (affecting currency exchange rates), pepper producers began 
to experience financial crisis. CAMTA had received regular technical and finan-
cial assistance from the Japanese Emigration Services, which later became part 
of JICA (the Japanese International Cooperation Agency). With technical sup-
port from JICA, the cooperative sought to devise alternatives to a pepper mono-
culture, and many CAMTA members adopted cocoa (Theobroma cacao) into their 
production systems (Saes et al. 2014).
A further push toward diversification occurred with the commercial adop-
tion of cupuaçu (Theobroma grandiflorum), a tropical relative of the cocoa family, 
introduced by CAMTA pioneer Katsutoshi Watanabe in the 1980s (Homma 
et al. 2014). At the same time, with financing from JICA, a fruit pulp plant 
was established under the management of a new cooperative called ASFATA 
(Associação de Fomento de Tomé-Açu, or the Tomé-Açu Development As-
sociation), with this membership being nearly identical with that of CAMTA 
(Piekielek 2010). The fruit pulp factory began to supply a wide range of fruit 
juice products to the Brazilian domestic market. In 1991, CAMTA purchased 
the fruit processing plant, disbanded ASFATA, and borrowed funds from JICA 
to expand the cold storage capacity. CAMTA producers began to produce a 
wide range of fruits, such as melon (Cucumis melo), papaya (Carica papaya), pas-
sion fruit (Passiflora edulis), pineapple, guava, and the “tropical cherry,” acerola 
(Malpighia glabra L.).
Despite CAMTA’s promotion of diversification, members still relied heavily 
on black pepper, the price of  which fluctuated widely. As Brazil entered a pe-
riod of hyperinflation and severe credit constriction in the 1990s, the coop-
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erative experienced a major crisis. It was laden with debt, and the value of its 
stocks was declining due to low global prices and domestic inflation. The crisis 
precipitated a change in cooperative management and an emergency meeting 
of the new directorship to determine if CAMTA should disband.** The new 
CAMTA leaders decided to sell their stored inventory, to divest many of their 
holdings (the supermarket, gas station, supply store, outlets in São Paulo, etc.) 
and to ask the membership to come up with funds, in cash, to cover the rest of 
the debt. In a show of solidarity and trust, the membership accepted this deci-
sion, and the cooperative continued its operations under a new, austere set of 
conditions.
This time, however, shifts in the economic environment brought luck to 
CAMTA. In 1987, JICA had provided financing for rural electrification. Now 
this credit was used to construct the infrastructure necessary to connect co-
operative members to the grid, which was supplied by the public state energy 
company. A cooperative, COERTA (Cooperativa de Electrificação Rural de 
Tomé-Açu, or the Tomé-Açu Rural Electrification Cooperative),†† managed 
the electrification project, and then sold the infrastructure to the state com-
pany in exchange for shares that were virtually valueless. Then, in the 1990s, 
the national neoliberal trend in Brazil was to privatize much of the economy, 
including the energy sector. The Pará state energy company put its stock on the 
market, but only to those who owned shares in the company. COERTA, as a 
shareholder, saw the value of its stock explode upward and auctioned shares off 
for more than $3 million. This capital was made available to CAMTA, which 
used the money to construct and equip a new fruit processing plant with a pro-
duction capacity of 5,000 tons of fruit products (Piekielek 2010, 19). In effect, 
CAMTA institutionalized its commitment to diversification at both the pro-
duction and marketing levels.
This shift toward a diversified product range is embodied in CAMTA’s re-
sponse to the rapidly growing market for açai (Euterpe oleracea), a globally popu-
lar palm fruit native to the Amazon and known for its health-enhancing char-
acteristics. Açai trees produce twice a year but only starting in the third year 
of growth, and optimal harvests are not achieved until the sixth year; thus, it 
is a longer-term investment on the part of farmers. Native stands of açai are 
**It is important to note that at this time, several large Japanese cooperatives failed 
and were shut down, including the iconic Cotia cooperative in São Paulo.
††Again, the membership of COERTA was mostly identical with that of CAMTA.
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found throughout Amazonia where soil and moisture conditions are favorable. 
The small purple drupe (fruit) forms in clusters at the top of the palm, and 
their harvest by hand requires climbing the trunk. Of critical importance, the 
fruit requires processing within 24 hours of harvest, more easily facilitated by 
the cooperative’s local fruit-processing plant. CAMTA has acquired an organic 
seal for its açai and has become a recognized national and international sup-
plier. In 2007, açai accounted for more than half (57 percent) of the cooperative’s 
total fruit pulp sales, with most being exported to the United States and Japan 
(Tafner Jr. and Silva 2010, 149). More recently, the cooperative partnered with 
a chocolate producer in Japan to produce fine-quality cocoa beans. After mak-
ing improvements in fermentation, CAMTA received the International Cocoa 
Award in 2010, and a quarter of the cooperative’s cocoa beans went to produce 
premium chocolate in Japan (Saes et al 2014). The açai and cocoa stories ex-
emplify CAMTA’s ability to reconcile production challenges with expanding 
markets.
susTAinABiliTy in A rAin FOresT
Sustainability is a complex concept that can assume various dimensions. It im-
plies a record of success through time without reduction in the means of that 
success. Thus, there are economic, environmental, and quality-of-life compo-
nents that make a social-economic-ecological system sustainable. In this more 
complex sense of the concept, the role of CAMTA in discovering a sustainable 
coexistence with an essentially fragile ecosystem is a core message of this chap-
ter. We propose that sustainability should be assessed from a long-term per-
spec tive of institutional, environmental, and cultural continuity.
Institutional continuity is closely related to economic success. In 2009, 
CAMTA had approximately 135 members (up from 113 in 2005), 75 percent of 
whom were of Japanese descent. Its diverse operation maintains a receiving 
warehouse and marketing infrastructure for black pepper, cocoa, and cupuaçu. 
The black pepper is cleaned, classified, and sacked for export, while the cocoa 
and cupuaçu yield multiple commercial products, including pulp, beans, and 
butter from crushed beans. CAMTA is also considering the production of a 
chocolate made from cupuaçu (called “cupu-late” in Portuguese). The fruit pulp 
processing plant has 14 fruit products and in 2009 produced 3,500 tons of fruit 
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pulp, about 70 percent of capacity. In 2007, the sales of fruit pulp represented 
around two-thirds of the total revenue flow of the cooperative.
The constraining factor to achieving full capacity in the pulp operation is 
the availability of quality raw material. The rural population of  Tomé-Açu and 
neighboring municípios has expanded with the economic growth associated with 
CAMTA; however, in contrast to the relatively wealthy and technologically so-
phisticated CAMTA membership, most regional farmers practice a small-scale, 
low-input agriculture and are resource-scarce. Whereas the CAMTA member-
ship has not been able to fulfill the demand for the range and quantity of fruits 
processed in the plant, the small-farm sector does not possess the resources and 
the technology necessary to provide a steady and reliable flow of quality raw ma-
terial (Homma et al. 2014). Thus, the institutional challenge is to engage an am-
bitious strategy of technology transfer to integrate potential producers into the 
stream of products to the cooperative.
The CAMTA management is well aware of the historical struggles to achieve 
a viable institutional presence, and the role of technology adoption has always 
been recognized and valued. The cooperative has provided a research and devel-
opment capacity from the time that the first pepper vines arrived from Singa-
pore. This openness to new knowledge from whatever the source has been a key 
mark of the CAMTA approach. Since the establishment of the processing plant, 
the cooperative has created a rural extension sector that works with associations 
of small producers in the neighboring regions, and CAMTA members provide 
regular technical assistance to these associations. Interviews in 2009 with one 
specific association, the Associação da Quarta Região (Fourth Region Associa-
tion), revealed that CAMTA had played a major technical and organizational 
role in transforming the production capacity of the group. CAMTA manage-
ment’s strategy is to invite the associations to become institutional members of 
the cooperative once a certain level of technical expertise has been achieved. It 
appears clear that the institutional sustainability and economic growth of the 
cooperative will depend upon the ability to incorporate a wide swath of produc-
ers into its supply catchment area, and that this process will in turn spread the 
benefits of the cooperative.
The second area of sustainability is environmental. Early in the history of the 
cooperative, one of its prominent members, Noboru Sakaguchi, who had stud-
ied agriculture in Tokyo, was inspired by the boat trip from Tomé-Açu along 
the Acará River through the rain forest to Belém. He noticed the riverbank 
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farmsteads with many different species of trees, bushes, and plants all mixed 
in the same garden (Yamada 1999). He observed that there were always some 
species in production throughout the year and wondered if this diversification 
strategy could serve as a wider model of land use in the Amazon rain forest. 
Sakaguchi is credited as one of the pioneers of what is call the “agroforestry sys-
tem” (SAF—Sistema Agroflorestal), a land-use system developed by coopera-
tive members and now a focus of intense global interest (Yamada and Osaqui 
2006; Yamada and Gholtz 2002a, 2002b; Porro et al. 2012).
The SAF, in contrast to the black pepper monoculture, features a crop mix of 
long-growing (and prized) timber species, many of  which were cleared in the 
earlier occupation of the rain forest, with annual producers (once mature) açai, 
cocoa, and cupuaçu, along with papaya, acerola, passion fruit, banana, melon, 
and other fruits. The planting and growth sequence mimics that of rain forest 
progression from herbaceous communities to arboreal ones (Bolfe and Batistella 
2011). We interviewed farmers who planted pepper vines and passion fruit in a 
cleared field, then interplanted species such as cocoa and cupuaçu between the 
rows, then interspersed the “noble” timber varieties (mahogany, ipé, andiroba, 
cedro, etc.) and Brazil nut throughout the field. This system produces an income 
stream in two to three years and continues producing up to 30 or more years 
when the timber species are ready for harvest.
There is great variability within the SAFs themselves, and Bolfe and Ba-
tistella (2001) have characterized four SAFs in terms of their cover structure and 
productivity. Yamada’s 1999 study describes the diversity of the SAFs in Tomé- 
Açu as follows:
The crop species comprising these systems included three perennial vine species, 
four species of shade trees, 33 fruit tree species, 68 MPT species and numerous 
vegetable, herb, grain, tuber and green manure species. Over 300 different poly-
cultural combinations of 70 species, 90 percent of which are trees, were docu-
mented in the main production fields (excluding home gardens) of  Tomé-Açu 
farmers. (Cited in Yamada and Gholz 2002, 18)
There is widespread consensus that these SAFs are environmentally sustain-
able, and, in fact, the CAMTA model has been disseminated around the world 
in person, print, and film. It is important, however, to acknowledge that the 
SAF is not a “natural” system but one designed and managed by humans. In this 
case, we ask what incentives exist for a middle-aged farmer to plant a species, 
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such as mahogany or even Brazil nut, that yields financial returns only after 
30 years. In this regard, the underlying values attached to sustainability become 
the focus of analysis. In interviews with CAMTA members in 2009, the Japa-
nese concept of atotori arose repeatedly. In Japanese family structure, the atotori 
is the successor, the one that carries on a family tradition and protects and cares 
for the family legacy (Kitaoji 1971).
In Tomé-Açu during the 1990s, many nissei young adults left Brazil to take 
manual jobs in Japan in order to accumulate capital.‡‡ In 1993, Paulo Gustavo 
reported that, of 1,300 Japanese immigrant descendants from Tomé-Açu, 400 
were in Japan. Despite the long-standing formal and informal ties with Japan, 
the return migration has been mostly temporary. There is great commitment to 
maintaining the legacies created by fathers and grandfathers. Children know 
that they will benefit from the timber investment made by their fathers—plan-
tations of mahogany, Brazil nuts, and other slow-growth timbers—and they, in 
turn, will plant more for their children. During interviews, several older mem-
bers spontaneously shared the importance of passing on their knowledge to 
future generations, especially through the cooperative and its youth programs. 
CAMTA has a very active youth association and supports a wide range of 
mixed cultural activities, from baseball to São João celebrations,§§ all reinforc-
ing a sense of community and the importance of atotori. In an interview, one 
member of the youth group stated, “We have to honor what our father has 
done for us, what he has established.” Thus, environmental and institutional 
sustainability is reinforced in a cultural system that provides deep-seated and 
essential incentives to protect and enhance the livelihoods established by previ-
ous generations.***
‡‡  These return migrants of  Japanese descent are called dekassegui, and the employ-
ment they obtained in Japan was often considered difficult and dangerous.
§§São João is celebrated throughout the north and northeast of Brazil on St. John’s 
feast day, June 24, and is marked by the reenactment of a “shotgun wedding” in a typical 
rural village, with a predictable story line and much dancing. It is, in essence, a harvest 
festival.
***Cooperative membership and farm titles are typically held by men as heads of 
households. Several members emphasized in interviews that, despite a male-dominated 
membership, the cooperative served households, including female spouses, especially 
through the women’s department, which had, among other things, experimented with 
supporting small-scale fruit preserves production.
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COnClusiOns: lessOns FrOM The  
CAMTA experienCe
This case study of CAMTA and its impact on economic growth, membership 
well-being, and environmental sustainability is, of course, unique. Nevertheless, 
it rather poignantly demonstrates the potential of smallholder cooperativism to 
fuel the development process in a sustainable way. The waves of  Japanese immi-
grants who settled the banks of the Rio Acará came equipped with a tradition 
of cooperative action, a sense of ethnic solidarity and cultural “spirit” ( yamato 
damashii), and a shared struggle. We argue that these qualities, channeled into 
a formal institution through the cooperative (after 1949), provided the mecha-
nism of resilience and successful adaptation in the rain forest ecosystem.
The lessons learned from this case study are multiple. First, CAMTA was 
never only an economic asset to the membership. The cooperative systematically 
organized the search for new technological options—new crops, cropping sys-
tems, input provisioning, and so forth—and it defined its responsibility in terms 
of the broader needs of a community of members. The cooperative provided 
health care, education, and cultural and leisure facilities, as well as a youth group 
and a women’s association—all of which contributed to the collective well-being 
of this community. Most of all, the cooperative became the central gathering 
point for community problem solving. As Piekielek (2010) has pointed out, the 
cooperative manages a pool of social capital as well as economic assets, and in 
this way, the cooperative has come to penetrate so many different areas of the 
daily lives of its members.
Second, the resilience of CAMTA in the face of so many financial and 
economic crises reflected a highly effective relationship with external actors, 
particularly the Japanese government (through JICA), Japanese and American 
private-sector firms, and the broader Brazilian policy-making apparatus. The 
cooperative showed itself open to new technology and new markets and was 
able to acquire capital investment support from Japanese and Brazilian devel-
opment organizations and banks at critical times. Even today, as the agrofor-
estry model of land use generates increasing attention at national and interna-
tional levels, the cooperative actively opens its experience up to all interested 
parties and participates in information sharing at all levels. Such an “outward-
looking” strategy has resulted in a constant stream of innovation and much 
institutional flexibility.
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Finally, the CAMTA case study suggests that adherence to the fundamen-
tal democratic principles of cooperativism—bolstered by a shared vision and 
shared values, a strong sense of community, and a common struggle—can 
contribute to great advances in well-being. Contrary to the broader Brazilian 
context of sharp socioeconomic stratification, this cooperative in Tomé-Açu 
reduces differences and manifests the equity benefits of community problem 
solving and collective action. Not all members have the same level of resources 
and wealth, but all have an important role to play in determining the future of 
their cooperative and their community. There is a shared feeling of pride among 
the members in their common quest for sustainability—both in the sense of 
economic stability, the legacy that is passed on to their atotori, and in the sense 
of environmental sustainability, their successful integration into a fragile rain 
forest.
Sustainability is a dynamic process, not a static result that, once achieved, re-
mains so. The cooperative will face challenges as it grows, most critically as the 
membership becomes more heterogeneous and the processing plant becomes 
increasingly dependent on raw materials produced by newer smallholder asso-
ciations. Greater organizational complexity is inevitable as the membership 
extends to those who do not appreciate golf and baseball or the rich Japanese 
immigrant traditions that the community regularly commemorates. How the 
cooperative grows will require adjustments, particularly in strategies of prob-




n 2002, the massive Castanhão Dam in the state of Ceará was completed, 
thus trapping the surface runoff of the Jaguaribe River Valley and its feeder 
watersheds into a vast reservoir (Açude Castanhão) capable of holding 
6.7 bil lion cubic meters of water. The area that was flooded with the filling of 
the reservoir covered 325 square kilometers and completely inundated the city 
of Jaguaribara, the seat of the município with the same name.1 As impressive 
an engineering feat as Castanhão is considered, the process of relocation and 
adjustment of the population was as daunting.
Ceará is one of nine states that form the northeast region of the country. 
The early Portuguese colony was established in the northeast, built around a 
sugar plantation economy along the relatively verdant coastal region. Toward 
the interior of the region, the environment is harsh—semiarid, mostly poor of 
soils, and subject to regular droughts. This drought-prone backlands region is 
called the sertão (its inhabitants sertanejos), and it evokes great meaning in the 
local imaginary as a place of suffering where resilience and the indomitable will 
of the population are the chief assets. The traditional economy of the sertão was 
integrated into that of the slave-based sugar plantation in that it provided food 
supplies, especially dried meat, draft animals, and leather to the sugar mills.
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The relations of production that emerged in the sertão have been presented 
as “semifeudal” (Goodman and Redclift 1982) based on the social formations 
that emerged from a highly concentrated landownership. Large landholdings, 
called fazendas, were often owned by local ranching elites who maintained on 
their properties a skein of resident sharecropper families. Typically, a share-
cropper received a residence and a plot of land ( Johnson 1971) on which sub-
sistence crops and, usually, cotton, were produced. In return for the land and 
residence, the sharecropper paid a proportion of production (usually one-third 
of food crops and one-half of cotton) to the landowner. In this system, the 
social relations between landowner and sharecropper were highly unequal and 
clientelistic, so that the sharecroppers turned to the landowner in times of crisis 
(e.g., drought), and the landowner could demand multiple forms of loyalty and 
support (Finan and Nelson 2001; Nelson and Finan 2009). In effect, the lives 
and livelihoods of the sharecropper and his household heavily depended on the 
largesse and good will of the patrão.
This background sets the context for the Castanhão Dam. Ceará has no nat-
urally occurring surface flow, and access to water for humans and animals has 
always been a primary source of vulnerability. Over the last 40 years, the state 
has shifted from a rural society to an urban one. In 1970, approximately 65 per-
cent of the population lived in rural areas and survived, albeit precariously, on 
rain-fed agriculture. Today 30 percent of the population is rural, and the state 
economy is based on tourism, industry, and services. One of the major concerns 
of statewide public policy is to guarantee urban supplies of  water, especially to 
the city of Fortaleza, the capital and now the fourth-largest city in the country.
Begun in the early 1990s, Castanhão was key to the larger, well-planned 
transformation of the state—a modernization project that was premised on a 
reliable supply of  water for an urban-based economy and the “rational” agricul-
tural use of water to support the production of high-value crops in areas with 
appropriate soils. Carried out in the flush of the nascent Brazilian democracy, 
the Castanhão project became an example of participatory planning and public 
consultation, and it was widely and openly debated.
First of all, the reservoir would entirely inundate the urban center of Jag-
uaribara, the seat of the município of the same name. Over the course of nearly 
10 years, the commission responsible for the Castanhão project brought in 
social scientists, architects, urban planners, and a variety of sector specialists 
to design the move of Jaguaribara town to higher ground and to manage the 
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displacement of over 10,000 people. A replica of the local church was built in 
the new town praça, graves were exhumed and moved, new housing was built, 
and eventually the relocation of this urban population to Nova Jaguaribara was 
successfully completed.
The reservoir waters also extended out to flood fazenda homes, pastures, and 
sharecropper plots that dotted the rural landscape, disrupting the centuries-
old livelihoods that had reigned in this part of the sertão. For this sizable rural 
population, several livelihood options were offered. The rural displaced who 
had known only the life of the sharecropper or smallholder farmer, cowboy, and 
agricultural day laborer were given a choice. They could remain as independent 
rain-fed farmers on their own plots of land (elsewhere on higher ground), pro-
duce cash crops on a plot within a new irrigation perimeter, raise dairy cattle, or 
cultivate fish on the edge of the new reservoir. This case study examines those 
sharecroppers who chose to raise fish.
A new LIveLIhood: tILApIA
It was recognized in the planning of Castanhão that the families displaced by 
Castanhão backwaters would not have the expertise or the experience to engage 
in new market-based livelihoods requiring significant technological sophistica-
tion. Thus a network of technical advisors was contracted to provide the assis-
tance to get the new livelihoods operational. In the case of the households that 
chose aquaculture, a well-trained expert from the State of Ceará Secretariat 
of Agricultural Development (Secretaria do Desenvolvimento Agrário—SDA) 
assumed the challenge of helping transform sharecroppers into market-savvy 
tilapia producers. The initial group, known as the pioneers (pioneiros), consisted 
of 10 former sharecroppers, and in organizational meetings it was determined 
that the group would register as a cooperative—Cooperativa dos Produtores 
do Curupati-Peixe (CPCP).2 In 2003, CPCP was officially registered, and its 
members began to produce and sell fish—namely, tilapia—for Fortaleza and 
local urban markets. As of 2009, CPCP had become the only tilapia-producing 
cooperative in Ceará and had quickly emerged as a major regional supplier, 
producing 590 tons of tilapia per year to the benefit of 70 member families 
(SEBRAE 2009).3
While the cooperative and its membership have flourished, two factors dis-
tinguish CPCP from other cooperatives in Brazil. First, instead of a group of 
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like-minded individuals pursuing the advantages and protections of a coopera-
tive organization, the state, in the person of one highly committed technical ex-
pert from a government agency (SDA), convinced the pioneer members that a 
cooperative was the most beneficial organizational solution. The members had 
no previous training or experience with the Rochdale Principles, with the fun-
damental philosophy of cooperative action, or with the details of cooperative 
management and decision making.4 Not only was the state the decisive stimu-
lus and the source of technical knowledge, it also provided the initial capital to 
purchase equipment and set up a working capital fund. The Castanhão project 
also built a small community of stuccoed homes with plumbing and electricity, 
lighted streets, schools, and meeting centers.
Second, the technical expert introduced a collective production system, which 
in a clientelistic society is a notion as distant and vague as it is challenging. 
While labor-sharing practices (mutirão) among households have been histori-
cally common, there are few examples of collective production per se, where the 
benefits (and losses) are shared by collectivity. Equally novel was the concept of 
individuals buying “into” a collective organization and owning a share of it, so 
that individual rewards would be realized only if the collectivity were success-
ful. In traditional clientelistic society, a sharecropper had no reference points 
or past models to make sense of collective organization. Survival in the sertão 
was dependent on a dyadic, individualist relationship with a person of superior 
power—the patrão.
Tilapia aquaculture requires a technology that is complex and demanding. 
The fish are raised in cages ( gaiolas) organized in lines out into protected inlets 
of the reservoir, where the shallow fingers of water are constantly refreshed from 
the larger water body.5 Production in 2003 was initiated with 15 gaiolas, a scale 
which has an annual yield potential of 30 tons of fish. By 2009 there were 588 
gaiolas in the water. The fingerlings are purchased from a supplier located in a 
neighboring state, and they are placed in a certain type of cage and fed a spe-
cific ration carefully prepared in the cooperative warehouse. As the fish grow, 
they are placed into other cages and fed ration types and amounts consistent 
with this stage of the life cycle. After several months, the fish are retrieved from 
the cages and classified by size so that the finishing cages have fish of a uniform 
size and weight.6 Those fish that are under the desired weight are fed a different 
finishing ration. At the time of harvest (about four months), the fish are recov-
ered from the cages, cleaned, boxed, iced, and shipped to market. The buyers are 
present at the harvest with their trucks ready to receive the fish so as to maintain 
116 cooperative experienceS in Brazil
freshness. Small tilapia (under one kilogram) at the time of the research were pro-
cessed into fillets by the member wives and sold to local schools for the school 
lunch program.
The collective production system defines a set of interrelated tasks—the ra-
tion managers (the “rations” team, in their parlance), who remain in the ware-
house, and the boatmen (the “support/vigilance” team), who travel back and 
forth in small canoes, feeding the cages and handling the fish. This team is also 
responsible for the night watchman task. All members participate in the flurried 
harvest, which is an intense concatenation of activities carried out under the 
pressure of time. Not all tasks are equally demanding, so each member is rotated 
into a different role each month. The coordination of activities is critical for the 
entire system to function successfully. Ration types and sizes, distribution of 
feeding, monitoring of fish size, and maintenance of the gaiolas are all linked 
together into sequences and schedules, such that, if one person fails to perform 
a task at the scheduled time, the entire operation is put at risk.
The management of the system is equally complex. In 2009, only two of the 
members had a high school education, and they were responsible for the overall 
administration of the cooperative and for marketing. Not only are fish sold, 
but key inputs such as rations and fingerlings must be purchased on a regular 
basis. It is important to note that the transformed sharecropper never held such 
managerial decision-making responsibility in his previous livelihood.
Following cooperative convention, an elected board of directors is responsible 
for the decision making of CPCP and is composed of five members, including 
the president, the financial director, the marketing director, and two production 
directors. The president carries out the function of allocating, according to the 
member’s capabilities, the different production-related functions. For example, 
if someone shows a particular talent for organizing charts and data, he would 
be assigned to the cage-organizing position; if he knows math, he could be as-
signed the task of keeping the accounting records of each sale. The marketing 
director must have some basic math/accounting skills to monitor and record the 
amount of fish sold. The finance director pays salaries and monitors the coopera-
tive’s net cash flow. And the two production directors manage the production 
activities. Regardless of administrative duties, all members belong to one of the 
two teams described above (rations and support/vigilance).
Board elections occur every two years with term limits set at four years (con-
secutive). Cooperative statute supports open membership, but in reality, the 
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production system (e.g., the number of cages) imposes an unspoken limit on 
the number of members. Individuals are allowed to join based on a skill set that 
is needed (e.g., accounting knowledge) or based on social and kinship ties. A 
current member proposes a relative as a candidate and this candidacy is consid-
ered during a co-op assembly meeting. In the assembly, voting is not secret, and 
close ties of kinship are usually considered an important criterion. After all, the 
community itself is small, and everyone is essentially a neighbor.
During 2004, 15 additional members joined the cooperative, and by 2009, 
membership had grown to 70.7 Under the collective production system, the 
costs and revenues are calculated monthly, a contribution is made to the capital 
reserve of the cooperative, and the “profits” are distributed equally as long as 
each member has fulfilled his task load. At the time of the research in 2009, the 
monthly return per member was approximately 1,100 Brazilian reais (US$500), 
well above the mandated national minimum wage. Members have seen the ben-
efits of collective activity organized around the cooperative model and have ex-
pressed satisfaction with these results.
trAnsformAtIon to coLLectIve ActIon: 
Lessons LeArned
A key question addressed in this volume focuses on the intrinsic tension of a 
cooperative model where economic and larger social goals seek a viable bal-
ance. In the case of Curupati-Peixe, the cooperative organization was burdened 
with an even greater challenge. A membership of mostly uneducated subsis-
tence farmers whose traditional strategy of survival had been an individualistic 
and dependent relationship with their landowners was transformed into the 
owners/operators of a business enterprise that could only succeed through col-
lective action. In effect, CPCP has thrived as an economic entity—it is profit-
able and has an effective business model; but the root of its success has been 
the acceptance of a cooperative form of production, where individual benefits 
are defined only by the positive outcomes for the enterprise. Through cooper-
ative practices motivated by individual economic incentives, the membership 
has increasingly come to understand and embrace the Rochdale Principles that 
constitute the cooperative foundation. The realities of ownership, management, 
interdependence, and participation contributed to the transformation of the 
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sharecropper into someone with both decision-making power and responsibil-
ity for the well-being of the totality. The cooperative imperative provided the 
instrument by which this transformation was effected.
A second lesson gleaned from CPCP was that success required strong, long-
term support from the state. In the larger Castanhão modernization project, 
the original design envisioned groups of displaced sharecropper households 
organized under some sort of associative model and engaged in market-based 
productive activity. In this sense, the cooperative was imposed on this group of 
neophyte fish farmers. Nonetheless, even with the significant influx of start-up 
capital from the larger project, it is doubtful that CPCP would have gained 
purchase without the constant, almost persistent assistance provided by the 
SDA technical expert. The transformation of sharecropper to owner/operator 
would not have occurred without the intense incubation provided by the state. 
In most cooperatives, such as in the south of Brazil, the membership accumu-
lates and manages its own assets and depends on the state for the enabling 
institutional framework and for episodic support in the form of credit lines, 
market opportunities, and so forth. In the case of CPCP, the state provided the 
capital, the collective production model, and the day-to-day technical orienta-
tion to move the group toward a sustainable business enterprise. Whereas in 
many places state intervention in the workings of cooperatives has been a for-
mula for failure, here it appears to have achieved success.
CPCP faces numerous challenges as it adjusts to changing business climates 
and to its own growth, and these challenges will provide further lessons into 
the future. The first is for the cooperative to expand its share of an increasingly 
competitive market. The current marketing strategy follows a highly traditional 
structure where buyers appear at the gate to purchase fish. In 2009, two high-
volume middlemen purchased four tons weekly for resale in the wholesale fish 
market in Fortaleza,8 and two mid-volume buyers purchased around one ton 
per week of lower-grade tilapia for resale in weekly markets around the interior 
of the state. This market is vulnerable to oscillation in price, and the cooperative 
does not have reliable access to market information. It has considered the pur-
chase of a refrigerated truck to transport its fish to market, thus taking greater 
control of the marketing process and eliminating some of the middlemen.
The membership has also discussed a diversification strategy to expand its 
product lines, as is the case of processed fillets for the school system. There is 
a large amount of  waste by-product in fish innards, skin and bones (from the 
fillets), and so forth, and proposals for the production of processed fish cakes 
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and the use of  waste to raise hogs have been considered. The expansion of the 
product line is a form of spreading the market risk that concerns the member-
ship currently.
The second and larger challenge is the need to develop management skills. 
While the co-op has taken advantage of technical assistance from the state, 
it must at some point develop its own management and administrative skill 
set in a sustainable and professional way. Currently, the membership does not 
have individuals with the professional administrative skills needed in such areas 
as accounting, information management, marketing, and finance. To achieve 
sustainability as an enterprise, the co-op must develop this talent internally or 
recruit it from outside. This lack of professional expertise will pose increasingly 
binding constraints on co-op growth.
The third challenge is to develop the social vision for the cooperative. This 
vision would include the projected size of membership and the strategy for new 
member recruitment. It is typical of the region that a father divides his assets 
among his children. In the case of the cooperative, a member cannot freely 
“bring” his children into the business because of the inherent limits of the co-op 
production. The intergenerational transfer of the tilapia enterprise to the next 
generation is a natural desire; however, the membership size is constrained by 
the scale of production, and it is not yet clear how the system can expand to ab-
sorb more members.
concLusIon: the potentIAL of  
cooperAtIve ActIon
Curupati-Peixe is a success story for a local community of displaced families that 
documents the development of potential cooperative action. Its powerful mes-
sage is that a model of cooperative production enabled a fundamental transfor-
mation of dependent sharecropper farmers into small-scale, empowered business-
men with new social identities and aspirations for the future. Regardless of past 
experience or status, each member recognizes the intrinsic value of his contribu-
tion to the collectivity and, in turn, understands how collective action enhanced 
the value of his labor. The membership has come to understand that working 
together in a coordinated way can generate a collective good in which all mem-
bers participate. This will be a lasting legacy of Curupati-Peixe—cooperative and 
community. CPCP will face obstacles in the future as it negotiates an uncertain 
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capitalist system that demands complex knowledge of value chains, input and 
output markets, production technology, and management skills. Fortunately, the 
membership is aware of these challenges and has grown in its decision-making 
sophistication. And for now, the co-op and its membership can take pride in the 
great strides already recorded.
notes
 1. In Brazil, a município is the small politico-administrative unit of government. 
A município typically has an urban center surrounded by a network of small 
settlement clusters in the rural areas. In terms of size, municípios can vary 
widely, from less than 100 square kilometers to more than 4,000 square kilo-
meters, and the state of Ceará has 184 municípios.
 2. Displaced households who sought other livelihoods, such as irrigated pro-
duction, also formed cooperatives: Curupati-Irrigação (irrigation), Curupati-
Leite (dairy), and so forth.
 3. The analysis that follows is based on data from Barros’s two-month stay in the 
cooperative community, interviews with technical experts and fishmongers in 
the Fortaleza, and follow-up communication with the community.
 4. Nor did they know one another for the most part. The families tended not to 
be related or to share much of a history.
 5. The original site for the gaiolas proved inadequate and, in an environment of 
crisis, a new, more appropriate site was selected.
 6. This selection process is called repicagem, a term that in horticulture refers to 
transferring selected plants from a seedbed to another site where the seedling 
will grow to transplant size.
 7. It is also true that the market for tilapia expanded rapidly during the period 
throughout the state, providing the cooperative with the incentive to increase 
membership.
 8. The Carlito Pamplona market in Fortaleza is itself iconic. It is a sprawling set 
of booths that operate during the early hours of the morning to sell to fish re-
tailers. There are several varieties of fish sold in this market, mostly freshwater 
fish, and sellers may come from all over the northeast. It is a highly volatile 
market.
T
he recurrenT quesTion in this book is, how exactly does coop-
erative organization confer economic advantage on a group of rural 
producers and offer them a pathway of dynamic change in commu-
nity well-being? The conventional explanations create a narrative of market 
strength and economies of scale at various stages of the commodity chain; but 
in highly stratified rural societies with unequal access to capital, technology, 
and information, such advantages seldom occur. The foundational Rochdale 
Principles of cooperativism presume both essential and operational equality of 
participation and voice, and where such equality is not present, the cooperative 
as institution adopts the structures of inequality of which it is part. This case 
study, however, presents a success story of cooperative action. The community 
described here—Comunidade do Sagrado Coração de Jesus do Paraná da Eva 
(SCJ)*—is located in the state of Amazonas in the middle of the Brazilian rain 
forest, and its cooperative, ASCOPE (Associação Sagrado Coração de Jesus 
do Paraná da Eva), provides an example of cooperative-led growth and devel-
opment seldom documented in the cooperative literature. This story is about 
how a group of producers coalesced around a common ideology of  justice and 
*“The Community of the Sacred Heart of  Jesus of the Paraná da Eva”—a paraná is 
a water body resembling a cut in a feeder river.
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self-sufficiency and succeeded in creating a burgeoning local community built 
upon a sustained market economy.
One clear overriding fact about this community is that it has changed in 
highly significant and measurable ways, including population growth, rapid in-
crease in diversity and intensity of economic activity, large public investment in 
infrastructure (asphalt roads and electricity), and the introduction of essential 
public services (schools and clinics). These changes occurred over fewer than 
20 years, and they are strongly associated with the success of ASCOPE as both 
a community project and an agribusiness.
The history of the community is deeply intertwined with that of the coop-
erative, and to those familiar with Amazonian rural society and its many forms 
of exploitation of both natural resources and people, the outcome of this story 
appears an improbable one. The chapter, based on field interviews from 2005 
and 2009, documents the founding and growth of  both SCJ and ASCOPE and 
explores the moments of crisis when the continued viability of the cooperative 
required significant reflection and difficult decisions. The great and constant 
challenge faced by both community and cooperative membership has been to 
mediate between the ideological commitment to solidarity and the realities of 
market and capitalist entrepreneurship. How this group has negotiated the in-
herent tensions between these two paradigms of development holds lessons for 
rural producers everywhere.
The SeTTing
The immense Amazonian floodplains, called the várzea, have supported hu-
man livelihoods for 12,000 years. Since European settlement in the region, 
and since the eighteenth century, European, indigenous, and mixed native- 
European (caboclo) communities have occupied these river edges of the Amazo-
nian basin engaging in subsistence agriculture, livestock, fishing, and extraction 
activities.† Annually the rivers spill their banks, covering nearly 100,000 square 
kilometers of low-lying forests and depositing nutrient-rich sediment brought 
from upstream. The water-level difference between the terrestrial and aquatic 
phases of the várzea can be as much as 10 meters. As the floods recede, local 
†In the middle half of the twentieth century, the várzea was also a site of widespread 
jute production, an agro-industry now in decline.
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residents plant subsistence crops and manage the emergent pasture grasses, fish 
and hunt, and collect nontimber forest products for consumption and sale. The 
várzea is a complex ecology to which equally complex livelihood systems have 
adapted over the generations.
Most households in these várzea communities are land scarce, with limited 
access to public services such as education and health care. Although recent 
federal programs have brought electricity to most towns, transportation and 
communication infrastructure remains underdeveloped. Houses are built above 
ground on stilts at the edges of the rivers, lakes, and igarapés (freshwater la-
goons), and the main source of daily transportation is canoes powered by small 
electric or gasoline motors (rabetas). It is a mostly remote and waterbound life, 
defined by the seasonal rhythms of this vast riverine system.
Sagrado Coração de Jesus do Paraná da Eva is located 227 kilometers east of 
Manaus, the capital of Amazonas State, and is part of the município of Itacoa-
tiara.‡ The community itself now has about 250 families (Souza and Jesus 2011), 
and its buildings were constructed above the reach of the seasonal floodwaters, 
on terra firme, or the “high ground” away from the flood plain.§ Recent history 
indicates that the first named community in the area of the Paraná da Eva was 
called Vila do Engenho, located around the Lago do Engenho ( Jesus 2000). 
This settlement, established in the 1950s with the arrival of the founding fam-
ily, was dispersed around a sugar mill (engenho in Portuguese, thus the name), 
the abandoned ruins of which are still to be found on the edge of the Lago. 
The population of the Vila do Engenho had mostly migrated from other parts 
of Brazil, particularly from the drought-plagued and land-scarce northeast 
of Brazil and from neighboring parts of the várzea ( Jesus 2000). Livelihoods 
along the Lago were highly diversified, combining small-scale production of 
food crops and jute in the várzea (during the recession of the waters) with the 
raising of cattle and chickens, then moving to temporary upland housing dur-
ing the floods. These farm families were often landless or occupied várzea lands 
illegally ( posseiros), and there was frequent tension between these farmers and 
‡The município in Brazil is the local politico-administrative level of government. 
The prefeito(a) is the locally elected executive who runs the prefeitura, roughly, the 
“mayor’s office.”
§Of architectural interest perhaps, many houses in the community are still built set 
off the ground even though riverine flooding is no longer a risk.
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the large-scale ranchers (  fazendeiros) who raised their animals on the pastures 
of the várzea.
In the 1970s, the Catholic diocese in the município seat of Itacoatiara orga-
nized the community that is today called Sagrado Coração do Jesus do Paraná 
da Eva. The residences were constructed on terra firme overlooking the river 
near the Vila do Engenho, and the new community was inhabited by two dozen 
families who shared a commitment to the religious and social values of libera-
tion theology—primarily the importance of justice and solidarity. From an ana-
lytical perspective, it is important to emphasize that SCJ represented the co-
incidence of physical and social space. To an outside observer, SCJ was indeed 
a small nucleus of houses organized along linearly planned streets, but to the 
residents it was also a well-defined and active social construction with solidarity 
and equality as the brick and mortar.
This basic fabric of shared religious and social values was further supported 
by the emerging political influence of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trab-
alhadores—PT) in the município of Itacoatiara. The theme promoted by the 
political leadership and the local Farm Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trab-
alhadores Rurais) was that the SCJ rural workers (trabalhadores rurais) would 
undergo a transformation into rural producers ( produtores rurais) fueled by an 
extremely powerful narrative of strength in solidarity and collective action.
In 1980, a charismatic political leader who had helped found SCJ led the 
effort to create a small group of farmers, called Grupo Lavradores em Ação 
(Farmers in Action), or LA, in order to put the essential principle of solidarity 
into action. There were 16 families from SCJ in the initial membership of LA; 
nine of them were families of landless day workers. Thus, the first challenge 
was to obtain land, which the group successfully did through various mecha-
nisms, including the granting of parcels by landed members. Steadfastly against 
the perceived evil of salaried labor, the group employed two strategies of labor 
sharing in the production process. First, to prepare the (forested) terra firme 
land for cultivation, a large contingent of members (called the grupão, or “large 
group”) went from parcel to parcel working together to clear the land and ready 
it for cultivation. Once this task was completed, every three families were or-
ganized into a grupinho (“small group”), which shared the labor tasks of pro-
duction (planting, weeding, spraying, harvesting). In this upland, the princi-
pal cash crops were pineapple (Ananas comosus) and the tropical fruit cupuaçu 
(Theobroma grandiflorum).
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Not only did the LA see exploitation and injustice in the traditional re-
lations of production, they also perceived the marketing system as a form of 
exploitation, both in the provisioning of basic consumer goods and in the pur-
chase of farm output. Accordingly, they formed marketing teams consisting 
of community members, who took the pineapples and cupuaçu to markets in 
Manaus for a group-approved fee.
In 1990, after a decade of active production and cooperative learning, the 
Lavradores group then decided to register as a formal cooperative under the 
current name, ASCOPE. The members realized that as a cooperative, they 
would be eligible for public financing destined for the support of small-scale 
agriculture. With the first bank loans, the cooperative set aside half the amount 
as a guarantee of repayment and used the rest to purchase a floating general 
store (  flutuante) anchored riverside on the Paraná da Eva. This store, still thriv-
ing and popular, provided basic food and nonfood items to consumers—mem-
bers and nonmembers—at prices lower than other local businesses. In accor-
dance with basic market theory, the flutuante introduced new competition into 
the area, driving down the prices of  rival businesses; but it also became an active 
point of informal social gatherings with small boats and their rabetas pulling 
up to make weekly purchases and catch up on news and gossip.
What SCJ did not have in its newly established community of the 1990s was 
electricity and infrastructure. There was limited schooling available to children, 
and health services were offered only in Novo Remanso, a town located about 
30 kilometers away but with poor access due to the precarious roads. If the 
sense of solidarity dulled the edge of need, the community was nonetheless a 
remote and poor one.
From SolidariTy To markeT CapiTaliSm
The trajectory that led from várzea to terra firme, from worker to producer, 
and from Lavradores em Ação to ASCOPE mounted a business model on an 
ideological foundation of solidarity and justice, which has been presented as 
an example of the “economy of solidarity” ( Jesus and Jesus 2006). In part, such 
solidarity came “naturally,” in that it was well enmeshed in the cultural fab-
ric of the small community that created the two groups. The 16 members that 
formed Lavradores em Ação came mostly from two large families, the Peixotos 
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and Barbosas, who had intermarried and were mostly all related to each other 
through biological or affinal bonds and through the common cultural tie of 
godparenthood.** This sense of community, however, needed to demonstrate an 
attractive economic outcome.
In 2005, the SCJ community had around 120 families, and ASCOPE had 
30 producer-members. In 2013, the official population of the community (includ-
ing the original Lago do Engenho) was 837 families with 230 families living 
in the “urban center” or the “agro-villa” (the original area of terra firme where 
the first settlement was constructed). Most of the families in this region make 
their living off agricultural production. The membership in the cooperative had 
increased to over 50 producer-members by 2009, with the prospect of further 
expansion. The agricultural livelihood is based on the production of pineapple 
and, to a lesser extent, cupuaçu. In 2005, there were an estimated 500 hectares 
of cupuaçu planted and 800 hectares of pineapple ( Jesus and Ribeiro 2008), al-
though this ratio has probably shifted as the result of disease problems in the 
cupuaçu and the increased market access of pineapple. In 2005, ASCOPE sent 
an estimated 20 million fruits to the market in Manaus, and by 2009, this num-
ber had risen to 36 million fruits.††
The production technology employed by ASCOPE members is advanced. 
Field sizes are less than five hectares, with around 20,000 plants per hectare in 
double rows. The use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides is part of the culti-
vation practice, as is the timing of plant maturation using calcium carbide to 
hasten flowering. In this way, the supply of fruits can be planned over the life 
of the plant. When harvested, the pineapple fruits are stripped of their slips 
and suckers, which are saved for replanting. At the end of the production cy-
cle, the plants are removed and the field is prepared for the next cycle. In the 
case of cupuaçu, the district of Novo Remanso (of which SCJ is a part) is the 
largest producer in the state of Amazonas, with around 1,000 hectares in 
cultivation and a production of somewhat more than 2 million fruits in 2011 
**In Brazilian culture, the godparents of children are socially, although not necessarily 
equally, connected in a strong social bond that involves common responsibilities between 
the two sets of adults.
††The Amazonas Institute for Agricultural and Forestry Development (IDAM) has 
estimated that, in the district of Novo Remanso, around one thousand family farmers 
cultivated 3,000 hectares of pineapples and produced over 60 million fruits in 2015. 
This suggests that the pineapple “fever” has been more widely adopted by farmers in 
the region.
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(IDAM 2015). Cupuaçu is related to the cocoa family and is a perennial. Origi-
nally, ASCOPE farmers intercropped the young cupuaçu in pineapple fields, 
but since the young plants require shading, they are now commonly grown 
among other tree species.
Along with the intent to eliminate daily wage labor as a rural livelihood, 
ASCOPE sought to create its own marketing chain in order to reduce the pro-
duction value captured by intermediaries. It created a marketing group that 
charged a fixed amount to sell pineapples in the central market of Manaus. 
Later, however, the management of ASCOPE entered into a contractual agree-
ment with the município and state secretariats of education (SEMED and 
SEDUC) to deliver pineapple and cupuaçu to the school feeding programs 
in Manaus. Brazil has a highly progressive school lunch program whereby 
the federal government subsidizes the purchase of local foodstuffs to provide 
lunches for all students in the primary and secondary school systems. In addi-
tion, the cooperative participates in several farmers’ markets in Manaus that are 
sponsored by the large military base (CEGIS) and the “modern” open-air mar-
ket in the city.‡‡ This marketing strategy has significantly expanded the name 
recognition of ASCOPE products and has reduced instability in prices.
In 2002, ASCOPE received government financial support to purchase an 
agro-industrial plant with refrigeration capacity, trucks, and a tractor. In 2005, 
the cooperative obtained land to install the facility, and in 2009, after electricity 
and a road arrived, the pulp-processing plant began production. According to 
the state and federal organizations that provide technical support to coopera-
tives (OCB-AM, SESCOOP),§§ the pulp plant marketed 100 tons of cupuaçu 
pulp and 80 of pineapple pulp in 2012, nearly all of it to Manaus, although ef-
forts are now in progress to reach European fruit pulp markets.
ASCOPE is widely promoted throughout the state (and more broadly) 
as the paragon of cooperative development. Based on the comparison of two 
points in time (2005 and 2009), the growth of the SCJ community and the 
‡‡CEGIS is the largest school for tropical guerrilla warfare in Brazil (and perhaps in  
Latin America), and it sponsors a large biweekly market for locally produced prod-
ucts on the base open to the public; the “Mercado Moderno,” sponsored by the state gov-
ernment, is an open-air market consisting of producer booths with a wide variety of 
fresh foods and a large public following.
§§OCB-AM is the Organização Brasileira para Cooperativismo—Amazonas, part 
of the national OCB cooperative-support network; SESCOOP is Serviço Nacional de 
Aprendizagem Cooperativista, the federal cooperative-learning organization.
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diversified expansion of  its economy provide remarkable signs of  vast improve-
ments in community well-being. In 2009, there was a small hotel, a restau-
rant and several luncheonettes, a pharmacy, a supermarket, and multiple other 
commercial points. The town has a paved road to the main Manaus-Itacoatiara 
highway, electricity, and Internet access. While there was not a resident doc-
tor in 2009, there is a health post for malaria testing and a community health 
worker. In 2004, SCJ also received a school that serves grades six through nine 
for the surrounding region, as well as high school and evening adult education. 
As important as the inventory of infrastructure and services, SCJ has a very 
strong feeling of community, and there is ample evidence of collective action—
the evening activities at the sports complex next to the school, decorated streets 
and painted reminders of upcoming commemorations and events, and, notably, 
families and friends of all ages walking the evening streets and sidewalks.
SourCeS oF TenSion WiThin aSCope
Growth with equity is an age-old development challenge, and in the case of 
ASCOPE, there is an inherent tension between the logic of market capital-
ism and the community values of solidarity and justice. The cooperative has 
accumulated sizeable assets, expanded its market reach, diversified into agricul-
tural processing (i.e., fruit pulp production), and intends to increase its product 
line into other exotic fruits. It operates a retail consumer and supply business, 
markets its own products, employs a number of local workers, organizes the 
distribution of collective assets, such as the cooperative tractor, and maintains 
multiple networks with external actors from banks to government agencies to 
private-sector representatives. In 2005, cooperative accounts were kept at the 
manager’s home by his wife; now full-time professional assistance is required. 
Under the demands for greater skill specialization, larger payrolls, and more 
complicated accounting, administration, and management, it is predictable that 
a distance might form between cooperative leadership and the membership. 
ASCOPE does not have the resources to contract professional management, 
so the decision- and policy-making role is blended with that of  the manager.*** 
***Under most cooperative structures, the board of directors (elected by the mem-
bership) contracts a professional manager (an employee) to carry out its policies and 
decisions.
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The concentration of decision-making power presents the danger of creating 
an administrative “elite” less responsive to the need and priorities of the mem-
bership and to the values of cooperative action that bind them.
This dynamic tension between the requirements of a growing capitalist firm 
and the solidarity emerged from structural differences within the membership. 
Among the 30 original members, only two had finished high school, while half 
either had no formal education or had not finished primary school. There were 
also among the 30 clear differences in income and wealth levels as measured in 
assets (land, cattle, cars, etc.). In 2005, some members stated that they remained 
silent during meetings and other public activities, feeling that their lack of edu-
cation reduced the value of their comments and opinions. In a similar vein, 
others insinuated that they felt intimidated by those who dominated the flow 
of the meetings.
Thus, while the origins of ASCOPE lie in strong values of solidarity and 
social justice, the management demands of the ASCOPE-cum-enterprise have 
seemed to distance cooperative leaders from the membership, creating an ideo-
logical division. During interviews in 2009, it was apparent that management 
had been increasingly perceived as being more involved in commercial business 
affairs and external negotiations at the expense of solidarity and social learning. 
Some original members felt excluded and stepped away from the cooperative 
or reduced their participation. To its credit, ASCOPE management addressed 
this basic identity crisis and sought to reincorporate disaffected members and 
reinforce the founding principles; and the current charismatic director/man-
ager proudly points to the fact that several adult members, including an ex- 
director, have decided to return to school. Nonetheless, this tension is an inher-
ent characteristic of the challenge to reconcile basic economic and social goals, 
and it appears unavoidable.
Other impending challenges are a natural consequence of ASCOPE’s suc-
cess. On the economic side, the cooperative will increasingly encounter tech-
nical capacity constraints that can be binding at the level of production (e.g., 
changes in cropping patterns, response to pests), at the processing level (e.g., 
equipment maintenance, quality control), and at the administrative and market-
ing level (e.g., volatile markets, policy impacts). The cooperative has to either de-
velop this technical capacity internally within the community or access it from 
external sources. In the past, the ASCOPE management has been very effective 
in its ability to attract public funds and technical assistance, but such ready avail-
ability of outside capital and knowledge carries no guarantee into the future.
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On the social side, ASCOPE must address the size of the membership, how 
new members will be recruited and under what terms, and how their incorpo-
ration will continue to maintain the sense of solidarity and community so im-
portant to the sustainability of the cooperative. This vision of the future requires 
a reflection on limits—including those implied by community commitment, a 
shared set of values, and even the environmental limits of the land and forests.
SolidariTy and developmenT:  
leSSonS From aSCope
Students of Amazonian rural society (e.g., Jesus 2000) propose that the unique 
nature of the várzea–terra firme ecosystem shapes livelihoods in a way that fa-
vors deep community bonds. The “shared isolation” of a waterbound existence 
engenders a strong psychological dependence on neighbors and a need for a 
community identity. Certainly, the history of Comunidade Sagrado Coração 
de Jesus, with its founding family lineages, conforms to that narrative. What 
makes SCJ unique is that it engendered ASCOPE—an active participant 
in market capitalism but predicated on a community vision of solidarity and 
social justice. This chapter has explored how this merging of community and 
capitalism can have positive development outcomes, measurable in terms of 
well-being and quality of life.
Several forces united to make ASCOPE a successful experiment in collec-
tive action. There can be little doubt that ideology of class consciousness and 
social equality was the enabling condition for the establishment of, first, Lavra-
dores em Ação, and subsequently, ASCOPE. The hours spent as a group at 
a member’s home discussing and reflecting upon the meaning of justice, the 
principles of associativism, liberation theology, and political participation cre-
ated a process of social learning that gave meaning to the cooperative vision. 
More than ideological harmony, however, the ability of the cooperative leaders, 
albeit without much formal education, to transform the ideology into praxis 
put the cooperative on a pathway to success.
The ASCOPE leadership, with the strong support of the local political 
structure in Itacoatiara (the Worker’s Party) and the Church (a diocese steeped 
in liberation theology), very actively took advantage of public policy incentives 
from a range of state and federal agencies. Agricultural lands were acquired 
through INCRA (the federal agrarian reform agency); the cooperative received 
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public financing from the FNO (Fundo Constitucional do Norte), a federal 
development fund; the fruit pulp processing plant with its refrigeration ca-
pacity was installed in SCJ with public-sector support; and ASCOPE has re-
ceived regular technical assistance from IDAM, the state agricultural extension 
agency, and from OCB-AM, the state agency of the national system that pro-
vides cooperative assistance ( Jesus 2000). Over the last decade, the cooperative 
successfully negotiated contracts with the prefeitura of  Manaus and the state of 
Amazonas to provide fresh fruit and fruit pulp to the compulsory school lunch 
program and gained access to several urban venues for the direct weekly sale of 
the SCJ product line. As a consequence of this history of public-sector interac-
tion, ASCOPE has become well-known and respected throughout the state 
and the entire Amazonia region as a model of agricultural success.
ASCOPE has also benefited from a charismatic and energetic leadership 
that promotes the founding principles and values of the cooperative but is also 
highly pragmatic and effective in its business practices. Few members of the 
cooperative travel to Manaus, the large urban capital, but the cooperative lead-
ers are frequently present in the market places, the government offices, and the 
OCB and SESCOOP facilities and classrooms. In a sense, the leadership lives 
in two worlds and must regularly negotiate the underlying contradictions be-
tween these two realities.
Ultimately, the success of ASCOPE depends upon the willingness and abil-
ity of farmers in the Comunidade Sagrado Coração de Jesus to produce pine-
apples, cupuaçu, and other fruits that have market value. In 2009 interviews, a 
sample of these farmers articulated that their goals are family-centered—they 
desire to increase the return on their labor in order to improve the opportuni-
ties for their children, achieve a sustainable economic living into the future, and 
maintain the self-respect that comes with control over their own destiny. As 
readily, however, they see collective action as the pathway to these goals. The 
continued viability of ASCOPE, therefore, is as much linked to this shared 
conviction that solidarity generates equal opportunity—that social justice and 
collective action are instruments that feed individual ambition—as it is to the 
expansion of markets, acquisition of agro-processing equipment, or the reduc-
tion of marketing costs.
ASCOPE will continue to reconcile the inevitable tensions within its group. 
New members will be needed to address generational transitions and demo-
graphic growth as well as to provide the pulp plant with raw materials and 
markets with product. The cooperative will require ever-increasing levels of 
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complex technical skills in agricultural production and processing, in admin-
istrative professionalism, and in marketing. How these challenges are met will 
define the sustainability of the cooperative, but the likelihood of success will 
mostly depend upon constant reaffirmation of the human dignity of each indi-
vidual, the value of solidarity and justice, and the continued emphasis on social 
learning, group reflection, and collective problem solving. In short, the history 
of a seamless cooperative-community must also be its future.
Bringing Power and History 
into CooPerative design
Lessons from AmazonCoop’s “Fair Trade”  
Partnership Among Indigenous Brazil Nut  
Harvesters and The Body Shop
Brian J . Burke*
a
s organizations Committed to radical social transformation, 
cooperatives face a serious challenge: they must build on the present in 
order to change it. To succeed, cooperatives must strike a fine balance. 
Those that cannot meet the demands of highly competitive markets risk finan-
cial collapse, but those that simply conform to the status quo become complicit 
in re-creating inequality and marginalization. Faced with this dilemma, many 
cooperative managers and commentators have prioritized pragmatic questions 
of how to launch and sustain cooperative economic projects. In the process, 
however, they often ignore questions of  history, power, and change that should 
be central to cooperativism.
In this chapter, I examine AmazonCoop from a historical-political-ecological 
perspective in order to demonstrate how a thorough consideration of power 
and history can enhance cooperatives’ impacts as deeply transformative change 
agents. A power-centered approach directs our attention to the noblest goal 
of cooperativism—which is, after all, not to establish a particular type of 
*A previous version of this chapter was published in the Journal of  Political Ecology, 
vol. 19, paper no. 9. The empirics and arguments in the two pieces are nearly identical. 
However, the version printed here has been reduced in length, in large part by elimi-
nating a discussion of how AmazonCoop is part of a more general effort to promote 
Amazonian forest conservation through community-based development.
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organization or survive in a global economy, but rather to create more just 
social and economic arrangements—and suggests innovative possibilities for 
achieving this goal.
AmAzonCoop
AmazonCoop (also known as CAMPEALTA) was founded in 1998 by rep-
resentatives of the Fundação Nacional do Índio (Brazilian National Indian 
Agency—FUNAI) and the UK-based cosmetics company The Body Shop to 
formalize trade links between the multinational firm and Brazil nut harvest-
ers from eight indigenous tribes. The cooperative was intended to supply The 
Body Shop with the raw materials and ecologically sustainable, socially just 
symbolism needed for its best-selling products, to help FUNAI protect and 
serve indigenous people despite neoliberal reforms that decreased funding and 
restricted their responsibilities, to allow indigenous people to finance their own 
community development, and to protect the environment by offering tribes an 
income-generating alternative to alliances with mining and logging compa-
nies. As a public-private partnership based on fair trade, the cooperative grew 
directly out of processes of neoliberal economic globalization and movements 
to harness globalization to benefit poor and excluded people. The cooperative 
was gradually destroyed between 2006 and 2007 as a result of legal troubles, 
strained relations with The Body Shop, and serious power struggles among the 
cooperative’s nonindigenous stakeholders. Nonetheless, it offers valuable les-
sons for other cooperatives.
AmazonCoop was located in Altamira, Pará, in the central region of the 
Brazilian Amazon.† Although Altamira was important in the rubber booms 
at the opening of the twentieth century and during World War II, the local 
economy is currently supported primarily by legal and illegal logging, agricul-
ture, and the extraction of nontimber forest products such as Brazil nuts, which 
are the fifth most valuable nontimber forest product nationally (IBGE 2004). 
Intensive natural resource exploitation has resulted in severe deforestation, wa-
ter pollution, and the invasion of indigenous territories (Fausto 2001, 99; Fisher 
†Amazonia is a culturally, ecologically, and economically diverse region that 
defies easy generalization. When I refer to the Amazon in this paper, the modifiers 
“Brazilian” and, in some cases, “Altamiran” are implied.
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2000). Nonetheless, satellite images showing relatively intact forest on indig-
enous lands (Schwartzman and Zimmerman 2005; Zimmerman et al. 2001) 
and ethnoecological studies (Posey 2002) have stimulated efforts to preserve 
Amazonian ecosystems through indigenous development projects similar to 
AmazonCoop’s Brazil nut trade. Outside of these programs, most of the re-
gion’s indigenous people combine subsistence activities with cash incomes from 
mining and logging concessions, employment in extractive industries, and gov-
ernment pensions (Castro 1992).
AmazonCoop generated income through Brazil nut sales, an Internet ser-
vice provider, and an eco-lodge in order to provide social and economic benefits 
to more than 2,000 indigenous people living in 14 villages and representing 
8 indigenous tribes: the Arara, Araweté, Asurini, Curuaia, Kayapó, Parakanã, 
Xikrin, and Xypaia.‡ Membership in the cooperative was organized at the vil-
lage level, with one or two representatives from each village granted the mem-
bers’ right to vote in the General Assembly, but these village representatives 
were not elected and the vast majority of decisions were made by international 
advisors and nonindigenous Brazilian managers. As I have discussed elsewhere 
(Burke 2006, 2010), the cooperative’s social and economic impacts in indige-
nous villages were inconsistent:
AmazonCoop’s international alliances certainly provided significant material ben-
efits. The Brazil nut trading program more than doubled the annual profits of in-
digenous nut collectors while steering tribes away from alliances with the more 
environmentally damaging mining and logging industries, and tourist-funded,  
cooperative-managed health and education projects further contributed to a 
widely supported form of development. The cooperative provided indirect benefits 
by supporting [government services, both financially and administratively]. Un-
fortunately, AmazonCoop also made indigenous people more vulnerable and more 
dependent on outsiders, failed to include them as informed participants in their 
own development, masked the negative effects on them of unfavorable govern-
ment policies, and perpetuated discriminatory distinctions among them. (Burke  
2010, 42)
‡For consistency, I use the same ethnic categories as AmazonCoop. The Xikrin, 
however, are considered to be members of the larger Kayapó ethnic group (though 
they are somewhat distinct from other Kayapó groups), and the degree of involvement 
of the Xypaia and Curuaia is unclear.
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Our initial analysis of AmazonCoop, based on research conducted in 2005 
(Burke and Canova 2006; Burke 2006), demonstrated that global markets and 
international alliances provided significant economic opportunities for the 
cooperative and its indigenous members through increased incomes and sup-
port for new infrastructure. However, it also showed that successful cooperative 
economies guarantee neither genuine cooperativism, nor social development, 
nor transformation of the structural conditions that maintain marginaliza-
tion. In particular, our research raised serious concerns about AmazonCoop’s 
structure and its success in altering the deep inequalities that plague Brazilian 
society. Cooperative managers and members failed to translate the principles 
of democracy, participation, autonomy, and self-sufficiency into action, leaving 
indigenous people in the region as passive beneficiaries subject to the decisions 
and desires of the cooperative’s international advisors and the local, nonindig-
enous cooperative staff, including the director of FUNAI-Altamira. This lack 
of indigenous participation raised concerns—which were, unfortunately, borne 
out—about the cooperative’s sustainability.
In the present chapter, I consider the cooperative from a slightly different 
perspective. By examining AmazonCoop in the light of indigenous people’s in-
volvement in historical extractivist economies in the Brazilian Amazon, I ana-
lyze how the cooperative altered the regional political economy and the sources 
of power and patterns of exploitation of indigenous people. To conclude, I argue 
that cooperatives can act most effectively as agents of change only when their 
activities are explicitly designed to alter historically unequal power relations.
HistoriCAl struggles in  
AmAzoniAn extrACtivism
The contemporary globalization underlying AmazonCoop’s work has deep 
historical precedents in the Brazilian Amazon. For almost four centuries, the 
resource-rich Amazon has been a source of wealth for colonial and capitalist sys-
tems, and the resulting extractive industries have been important sites of political 
and economic negotiation among Amazonian indigenous people, nonindig-
enous Brazilians, local and foreign commercial interests, and the state. Under-
standing the impacts of AmazonCoop and contemporary globalization requires 
that we investigate the history of Amazonian extractivism, and particularly the 
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history of the rubber industry. Three features of the rubber industry are particu-
larly important for this discussion: the involvement of indigenous people in the 
rubber industry, the organization of rubber extraction through the aviamento 
debt-peonage system, and the recurrence of the aviamento system in Amazo-
nian political-economic organization throughout the twentieth century (Burke 
2006).
The Amazon presented would-be rubber barons with a number of serious 
obstacles. As Bunker (1984) explains, each mode of extraction in the region has 
been shaped by the social and ecological legacies of previous extractive projects. 
The late nineteenth-century elite could not easily respond to nearly insatiable 
rubber demand because the colonial-era spice and animal oil trades had de-
graded ecosystems, decimated the local, indigenous labor pool, and encouraged 
survivors to flee to upland areas from which they could more effectively con-
trol contact with Euro-Brazilians. To capitalize on new global markets and the 
high quality of Brazilian rubber, the elite were forced to import tens of thou-
sands of  workers to the region, mostly from drought-burdened Ceará.
If importing laborers was difficult, ecological and economic barriers posed 
even greater problems. Seringalistas (rubber bosses) struggled to make a profit 
in a highly volatile world market while using imported, impoverished, and in-
experienced laborers to collect widely dispersed wild rubber in “what may be 
the most inaccessible area in all of Brazil” (Nimuendajú 1920, 149). They faced 
high costs related to river transport, numerous intermediaries between tapping 
and export, and the provisioning of tappers so that they could dedicate them-
selves to rubber collection rather than subsistence. They also faced high risks of 
losing their product on dangerous rivers, of losing upward of 50 percent of their 
tappers to disease and desertion, of losing profits due to unfavorable exchange 
rates and rapidly changing prices at export houses, and of being cheated when 
workers covertly sold rubber to itinerant traders (Barham and Coomes 1994).
The infamous aviamento system effectively overcame these obstacles to eco-
nomic organization. Through this system, rubber tappers were transported into 
the Amazon and advanced supplies at the beginning of each season with the 
expectation that they repay these debts in rubber. Seringalistas set the terms of 
trade and in many cases used extreme violence to ensure payment. Minor serin-
galistas entered into similar arrangements with larger ones, and larger ones 
with the export houses that ultimately controlled prices and credit. Tappers, 
located at the bottom of the debt and pricing pyramid, paid as much as 250 to 
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500 percent above city prices for basic goods and received less than 50 percent 
of going prices for their rubber (Barham and Coomes 1994).
Indigenous Amazonians were profoundly, though not uniformly, affected 
by the rubber boom, particularly as tappers invaded upland areas in search of 
caucho trees and forced indigenous populations to flee, resist, or join the rubber 
economy as willing and unwilling laborers. Some tribes in the Altamira region 
fell prey to disease and a “slow and cruel war of extermination” (Nimuendajú 
1920, 146). The Kayapó-Gorotire, for example, were attacked by rubber tappers 
after a period of peace and forced to migrate several times, initiating a long-
standing war against the tappers of the Xingu, Fresco, Iriri, and Curua Riv-
ers. Widespread violence made the Gorotire so haunting in popular mythology 
that Fisher (2000) reports present-day Brazilians shouting “Gorotire” to scare 
their children into good behavior. Other tribes worked with rubber tappers to 
identify trees, defend territories against competitors, and provide food in times 
of need, all in exchange for manufactured goods (Fisher 2000). The unequal 
influx of weapons affected intertribal power dynamics, forcing some tribes to 
migrate away from their well-armed neighbors. Enterprising seringalistas of-
ten exploited intertribal tensions, arming and paying “pacified” tribes to attack 
and sometimes enslave those who posed a greater threat to extractivism (Nim-
uendajú 1920, 152). A different Kayapó group, however, “had the rare fortune of 
making their first contact with well-intentioned civilized people . . . in 1891,” 
and thereby “escaped from extermination by iron and fire, which was the fate of 
the others during the great advance of the caucho rubber tappers in this region” 
(Nimuendajú 1920, 147). Their good luck was not the norm.
Nimuendajú described, north of the Kayapó, other “leftovers of tribes, mea-
ger wastes that the wave of caucho rubber tappers did not drown in its brutal 
advance” (1920, 150). The Asurini “appeared” in 1894 and immediately launched 
a war against the “civilized people,” maintaining an area between the Xingu and 
Pacajá Rivers by attacking on both sides. But the seringalistas armed and paid 
the “pacified” Arara to attack the Asurini, reducing their numbers and power 
significantly. Nimuendajú described the Arara and the remaining Xipaya and 
Curuaia as “belonging to” different white settlers, a relationship that he says 
saved the latter groups from the full onslaught of the rubber tappers but also 
forced some Xipaya into “conditions that can only be clearly characterized by 
one Portuguese word: slavery” (Nimuendajú 1920, 152). The Juruna, at one time 
the most important tribe of the Xingu region, were attacked, forced to migrate, 
and attacked again before finally establishing peaceful relations with a rubber 
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tapper who took several leaders to Altamira. Most of the travelers died in the 
city, and the survivors fled into the forest.
After the Brazilian rubber industry collapsed under competition from more 
efficient Southeast Asian plantations, many indigenous people fled to more se-
cure upland areas, and nonindigenous people migrated in search of other eco-
nomic opportunities. But the aviamento system continued to organize Am-
azonian labor and commodity flows, including the extraction of Brazil nuts, 
throughout the twentieth century (Laraia and da Matta 1967). Aviamento re-
mained a “rational” way of organizing and controlling scarce labor and capital 
in an Amazonian ecological context, and had likely become a fairly hegemonic 
template for social and economic organization. Relations among regional elite 
and between the elite, intermediaries, and extractivists certainly changed over 
time (see, for example, the discussion in Weinstein 1983), but one hundred years 
of patron-client networks organized around the aviamento system likely made 
it difficult to conceive of viable alternatives, let alone establish them against 
entrenched elite interests.
The case of the Kayapó-Xikrin demonstrates the continuity and institution-
alization of the aviamento system and the importance of extractivism in regional 
political economies. After years of disrupting local extractive efforts, the Xikrin 
were “pacified” at the end of the 1950s, integrated by government officials into the 
international fur trade under the aviamento model, and used to fight and settle 
the Asurini and Araweté, who were also seen as threats to extractivism. Fisher 
(2000) notes that the Xikrin entered the fur trade to meet their own goals, not 
simply because of government coercion. Government-issued firearms offered se-
curity after several decades of war and migration, and long treks in search of furs 
allowed Xikrin families to avoid sad and dangerous reunions with the spirits of 
the many ancestors who died during contact and lingered in villages. In many 
ways, the Xikrin think of the fur boom as a golden age of peace, security, and 
impressive access to goods. With its own source of goods, the tribe was not vul-
nerable to the vagaries of government spending. However, the international ban 
on the fur trade generated that vulnerability and prompted the government and 
tribe to reorient their efforts around Brazil nut collection.
While the Brazilian state played little direct role in the rubber boom, it has 
entangled itself in contemporary manifestations of the aviamento system as an 
intermediary. By the 1970s, FUNAI had “pacified” and “villagized” many of Al-
tamira’s indigenous people and had drawn them back into extractivism through 
trade in fur and Brazil nuts. By mediating indigenous peoples’ involvement 
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in extractivism, FUNAI used indigenous labor to underwrite its own operat-
ing costs and established itself as a powerful supplier of manufactured goods. 
Extractivism turned indigenous groups into “self-financing and dependent 
communit[ies]  .  .  .  initiated into a system that [has] been in existence since 
the rubber boom in Amazonia, a system still widely practiced on Indian posts” 
(Fisher 2000, 77). In this context, however, FUNAI’s power is largely depen-
dent on fluctuations in the world market in nontimber forest products. Writ-
ing just as AmazonCoop was being founded, Fisher describes the Brazil nut 
harvest as “a calculated gamble” and “a time of great anxiety” for Xikrin villagers 
(2000, 78).
Extractivism creates a delicate and competitive set of alliances among Ama-
zonian indigenous peoples, FUNAI, and corporations. Goods and services are 
critical forms of currency that make those alliances possible. Nonindigenous 
people seek raw materials such as spices, rubber, fur, timber, minerals, and Bra-
zil nuts, and they depend on a predictable and controlled labor process to ob-
tain these goods. Manufactured debt and direct government mandates shape 
indigenous people into “useful” extractivists. For their part, indigenous people 
seek manufactured goods and development projects that, in addition to their 
instrumental value, have the political value of reinforcing the power of chiefs 
as intermediaries with the white world and redistributors of trade goods. These 
material bases of chiefly power have become especially important because the 
dispersed and family-based nature of extractivism has weakened chiefs’ tradi-
tional roles as organizers of communal labor (Fisher 2000).
Fisher’s account of Kayapó-Xikrin involvement in extractivism is particularly 
rich because it explains the sources of indigenous people’s power and agency in 
these negotiations and conflicts: their labor power, ecological knowledge, abil-
ity to disrupt nonindigenous economies, and ability to fall back on traditional 
hunting-planting-gathering livelihoods that permit relative autonomy. Indig-
enous people have been a resource and threat to extractive industries, and they 
have generally remained resilient to economic booms and busts. Their ability 
to shift between government and corporate partners has also been helpful; for 
example, a downturn in the FUNAI-organized Brazil nut trade in the late 1990s 
prompted tribes to fulfill their demand for goods through alliances with mining 
and timber firms. This is where the story of AmazonCoop begins.
Like previous extractive projects in the region, AmazonCoop grew from the 
convergence of foreign demand and local and international entrepreneurship. 
Through the cooperative, indigenous people, corporations, and the state sought 
to capitalize on local natural resources within the political and economic con-
Bringing power and History into Cooperative design 141
text of globalization and neoliberal policies. The cooperative’s adaptations, like 
those of nineteenth-century seringalistas, were shaped by previous extractive 
projects. AmazonCoop was established in a region structured around the old 
aviamento system, where indigenous people and other extractivists have of-
ten been controlled by debt and violence in a nearly lawless land, and where 
they typically have occupied the most unfavorable position within a value chain 
con trolled by foreigners and a large number of intermediaries. Worse, while 
indigenous people historically found power in their ability to provide or with-
hold critical knowledge, to play competing firms against each other, to violently 
disrupt the riverine trade of rubber and basic necessities, and to return to tra-
ditional means of subsistence, state-led “pacification” and “villagization” have 
significantly limited many of these avenues of indigenous power. In addition to 
this historical legacy, AmazonCoop also embodies several distinctive features 
of contemporary society, most notably the prominence of international civil so-
ciety, new niche markets for socially responsible consumption, the improved le-
gal and social status of indigenous people in Brazil and beyond, and consumer 
concern for the people and ecology of the rain forest.
ContemporAry And HistoriCAl extrACtivism  
in tHe BrAziliAn AmAzon: AnAlyzing 
AmAzonCoop As An Agent of CHAnge
Cooperative organizations are a promising addition to the extractivist eco-
nomic landscape in this region. Cooperatives are meant to benefit members 
by changing their position within production, marketing, and/or consumption 
systems. By drawing members together in a single institution, they can provide 
important benefits like economies of scale; access to credit, capital, and ma-
chinery; possibilities for providing social services en masse; and the ability of 
members to mobilize and exert political influence. In our previous research, we 
have shown that the AmazonCoop trade relationship did provide significant 
material benefits to indigenous extractivists in Altamira. By combining verti-
cal integration with The Body Shop’s above-market price, the cooperative was 
able to pay indigenous harvesters more than double the local rate for riverside 
purchases of Brazil nut.
However, I argue that if cooperatives are to be agents of change, they must do 
more than help members benefit from existing political economies; they must 
also change unjust patterns of power and exploitation within those political 
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economies. To what extent did AmazonCoop change historical relations of 
power, control, and exploitation? On the surface, the (nonindigenous) coop-
erative directors seemed to be on the right track. They listed self-sufficiency, 
cultural integrity, and the ability to engage effectively with o mundo branco (the 
white world) as their most important goals for indigenous members. The co-
operative’s success in vertical integration of the rubber industry and economic 
diversification (results of large infusions of foreign capital) also seemed promis-
ing. Unlike the rubber tappers of the past, the cooperative was able to eliminate 
several intermediaries by purchasing its own cargo boat, warehouse, and oil-
processing plant. This ensured the cooperative a larger profit and fewer risks 
than historical seringalistas enjoyed, and therefore reduced the need for ex-
treme exploitation and violence.
On closer examination, however, AmazonCoop reproduced many historical 
relations of control and exploitation without enhancing the bases of indigenous 
people’s power. The continuities in Amazonian extractivism are particularly evi-
dent in the organization of Brazil nut collection. As with previous modes of 
extraction, the Brazil nut trade is internationally oriented, with a market struc-
ture determined by forces outside of Brazil and its indigenous communities. The 
costs, risks, and difficulties of Brazil nut extraction resemble those of rubber 
(though they are less extreme), and the cooperative’s extractive program is orga-
nized along the lines of previous FUNAI programs, which are themselves varia-
tions of the aviamento system. Laborers are controlled by the cooperative’s and 
FUNAI’s near monopoly on manufactured goods and development projects, by 
debt accrued through advanced supplies, and by strong government control over 
indigenous villages.
AmazonCoop’s Brazil nuts are harvested directly from the forest, a difficult, 
time-consuming, and dangerous process. In most member villages, the nuts are 
collected in February and March by individual families, some of whom spend 
the entire two-month harvest season in the forest. Traveling to distant Brazil 
nut patches requires a significant investment of time and money for inputs such 
as gasoline, food, and hunting and fishing supplies. To offset these costs and 
encourage intensive dedication to Brazil nuts, the cooperative advances money 
and supplies at the start of each harvest season, which harvesters must repay 
in nuts. The extractivists we interviewed gave mixed reviews of this credit sys-
tem, complaining about low end-of-season profits but content with the higher 
yields made possible by more time in the forest. Long absences threaten family 
agricultural production, however, and may decrease food quality for the rest 
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of the year. One Asurini family dedicated themselves so intensively to Brazil 
nuts that they did not grow their own farinha (yuca or manioc meal), marking 
the first time that anyone could remember a family lacking this staple food. 
Though not as exploitative as the traditional aviamento system, AmazonCoop’s 
credit system creates dependencies on the cooperative, the government, and the 
Brazil nut harvest by encouraging extraction at the expense of other livelihood 
options.
If the cooperative had been owned and operated by its indigenous members, 
this manner of organizing extractivism would have been a significant change 
from the aviamento system: indigenous harvesters would suddenly have con-
trolled the capital, credit, and equipment that shaped their work, and their pro-
duction of Brazil nut oil would have moved them up the value chain. Unfortu-
nately, however, AmazonCoop was a top-heavy organization in which power 
and decision-making authority were concentrated not only outside of indige-
nous villages but also outside of Brazil. The cooperative’s use of  “them” in public 
references to indigenous members is revealing in this regard. AmazonCoop was 
an organization of nonindigenous advocates acting on behalf of  the indigenous 
people of the Altamira region and in the interest of a multinational corporation 
and a government agency. The cooperative’s strategy was devised by an interna-
tional advisory board composed of representatives from multinational corpora-
tions and leaders of the corporate social responsibility movement. This strategy 
was then handed down to an administrative council whose active members were 
all nonindigenous Brazilians. It was only through village representatives to the 
General Assembly that indigenous people were involved in decision making, 
but assemblies were rarely held, and a quorum required the presence of as few 
as three indigenous people. In addition, the cooperative’s three main income 
sources—Brazil nut sales, the provision of Internet services, and donations via 
the Tataquara Eco-Lodge—all depended on nonindigenous managers and for-
eign money and markets. Indigenous people had virtually no say in the organi-
zation of these economic projects and controlled none of the assets on which 
they depended.
AmazonCoop probably did not choose this international orientation for the 
purpose of maintaining the dependency of indigenous members. In addition 
to extremely low levels of education and professional capacity in Altamira’s in-
digenous villages, there were several good reasons that the cooperative founders 
might have looked abroad for support. The cooperative was founded by nonin-
digenous entities—The Body Shop and the regional FUNAI administration—to 
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meet the material, financial, and marketing needs of those entities. In addition, 
this strategy was an economically rational response to the cooperative’s abil-
ity to mobilize significant levels of foreign capital from countries where indig-
enous Amazonians have high symbolic power and to the difficulties of finding 
domestic support as a result of anti-indigenous racism. Finally, the cooperative 
emphasized international partnerships because, in the view of its managers, the 
Brazilian state had failed to provide adequate support for indigenous people. 
Nonetheless, while international links facilitated access to new markets, funding 
sources, and expertise, they did little to eliminate the dependencies and power 
imbalances of previous extractive systems.
In fact, the cooperative decreased many of the traditional sources of indig-
enous power within extractivist economies. By integrating indigenous people, 
the state, and corporate interests into a single institution, it reduced competi-
tion between corporations and the state and limited opportunities for indige-
nous groups to play outsiders against each other. That it eliminated competi-
tion without securing a long-term commitment or formal contract from The 
Body Shop made the economic benefits of this “fair trade” system even more 
precarious. In addition, because indigenous labor contributed to less than half 
of the cooperative’s total income (the Internet service provider was equally lu-
crative), their ability to use slow-downs and strikes to pressure Brazilian and 
international decision makers was limited. The extent of government control 
over indigenous villages, development and social service opportunities, and the 
cooperative further enforced indigenous people’s compliance with the coopera-
tive’s labor demands.
The final days of the cooperative revealed the full extent of indigenous dis-
empowerment. In the dramatic conflicts that led to the cooperative’s dissolu-
tion, the organization’s enormous debts and legal liabilities were transferred to 
a newly appointed indigenous president while a sizeable portion of machinery 
and other assets mysteriously disappeared or were transferred to nonindigenous 
people. Indigenous people not only lacked effective decision-making power, 
even the collective nature of cooperative economic resources was a farce. Given 
this, the cooperative can best be seen as a new intermediary in an aviamento-like 
system. Rather than enabling indigenous people to control their own capital, 
credit, and labor, the cooperative maintained indigenous people at the lowest 
rungs of the production chain, albeit with better compensation.
Of course, better compensation and decreased exploitation are important 
gains, and the indigenous villagers that we spoke with were clearly happy with 
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the higher incomes that the cooperative permitted. My point is simply that 
these benefits were secured through the workings of a highly unequal society 
and did not entail a change in indigenous people’s position within local power 
relations.
Furthermore, many of these benefits depended more on external factors 
than on the cooperative itself. For example, because Brazil nuts have a shorter 
harvest season and constitute a much smaller industry than rubber, harvesters 
are able to pursue other subsistence activities and are less likely to become de-
pendent on this single commodity and the intermediaries who control its sale. 
Also, the security of a “pacified,” government-monitored indigenous labor pool 
lowers economic risks and the need for more extreme forms of labor control. 
Most important, though, the main value of the cooperative’s Brazil nuts derives 
not from their use-value but from their symbolism, from the positive image 
that comes with fair trade, cooperative organization, and indigenous develop-
ment. This fact alters the industry, establishing a limit to the exploitability of 
indigenous people and obliging corporate and state partners to provide (or at 
least appear to provide) something recognizable as “development.”
Considering power And History in 
CooperAtive design
By now it should be clear that AmazonCoop provided economic benefits to in-
digenous people in the Altamira region, but it did not change (or even attempt 
to change) their extreme marginalization within networks of power. Unfortu-
nately, this is not an unusual outcome of cooperative organizing. The Amazon-
Coop story can be useful, however, for reimagining how we might transform 
cooperatives from beneficial social and economic institutions into agents of 
profound social change.
The key, I think, lies in the way that we think about cooperative design. If 
we focus on developing cooperatives that can successfully execute economic 
projects, that is precisely what we will get: cooperatives that execute economic 
projects and marginally improve people’s well-being. This work is important, 
but these cooperatives will tend to work within—and therefore reproduce—
the power dynamics that have created today’s vastly unequal world. What if we 
design cooperatives based on a different set of questions? What if, instead of 
(or alongside of ) the standard question of how to organize economically viable 
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cooperatives, we also thoroughly interrogate how our cooperatives can challenge 
the historical relations of power that have created the very need for institution-
alized cooperation among the poor?
AmazonCoop provides a useful example for how cooperatives might be de-
signed differently. The founders of AmazonCoop asked, “What type of organi-
zation do we need to create in order to trade with those multinational corpora-
tions that will pay a premium in order to appear fair and just?” This question is 
perfectly reasonable, but it reduces indigenous people’s interests to the narrow 
issue of achieving a higher price for their products. It also puts multinational 
corporations in the driver’s seat by emphasizing the need to adapt to their de-
mands. Most important, it diverts attention away from critical reflection on the 
status quo. Instead, we might place this new possibility of cooperative-based 
fair trade into the historical context of indigenous involvement in extractivism, 
asking how it could alter the resources, challenges, and vulnerabilities that shape 
indigenous people’s social and economic opportunities. While there are many 
ways to approach this discussion, I offer the following questions as one path for 
considering how historical power relations can be mobilized and changed in 
order to promote indigenous well-being today:
 1. How can indigenous people use this cooperative to preserve and expand his-
torical sources of power in extractive economies?
 2. How can indigenous people use this cooperative to mobilize new types of 
power available in today’s global economic and social landscape?
 3. How can indigenous people use this cooperative to avoid, escape, or change 
the dynamics that have contributed to their unfavorable position in extractive 
economies?
These questions clearly establish that the cooperative is not an end in itself 
but rather a tool that indigenous people might use to combat their systematic 
marginalization. By making power central to cooperative design, they help us 
look beyond the ways that indigenous people can use the cooperative to make 
inroads with a multinational corporation willing to pay a premium for the right 
to use indigenous, environmental, and fair trade symbolism; they also prompt 
us to think about how indigenous people can carve out power within that trade 
relationship and how they can leverage that relationship to make broader claims 
to power.
Examining the old aviamento system, it is clear that a lack of capital main-
tained indigenous people in the lowest links of the commodity chain. A 
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genuinely participatory cooperative would create the possibility of indigenous-
controlled credit to support the Brazil nut harvest and indigenous-owned 
transportation and processing plants. These new commons would surely im-
prove the position of indigenous people within the commodity chain, but the 
series of questions that I propose raise other possibilities as well.
For example, history shows that indigenous people sometimes resorted to 
extreme measures—disrupting trade through violent river closures or leaving 
the rubber trade altogether—in order to force consideration of their interests. 
This historical understanding could be used to ensure that any new coopera-
tive actively privileges indigenous interests. First, we might institutionalize 
frequent and meaningful opportunities for indigenous people to express their 
interests in ways that do not disrupt trade, for example through regular meet-
ings on indigenous lands. But a cooperative that seeks to actively challenge 
power hierarchies might take a second, more unusual step of valuing and even 
strengthening indigenous people’s ability to disrupt trade. This type of ulti-
mate veto power—which could be established through a number of different 
mechanisms—subordinates the cooperative economic project to the broader 
goal of social change. The cooperative might also strengthen indigenous power 
vis-à-vis international partners and other local economic elite (including the 
government) by using profits to strengthen traditional subsistence systems and 
to pursue new livelihood options, thus decreasing dependency on individual 
industries and partners. Not incidentally, designing these possibilities for pro-
test into the cooperative might actually stabilize (rather than threaten) inter-
national partnerships by decreasing the risk of unexpected and more dramatic 
forms of resistance. If indigenous people have the power to demand meaning-
ful dialogue, they don’t need to assert their power through mass mobilizations, 
protests, and media attacks against their partner corporation.
This brings us to a second point: how the cooperative might use contempo-
rary developments to promote change. AmazonCoop was founded on the new 
symbolic value of indigenous people and the interest of international civil soci-
ety in indigenous rights and conservation, but these resources were used only to 
increase profits to The Body Shop and earnings for indigenous harvesters. The 
lack of engagement with indigenous political movements is especially surpris-
ing given that the initial idea for The Body Shop’s involvement in the region 
grew out of a masterfully executed symbolic protest by local indigenous people 
against the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam. A lucrative project like the Ama-
zonCoop Brazil nut trade might lend extra weight to indigenous demands that 
the Brazilian government uphold basic rights, particularly in areas like land 
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rights and education, which become (monetarily) valuable prerequisites for for-
eign direct investment. This type of project could also be used to unite tribes 
that were previously divided (and exploited through their division) and to form 
mutually beneficial relationships between urban and rural indigenous people.
These ideas offer a hint of the possibilities that emerge when we consider 
cooperatives as agents of change rather than more limited economic projects, 
and when we place them in their historical context. Of course, most coopera-
tives will not be able to launch entirely new modes of production, extraction, 
exchange, and distribution. Historical relations of exploitation, dependency, 
and unequal exchange may be so entrenched that cooperative members can-
not create a radically new alternative all at once. In fact, some of that resistance 
will come from cooperators themselves; developing an intertribal cooperative 
in the Altamira region would challenge traditional systems of chiefly power 
and authority, and parallel projects in other rural areas would provoke similar 
challenges. But these sticking points only underscore the importance of more 
transformative cooperatives. They raise a final question that could aid in re-
thinking cooperatives:
 4. How can cooperative members engage in these still imperfect, still exploitative 
economic practices in a way that promotes their long-term liberation from sys-
tems of exploitation?
Change will not come overnight, neither in cooperatives nor in society at 
large. Many new AmazonCoops will be created, projects that don’t challenge 
the status quo but do improve living conditions for the economically disenfran-
chised by offering them slightly higher profits and added social perks. These 
remain valuable. But I think that cooperatives can aspire to more. Through criti-
cal interrogations of power and history, I think cooperatives can help us imagine 
and move toward a more profound reconfiguration of power in the future. This 
is surely a worthwhile task.




o appreCiate smallholder Cooperatives and associations in 
Co lombia, it is important to understand the contemporary character­
istics of the rural economy, its importance nationally, and the major 
threats it faces. In this chapter, I present a vision of small producers in Co ­
lombia and the role that some significant cooperatives have played in small­
farmer development. This chapter is based on the results of rural­sector studies 
car ried out since 1980 by the School of Rural and Environmental Studies at 
the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. The first part of the chapter focuses on 
the smallholder economy. The analysis draws primarily upon the work of 
Jaime Forero Álvarez (2010), a professor in the Department of Regional and 
Rural Development who has addressed the profound changes incurred by the 
smallholder or family economy throughout the twentieth century and the 
chal lenges faced in the last 25 years—including violence, land seizures, dis ­
placement, and, as a result, massive impoverishment. In the second section, I 
lay out the importance of the cooperative sector in supporting the smallholder 
economy, grounding my discussion in studies carried out by the Solidarity 
Studies Unit (Unidad de Estudios Solidarios, or UNES) in the southern 
provinces of the department of Santander (see López in this volume).
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The PeasanT economy in colombia
The family­based small­producer economy holds an important place within Co­
lombia’s agricultural sector. According to Garay, Barberi, and Cardona (2010), 
87 percent of productive farm and livestock units in Colombia are associated 
with the smallholder economy. From data collected for a 2005 household sur­
vey by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), this is 
equivalent to about 1.4 million households (almost 6 million people, or 12 per­
cent of the total number of households in the country)—without including the 
760,403 family groups who were displaced between 1998 and 2008 (Forero 2010, 
74). On average, the productive agriculture and livestock units linked to the 
smallholder economy use 4.8 hectares of land and allocate at least part of their 
labor and income to their farms or plots. Such numbers contrast with those per­
taining to business agriculture, which uses an average of 65.1 hectares per farm, 
with 53.1 hectares dedicated to pastureland for grazing livestock (Garay, Barberi, 
and Cardona 2010).
Beyond doubt, the contribution of family production to national livestock 
and agricultural production is of great importance. Several studies carried out 
over different historical periods clearly illustrate this. For example, in 1988, the 
Agriculture and Livestock Sector Studies Mission (Misión de Estudios del 
Sector Agropecuario, or MIESA) showed that smallholder agriculture in Co­
lombia constituted 57.1 percent of crops and contributed 42.7 percent of ag­
ricultural production value—this, without counting coffee, sugar, or livestock. 
Forero’s calculation more than 10 years later separated small­scale from capi­
talist agricultural production, averaging for 1999–2000, and found that pre­
dominantly smallholder production made up 67.3 percent of harvested land and 
62.9 percent of national agricultural production value without counting coca or 
poppy farming in either case. Another study, by Garay, Barberi, and Cardona 
(2010), using data from the National Households Survey, calculated the small­
holder economy as 47 percent of total land harvested in 2005 and 50 percent 
of production value for transitory crops; in the case of permanent crops, this 
participation reached 56 percent of harvested area and 48 percent of production 
value.*
*Forero notes that these data are not comparable to those that he calculated for 
1999–2000 because they come from different sources.
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In the case of coffee, smallholder production has played an increasingly im­
portant role. Today, this sector occupies 78 percent of land planted with coffee 
crops. Moreover, the small­producer sector’s great capacity for adaptation as 
a result of a combination of monetary and nonmonetary strategies has given 
it greater resilience in comparison with industrial (or capitalist) production 
(Forero 2010, 72). And as for livestock production, small producers hold 69 per­
cent of land dedicated to ranching and own 14 percent of cattle at the national 
level (Ibid., 70).
TransformaTion of smallholder  
households in colombia
One of the most significant changes in the Colombian smallholder economy 
has been the partial monetization of family agricultural production systems and 
smallholder subsistence. This change is the result of smallholders’ increased en­
trance into labor markets (both supply and demand), agricultural inputs, goods, 
and services. This is different from what was happening in the mid­1900s, when 
small­producer households accessed agricultural inputs and other consumer 
goods through their own or their neighbors’ farms and used mainly family la­
bor. Today, the family­based producer sector in Colombia hires between 17 and 
53 percent of the labor employed on its land. Furthermore, this sector purchases 
“a high percentage of foodstuffs, [and] almost all their clothing, housing mate­
rials, vehicular transportation, public services, health, education, electrical ap­
pliances, beverages,” and so on, on the market (Forero 2010, 80–83).
Greater dependence upon consumer goods and monetization has helped 
transform economic rationality within the smallholder sector. To wit, we have 
seen the development of a particular production logic involving two clear spheres. 
In the monetary sphere, producer families carry out their market transactions to 
acquire goods and services. And, in the domestic sphere, producers use their own 
farm resources, as well as family and outside labor, according to relationships of 
donation and reciprocity (Ibid., 85).
Another area of generalized transformation has been in technological change, 
which, according to studies evaluating Colombia’s Integrated Rural Development 
program (DRI, in Spanish), has been evident since the 1980s. Conclusions 
from a study carried out by MIESA in 1990 showed that this change, based 
on the introduction of Green Revolution practices, narrowed the technological 
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gap between small farmers and big producers (Ibid.). Such evidence, in turn, 
belies assertions made even today about the resistance of rural producers to 
technological and technical change.
An additional important development in the family agricultural sector has 
been members’ participation in marketing their products at different levels. This 
sector allocates a good portion of its harvests to the market through either in­
formal intermediaries or supply warehouses in big cities and market squares. As 
Forero explains, the informal and formal marketing channels complement one 
another when it comes to satisfying low­, median­, and high­income consumer 
needs (Ibid., 91).
Higher participation of small­producer households in the market econ­
omy does not mean that local consumption is no longer important, however. 
As Forero highlights, local consumption among small­producer households is 
on average around 30 percent. Indeed, there are novel practices in sales and 
product placement whereby certain producers who achieve high levels of local 
consumption manage to significantly expand their market sales thanks to the 
complementarity between the domestic and monetary spheres of their produc­
tion systems.
It is also worth pointing out a particular change in the conceptualization of 
microscale economies. In Forero’s research, for example, case studies demon­
strate that small producers have achieved profits similar to or higher than those 
of medium and large producers despite attendant costs, including remunerating 
their own labor force. Without generalizing, what is striking is the assertion 
that “in some cases, it can be shown that medium [producers] do not have the 
advantages belonging to large­scale production, nor do they benefit from cer­
tain possibilities that small producers have to save costs” (Ibid., 93). For Forero, 
small producers’ focus on tasks specific to their farms generates microecono­
mies of scale derived from “the virtuosity of the farmer” in attending directly 
to his farm and to the work it demands. This gives the family farmer a com­
parative advantage vis­à­vis large­scale farmers and/or agriculture and livestock 
businesspeople.
Finally, Forero responds to stark affirmations related to family producers’ low 
income and high poverty levels, which have served arguments that smallholder 
production is unviable. Based on studies carried out since 1990 in diverse rural 
areas of the country, he concludes that, “as far as our analysis goes, family pro­
duction is economically viable if we take labor remuneration, precisely, as an 
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indicator of viability against other alternatives. But what is perhaps most no­
table is that, even after paying expenses, the producers analyzed offer payments 
that remain higher than the minimum wage” (Ibid., 97).
The smallholder economy in The  
agrarian conTexT of colombia
The Colombian small­producer population, with its multiplicity of productive 
means, forms part of an agrarian structure that interconnects them with other 
economic agents. Forero highlights seven types of agrarian spaces, in five of 
which the smallholder economy has a significant presence. These spaces are: 
(1) spaces of “rural capitalism,” wherein family enterprise coexists and has a 
working relationship with capitalist enterprise, and in which investors—who 
often come from smallholder communities themselves—have made possible 
the productive expansion and intensification of crops such as coffee; (2) spaces 
in which large, medium, and small producers converge through mechanized 
farming, wherein family production persists in areas economically domi­
nated by capitalist agribusiness but interbusiness relations among the differ­
ent types of producers are lacking; (3) small­producer spaces, wherein family 
agriculture predominates but rural plots and communities are “surrounded” by 
cattle farming latifundios; (4) disputed spaces between owners of latifundios 
and small­producer communities, wherein the latifundios have expanded at 
the expense of smallholder properties and as a result of rising land purchases 
by drug traffickers;† and (5) resettlement spaces, in which already­settled small 
producers and businesses (extractive or cattle grazing) converge with new lati­
fundios and indigenous communities (Ibid., 74–77). Overall, it is important to 
emphasize that illegal crops (coca, poppies, and marijuana) occupy fewer than 
200,000 hectares overall, compared to the 40 million hectares of grassland needed 
to accommodate a herd of nearly 30 million grazing livestock animals. Nonethe­
less, the coca­producing regions are characterized by the emergence of armed ac­
tors, creating a violent and unstable context for producers.
†These spaces are concentrated in Magdalena Medio and on the Atlantic coast.
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The disPlaced PoPulaTion and ThreaTs  
To The smallholder economy
Over the last 25 years, the rise in paramilitary action, drug trafficking, and guer­
rilla warfare, together with the push toward neoliberalism by the César Gaviria 
government (1990–1994), all contributed to the dramatic impoverishment of 
the 760,403 family groups who were displaced between 1998 and 2008 (Comis­
ión 2009). Not only stripped of their land, they were dispossessed of their crops 
and animals, as well.‡ It is worth stressing that the total area abandoned be­
tween 1998 and 2008 is equivalent to 25 percent of farming land in the country. 
These families’ basic capacity for generating monetary and nonmonetary in­
comes was substantially affected. If 49 percent of these families were classi­
fied as not poor prior to displacement, today only 3.4 percent qualify as such; 
and while predisplacement 31.5 percent were indigent, today 80.7 percent are 
(Forero 2010, 102–103).
Additionally, the increasing concentration of land in the hands of  latifundio 
owners who dedicate it to cattle grazing has contributed to displacement and 
war in the countryside. In a total area of 42 million hectares, 32 million are dedi­
cated to cattle grazing latifundios, 6 million to semi­intensive cattle farming, 
1.6 to industrial agriculture, and 2.6 to family agriculture. This inequality in land 
distribution allows Forero to highlight the following paradox: “While the pro­
ductive capacity of family farmers cannot be minimally activated due to limita­
tions on access to land, most of this resource [land] finds itself monopolized in 
an unproductive state by latifundios dedicated to cattle grazing” (Ibid., 105).
cooPeraTives and The PeasanT economy
Cooperatives appeared in Colombia in 1931 after the issuing of Law 134, and 
their presence was felt mainly in urban sectors. In the rural sector, cooperatives 
appeared in the 1940s and began to have an important presence in the 1960s 
with the enthusiasm inspired by the Cuban revolution and as an instrument 
‡According to data in the Second National Survey on the Verification of Rights of  
the Displaced Population, 55.5 percent of displaced persons owned land, and 78.9 per­
cent owned animals that generated income (see Forero 2010, 102).
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for modernizing the countryside. From then on, the state pushed mainly agrar­
ian reform cooperatives, the Catholic Church promoted rural savings and loan 
cooperatives, and dairy businesspeople, along with the sugarcane and coffee 
unions, promoted agro­industrial and marketing cooperatives. These experi­
ences were consolidated starting in the 1980s. Currently, cooperatives form part 
of the Solidarity Economy System, which in Article 2 of Colombia’s Law 454 
of 1998 is designated as the “socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental system 
shaped by a collection of social forces organized in associative ways identified 
by solidarity, democratic, and humanist self­governing practices, not motivated 
by profit, for the comprehensive development of the human being as a subject, 
actor, and ultimate beneficiary of the economy.”
The most important results achieved by cooperatives in support of the small­
holder economy can be organized into three fundamental categories: those of 
an economic character, those that concern social capital, and those related to 
technological change. These are explored below with reference to studies in 
the south of the department of Santander. Five cases are discussed in detail by 
López later in this volume.
resulTs of an economic naTure
Cooperative experiences in the southern provinces of Santander exemplify the 
role that cooperativism has played on behalf of small producers, insofar as it has 
allowed them access to financial and other complementary services. This has 
unfolded within the framework of the Catholic Church’s rural development 
programs, thanks to which rural savings and loan cooperatives (cooperativas ru-
rales de ahorro y crédito, or CRAC) have become active agents for local and rural 
development. In this vein, the Secretariat of Social Ministry (Secretariado de 
Pastoral Social, or SEPAS) of the San Gil and Socorro diocese started a pro­
gram in 1964 that “has contributed to strengthening the socioeconomic fabric 
of this peripheral region” in large part because SEPAS knew how to “extract the 
best from the cooperative model and from its adult education methodologies to 
develop and redevelop original development models and strategies adapted to 
its particular context” (Bucheli 2006, 13).
By 2007, this network of cooperatives supported the existence of seventeen 
CRACs that managed to consolidate autonomous capital from member con­
tributions. This allowed them to cover unsatisfied demand for credit through 
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the successful actions of  loan operators to express social and economic rational­
ity in local cultural terms (Dávila 2004; Silva and Dávila 2002). In 2005, 15 of 
these CRACs provided loans of close to $31 million (López and Peña 2005).
Despite these achievements, a weakness remains in the fact that the most 
needy sectors have not been totally addressed. Within areas under the influence 
of CRACs, there remain landless producers who, in their vast majority, are not 
associated with cooperative practices. They have neither sufficient money nor 
assets to allow them to join and use the savings and loan services that these 
organizations offer (Dávila 2008).
What has been most important in this process has been that the CRACs 
have managed to carry out activities that are well established and well con­
nected to local and regional communities. This success is due to two strengths: 
“For one, the close relationships with members, which reduces the problems 
of poor selection and moral risk. This facilitates loan repayment and allows the 
institution to tailor itself to borrowers’ needs. And second, financial administra­
tion by directors and managers that is derived from knowledge of microcredit” 
(López and Peña 2005, 47–48). In addition, the offer of “tailor­made services 
for the needs of members” and “guarantees founded in trust and familiarity” 
makes room for flexible and timely lending services (Dávila 2008, 312).
resulTs relaTed To The creaTion  
of social caPiTal
Lobo (2001) shows how a cooperative in the south of Santander has been an 
important actor—together with the parish and the agricultural school—in the 
peace process. Facing pressure from an armed group that had been dominant 
since the mid­1980s, this area decided to become a “peace territory” in 1997. 
Given the absence of the state and the presence of armed actors, the commu­
nity decided to organize itself into committees and create a space to resolve con­
flicts through dialogue, as well as address specific community needs and outline 
demands for recognition as part of civil society, including respect for human 
rights. In this way, they pushed the pacification process forward. The contribu­
tion of the COAGRANJA cooperative was to strengthen community identity 
through a process of  “building values, attitudes, [and] social norms based princi­
pally on trust and solidarity (cognitive social capital) from the time of its found­
ing by offering loan services based upon personal guarantees based on trust and 
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familiarity among members (the use of a guarantor)” (Ibid., 103). They also facili­
tated the presence of members and employees as cooperative representatives at 
different moments of the pacification process, such as meetings with the armed 
groups and committees for human rights.
resulTs relaTed To Technological change
The CRACs created in this territory soon moved beyond the distinct stages of 
their life cycles (i.e., promotion, creation, development, and consolidation) and 
strengthened their economic positions. Meanwhile, complementary services 
related to farm and livestock activity were converted into basic support for im­
proving technical conditions of production and adopting new technologies ap­
propriate to members’ economic circumstances. For example, the cooperatives 
located in Barichara (founded in 1965) and Villanueva (founded in 1960), with 
significant activity in bean crops, established tractor lending services in the 
1980s—at fair prices—facilitating members’ work on the flatlands of the two 
municipalities. By so doing, they accelerated the adoption of modern farming 
technology in the subregion. Likewise, the cooperatives were able to offer rent­
als of grain strippers and other necessary tools at reasonable prices to in troduce 
modern technology into different farming tasks (Medina 2002).
The La Granja cooperative (founded in 1974), located in the municipality of 
Sucre, stimulated a comprehensive development project starting in 1989. Sup­
ported by the Inter­American Foundation, which promoted technical assis­
tance services, this allowed for increased milk production and improved cheese 
production. The Valle de San José cooperative (founded in 1967) promoted an 
institution­building process in the 2000s to improve members’ agriculture and 
livestock production, pushing for environmental education in agroecology and 
technical assistance for organic agriculture and solid waste management. This 
effort has made it into one of the municipalities with the highest numbers of 
production systems aimed at clean farming (Ariza 2007).
conclusions
The most important conclusion derived from the role of cooperatives in the 
context of the smallholder economy has to do with the skills these cooperatives 
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have developed in approaching local culture—especially in interpreting the 
particular production logic held by family producers—as they offer their dif­
ferent services. The ability to consolidate autonomous capital from member 
contributions, for instance, has provided flexibility in the terms set for loan 
repayment. Also, close relationships with and between members allows for de­
cisions regarding credit to be based on notions of trust and awareness of house­
hold’s needs, ability to repay loans, and credibility. The role of cooperatives in 
strengthening community identity in a violent context and rebuilding trust and 
solidarity has been particularly important in the Colombian context, creating 
real possibilities for a viable future for smallholders. In other words, coopera­
tives have advanced the sustainability of the smallholder economy and its tech­
nological development while generating ideal conditions for its maintenance 
and defense within a violent setting. Through the development of social capital, 
they have also helped support and promote the peace processes that have taken 
place in the region. In this sense, a very important contribution has been their 
advocacy for small producers as citizens, as subjects with rights and responsi­
bilities, and in empowering and defending small producers as social subjects 
worthy of full recognition by the rest of society.
I
n 1989, the restructurIng of the global economy through open 
markets, free trade, and common market blocks took a toll on the coffee 
industry by forcing the dismantling of the International Coffee Agreement. 
The International Coffee Organization had handled this agreement since the 
1960s, managing to stabilize international prices by setting annual export 
quotas for each producing country. This, in turn, facilitated the overall devel-
opment of the coffee sector, as well as long-term economic planning by large 
producing countries, such as Colombia. Colombia itself specialized in export-
ing green coffee as an excellent-quality raw material to be mixed with beans 
from other origins, a strategy that allowed for the growth of coffee-roasting 
facilities, which entered into supply quota agreements between exporters and 
the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia (FNC, in Spanish).*
Despite the fact that over the course of the twentieth century Colombia 
irrefutably created a comparative advantage for its coffee industry in terms of 
domestic infrastructure, crops, research, technology, and internal marketing, 
producers failed to acquire external marketing experience. On the one hand, 
*The FNC is internationally recognized by the famous image of  Juan Valdez. 
The FNC, since its formation in 1927, has represented over 500,000 coffee-growing 
families—the majority of which are small producers—in promoting the production 
and export of Colombian coffee.
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specialization was emphasized and supported through monoculture and the 
intensive use of external agricultural inputs under the technological model of 
the Green Revolution. This emphasis on modernizing peasant agriculture came 
with high costs, including the rapid degradation of natural resources, the grad-
ual loss of local technical knowledge and crop diversification as a development 
strategy, and the acceleration of migration from the countryside to the cities, as 
small farmers did not have the resources to follow the modernization trend, be-
ing forced, instead, to abandon production altogether. In addition to these, the 
importation of food has tended to further destroy the productive foundation of 
local agriculture.
On the other hand, the oligopolistic structure built around the International 
Coffee Agreement and its quota system historically kept small coffee produc-
ers in the role of dried parchment coffee providers for internal and external 
marketers. In this way, they were denied the possibility of building a product 
with value added due to its distinguishing features such as the type of crop, the 
altitude, the varieties planted, and the collective intellectual property protection 
furnished by the terroir denomination (based on qualities specific to produce 
from a given region).
Today, all of this has changed radically. While it is true that the opening up of 
the international coffee market negatively impacted the large coffee-producing 
countries, it also allowed for the development of a market for sustainable, or-
ganic, certified, and specialty coffees. This market emerged in the mid-1990s, 
backed by demand from consumers willing to pay more for coffee produced 
according to universal standards that met protocols for social justice, envi-
ronmental protection, and the implementation of best practices in agriculture 
and manufacturing. Although these standards have benefited small producers 
by making them the preferred source for high-demand coffees, the standards 
themselves are established by certification bodies in consumer countries in Eu-
rope and North America. Generally speaking, these bodies do not consider the 
local conditions and complexities of the producing regions.
In this chapter, we draw from several years of work as practitioners with 
ACDI/VOCA’s Specialty Coffee Program, implemented in five coffee-producing 
departments (or states) of Colombia from 2002 to 2010 with funding from 
USAID. The program was specifically designed under the framework of an 
alternative development strategy to provide small farmers a way out of coca 
production. Here we examine some of the local conditions and complexities 
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that have made small-coffee-producer associations and cooperatives key enti-
ties in negotiating the vast transnational terrain of specialty coffee markets. To 
wit, small-producer associations and cooperatives have worked to transform 
smallholders’ place within international trade networks by connecting produc-
ers, through direct market relations, with roasters and importers at the other 
end of the value chain. They have also worked toward strengthening producers 
both economically and socially, with institutional backing, to help them transi-
tion away from the production of illicit drugs. The impacts have been transfor-
mational in terms of improving quality of life and empowering the households 
and communities where producer associations and cooperatives are located. 
This is especially important in areas that are transitioning away from coca pro-
duction in order to minimize the presence of armed actors (see Dávila, this 
volume).
We begin by identifying the challenges small-producer associations face 
when attempting to integrate into the value chain and the global marketplace, 
and we describe the strategies that, in our experience, have been most success-
ful for addressing these challenges. We examine producer organization experi-
ences in the Huila region, focusing on a specialty coffee support program led by 
ACDI/VOCA. We wrap up our discussion with a case study that exemplifies 
the changes taking place among producer organizations adapting to the spe-
cialty coffee market.
The Challenges and diffiCulTies 
of globalizaTion
In the face of economic globalization, Colombian coffee growers and support-
ers have had to seek locally specific economic strategies. Those of us working in 
Colombia’s coffee-growing region have had to define our future using regional 
and/or local value-added strategies. These strategies require an expansion of 
the socioeconomic dimensions of coffee growing, going beyond the agricul-
tural activity of farms to encompass other related activities such as market-
ing, industrialization, and training. They also require—above all, in the case 
of the small coffee producer—that people work in a coordinated manner by 
forming different types of producer organizations (OPs, in Spanish). OPs have 
spread rapidly and enjoyed notable success on various fronts, including market 
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presence, access to public goods, rights of representation, and better quality of 
life for smallholder households.
Value chains and global market forces create continual new challenges for 
small OPs, including the following: rapid acquisition of new technologies and 
technical knowledge in order to improve production, processing, and marketing 
operations; obtaining resources for joint finance of their operations; the need 
for highly skilled management; and achieving efficient market insertion despite 
strong competition from big private companies, as well as from medium and 
large agribusinesses. Such difficulties were clearly visible, for example, in the 
World Bank’s 2007 report on agriculture and development, which identified 
key challenges for organizations and governments wanting to promote the in-
tegration of small producers and their OPs into value chains in such a way that 
benefited the rural economy in developing countries. Another key challenge in 
the Colombian case is the presence of armed actors in the rural context, where 
farmers feel forced to produce illegal crops, partly because of lack of viable eco-
nomic alternatives but also as a result of coercion and intimidation.
Through ACDI/VOCA, we worked to support peasant coffee farmers as 
they transitioned from producing low-value commodity coffee and, in some 
cases, illegal crops, to high-value specialty coffees. Over the course of more than 
five years, our work included technical assistance for farmers, the introduction 
of new processing technologies, work with farm laborers, broad-scale training in 
coffee quality and differentiation, and ultimately the establishment of trade re-
lationships between OPs and buyers. This experience with small-coffee-grower 
associations in Colombia and other parts of Latin America highlighted the im-
portance of the above-mentioned challenges in the development of cooperatives 
and associations, particularly in a context where small producers have histori-
cally been excluded.
finding a balanCe between solidarity  
and eConomiC effiCienCy
A common dilemma facing small OPs is the need to find and maintain a bal-
ance between economic efficiency and social equity—two objectives that tend 
to generate conflict since they often represent opposing forces. Operating in 
rural communities that place a high value on social inclusion and solidarity, 
small OPs find it difficult to exclude association members who do not fulfill 
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their obligations. In their attempts to protect and maintain solidarity, organiza-
tions are pressured to subsidize the least productive members at the expense 
of the most productive members. Conversely, they feel compelled to provide 
assistance and services to their communities, affecting not only their economic 
efficiency and innovation, but also depleting their own resources, generated 
through their commercial and/or financial operations.
Although small-producer cooperatives and associations should practice val-
ues of solidarity and mutual support, they need to use their market involve-
ment as a foundation for social solidarity. That is, to be able to lend services to 
members and communities, they need to generate the resources necessary to 
do so. At the same time, services should be lent equitably, which means that 
there should be an awareness of social equity, allowing for the just distribution 
of services offered by the cooperative. Insofar as members successfully balance 
revenue and operational costs, the cooperative will grow stronger through the 
economic gains generated, adopt a more favorable sector position, and exer-
cise greater influence on its surroundings. To these ends, and following market 
quality standards, all members should adopt shared policies for production ef-
ficiency and product delivery to fulfill contracts and generate hoped-for profits 
that will improve both the income of each associate and the financial position 
of the organization.
As we observed among coffee-grower associations in Colombia, subsidies 
and support to members who were inefficient and disloyal usually resulted in 
weak organizations that ultimately dissolved. To rectify this situation, solidarity 
and mutual support for the most needy members was channeled through tech-
nical assistance and improved coffee-processing infrastructure. In exchange, 
members had to be punctual in meeting production requirements, productivity 
and quality standards, and credit payments to organizational rotating funds, 
if available. It was also important to make use of purging mechanisms, which 
excluded members who did not fulfill their commitments and duties. In other 
words, while members claimed their rights, organizations demanded compli-
ance and created exclusion mechanisms in order to avoid situations of great 
inefficiency.
Successful organizations will forever contend with maintaining equilibrium 
between social and economic interests. If a cooperative or association is man-
aged through criteria focused mainly on solidarity and mutual support, it will 
suffer an imbalance and risk collapse. The opposite is equally true, insofar as 
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complaints and associate withdrawals due to sidelining of social objectives and 
community dissatisfaction can lead to organizational breakdown.
improving organizational governanCe
A great challenge in all cooperative associations is how to achieve fair represen-
tation through attention to members’ wide gamut of interests. Organizations 
should ensure that small producers’ interests are represented, including among 
them those of women and youth; thus it is important to consider the household 
as the production unit. This means considering different needs in order to later 
address them. In this sense, the most successful coffee-grower associations and 
cooperatives in Colombia, in addition to promoting cooperative education pro-
cesses, have promoted the grassroots participation of their members by forming 
various committees, each with its corresponding norms and each contributing 
to the management’s administration of activities within the cooperative.† These 
committees pay attention to various phases and types of agricultural produc-
tion, processing, and marketing, including those where young adults, men, and 
women can develop specific leadership skills, such as in the processing, tasting, 
and marketing of specialty coffees. In addition, there has been attention paid to 
areas where women have a predominant role, providing credit for the establish-
ment of subsistence gardens and small animal raising.
A key program to improve family dynamics and inclusion that impacts 
organizational governance within the OPs is the provision of psychological 
assistance to help farmers deal with the stress related to illegal drug produc-
tion, which has resulted in significant violence experienced by communities 
and producers and which eventually impacts the incidence of violence within 
households.
Fortifying members’ organizational capacities, both as members of the OP 
but also as members of households, strengthens their representational voices, 
along with the OP’s decision-making mechanisms, which ultimately contributes 
to improved governance. It is also important to maintain efficient information 
†A similar strategy has worked well in Peru, where coffee-grower cooperatives 
have set up grassroots committees in the rural areas. These committees serve as nuclei 
for communication and information exchange with cooperative headquarters. This 
also facilitates the development of organizational leaders and promoters through the 
exercise of local governance; active participation arises out of discussions over technical 
issues, production, quality, harvesting and financing, among other matters.
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and communication systems using media such as radio, technical bulletins, and 
balance sheets, as well as appropriate information and entertainment technolo-
gies (including virtual and/or blended learning model ones) to offer younger or 
newer members tools to make the most of their learning. Such measures allow 
organizations to improve governance and prepare leaders to fulfill their respon-
sibilities with transparency on behalf of the social base they represent.
developing managerial CapaCities for value Chains
One indispensable requirement today has to do with the development of 
management capacities for high-value chains, a task that Colombian coffee 
growers previously delegated to exporters and the FNC. Managers and their 
organizations have to negotiate within increasingly sophisticated national and 
international supply chains with strict standards and changing market situa-
tions and certifications; such is the case with prices on the international coffee 
market. Managers need to organize associates’ inputs and production to satisfy 
value-chain demands while also keeping in mind the following: (a) achieving 
economies of scale and on-time deliveries; (b) meeting economic, social, and 
environmental standards required by the certification schemes that individual 
buyers request; and (c) complying with exporters’ specifications, as well as with 
those of sophisticated specialty buyers or specific market niches. This means 
participating in analyses, dialogues, and negotiations with other actors along 
the chain, thereby creating direct communication links between producers and 
buyers.
Colombian coffee-grower associations met the challenge of increasingly 
complex professional management in two different ways. On the one hand, tra-
ditional coffee-grower cooperatives supported by the wider coffee-producing 
institutional structure, the FNC, had to restructure and modernize processes 
within their business culture. To adapt to new market realities, they imple-
mented professionalization and training measures for their managers and lead-
ers, as well as merger and incorporation processes to survive using economies 
of scale. On the other hand, newer coffee-grower associations, formed since the 
1990s, have learned as they go about better management and business practices, 
adapting quickly to meet scenarios presented by the national and international 
coffee market. Those who have managed to do this successfully remain, but oth-
ers do not. Currently, OP learning goals focus on understanding topics such as 
risk management in coffee, financial operations for marketing, and evaluation 
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standards for specialty coffees. Across both sectors, the use of transparent fi-
nancial management systems has been important, as have periodic presenta-
tions of results to associates and OP-served communities.
Managers of small OPs, who participate in high-level technical discussions 
like those surrounding local, regional, national, and/or international commercial 
negotiations, need to develop technical and commercial skills and tools. In some 
cases, they must look to outside experts and facilitators, seeking professional 
advice to better understand the consequences of required changes and gaining 
experience in preparing their input for dialogues that affect or concern them.
faCing the external regulatory and  
publiC poliCy atmosphere
In considering small OP operations, it is important to consider the weight of 
the legal, regulatory, and policy atmosphere, which guarantees the autonomy 
of small OPs. The idea would be for OPs to be recognized as full actors—not 
as instruments of predesigned policies implemented without their consulta-
tion. From the perspective of local, regional, and national development, OPs 
have a key role to play; and in some countries, such as Peru and Brazil, coffee-
grower cooperatives work continually through their representative institutions to 
shape public policies affecting the coffee sector.
In Colombia, coffee cooperatives and associations participate in coffee pol-
icy decisions through Comités Departamentales de Cafeteros (Departmental 
Coffee Grower Committees), with delegates taking concerns to the Comité 
Nacional de Cafeteros and Comité Ejecutivo (National Coffee Grower Com-
mittees and Executive Board), an advisory and decision-making body for the 
coffee sector. The most prominent new leaders also represent their associations 
at the Congreso Nacional de Cafeteros (National Coffee Grower Congress). 
Similarly, at the local and regional levels, cooperatives and associations have 
connected through constructive dialogue with municipal and departmental 
leaders to lobby for political and economic support for their development proj-
ects. In this way, and in contrast to some interpretations of the cooperative 
principle of “political neutrality,” we consider involvement in defining policy 
both viable and appropriate as long as such efforts focus on the promotion of 
organizational interests and not on advancing the positions of individual lead-
ers (see also Ruiz, this volume; Burke and Piekielek 2011).
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Coffee ProduCers’ assoCiaTions in The 
deParTmenT of huila
Any discussion of Colombian coffee-producer cooperatives invites special at-
tention to the region of  Huila, a department located in the country’s southwest. 
There, coffee-producer associations have gathered continuing strength, some 
with over two decades of history and others more newly formed. We believe 
that one of the most influential variables in the consolidation of this phenom-
enon is a regional identity based on mutual trust and a sense of loyalty—key 
characteristics in all associational work. In small OPs in Huila, we found an 
awareness among associates that collective success in negotiating and main-
taining a direct relationship with the specialty coffee market depended upon 
the responsible functioning of their farms.
The specialty coffee program of ACDI/VOCA in Colombia funded by US-
AID began at the turn of the twenty-first century in five different departments. 
The department of Huila did not initially stand out for its coffee production 
or for its cup quality. In a few short years, however, Huila became a pioneer 
in the installation and staffing of quality analysis, or cupping, laboratories. It 
also distinguished itself by training qualified personnel to evaluate and harvest 
coffee in the highest-producing areas and by being the first to separate coffees 
according to their origin and quality. This constituted a step toward an initial 
characterization of producer subregions, which led to product differentiation 
with significant benefits for producers as well as for buyers.
The initial impulse for this transformation came from the Cooperativa De-
partamental de Caficultores de Huila (Coffee Growers’ Cooperative of Huila, 
or CADEFHUILA), which marketed coffee from 26 of the 32 coffee munici-
palities in the department and enjoyed support from the FNC. The cooperative 
also started a training program for small-coffee-grower associations through a 
workshop called “High-Quality Coffee Production with a View to Exporting.” 
Through this workshop, producers from more than 60 organizations got train-
ing. At the same time, the workshop was selected, supported, and promoted by 
ACDI/VOCA through its specialty coffee program, which started at the end of 
2002. The effort later expanded to other departments in southwest Colombia, 
turning this region into the new frontier of specialty coffee production, with 
growth in terms of volume and quality and with origins identified and cur-
rently recognized by national and international markets.
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By 2004, international market demands regarding quality and volume from 
coffee-producing countries had increased. This required improvements in cof-
fee production and postharvest processing at the farm level—a step that pushed 
producers to adopt and incorporate new practices in order to capture better 
product value by negotiating special premiums for high-quality coffees (certi-
fied, sustainable coffees remained in an incipient state with very low volumes). 
Thanks to program-trained producers’ adoption of new practices, international 
buyers offered economic incentives or special premiums for the quality of cof-
fee produced. In addition, producers gained support for established regional 
socioeconomic and commercial development projects, which translated into 
immediate improvements in quality of life for their families and, as a result, 
their communities. In this particular case of cultural change and adoption of 
new practices, the economic stimulus was decisive; the parallel incentives of a 
higher selling price and the improvement of social and community life facili-
tated a process of  “un-learning” in order to learn to negotiate a new commer-
cial situation.
Change was noted in the participation of more family members in the 
coffee-producing process. Wives of coffee producers, who traditionally worked 
in the home producing some subsistence crops and generally taking care of 
domestic affairs, became empowered in administrative roles to manage record 
keeping, also gaining knowledge of agricultural best practices specific to coffee 
quality and directly participating in decision making regarding crop produc-
tion and management. Young men and women within the farming household 
got involved in sensory quality control by participating in cupping workshops 
and later took charge of this process themselves in laboratories acquired by the 
OPs; they also participated in coffee quality control at the farm level.
Below, we present the case of one grassroots producer association that ex-
emplifies some of the transformational processes described here. Its creation, 
evolution, and development during the last 10 years is discussed according to 
our perspective, which is a product of extensive collaboration and dialogue with 
association leaders and members.
The oCCiCafÉ Case
The Asociación de Productores de Café de Alta Calidad del Suroccidente de 
Huila (the High-Quality Coffee Growers’ Association of Southwestern Huila, 
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or OCCICAFÉ) is located in the La Plata municipality in the southwest of the 
department of Huila. Its 300 members live in 5 municipalities in which coffee 
accounts for 90 percent of the local economy. More than 10,500 family mem-
bers have participated in OCCICAFÉ, working about 11,000 total hectares of 
coffee. Annual production of this region was around 20,625,000 kilograms of 
dried parchment coffee as a whole.‡
OCCICAFÉ was formed in Huila in 2002 as one of 14 associative groups 
that grew out of a state-sponsored training project for coffee growers who be-
longed to legally registered associations. The purpose of this initiative, which 
received technical assistance from the La Plata section of the Municipal Com-
mittee of Coffee Growers, was to offer training in issues related to sustainable 
coffee production and to evaluate the infrastructure needs of participating pro-
ducers. As a contribution to the growth of high-quality coffee production, or-
ganizations received machinery and processing infrastructure at the farm level. 
For their part, the new OPs were required to comply with legal and tax obliga-
tions; this requirement arose as part of the national government’s public poli-
cies and was one of the key points identified by the World Bank as an internal 
challenge to emerging organizations joining value chains.
A few months after the start of the project, organization leaders received of-
ficial notification of its suspension, citing the government’s insufficient budget. 
Although the news constituted a moment of frustration for OP representa-
tives, faith in the initial proposal remained unaffected. The presidents of the 
14 organizations met and analyzed the situation, together with the head of the 
La Plata section of the Municipal Committee of Coffee Growers, and reached 
the conclusion that their reasons for working together went beyond the pur-
view of this project. They therefore set their sights on future production and 
marketing projects that would directly benefit their associations. This led in 
turn to the need for developing OP managerial capacities, another of the chal-
lenges identified by the World Bank.
Thus, OCCICAFÉ was founded as a formal and legal apex association in 2004, 
with the membership of the 14 grassroots associations, representing 264 coffee 
‡This is the equivalent of 229,166 70-kilogram bags of Excelso coffee (green or 
golden bean), calculated with an average yield factor of 90 kilograms per bag, which 
is defined as the number of kilograms of dried parchment coffee needed to make 
a 70-kilogram bag of green bean coffee for exporting. This is the measure used in 
Colombia.
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growers, legally constituted as voting members. This new organization was 
started under the leadership of one of the founding associations’ presidents, 
who would go on to demonstrate clear advancement in management, technical 
aspects of production, input acquisition and distribution, marketing, and nego-
tiations with other actors in the value chain.
From that moment, OCCICAFÉ opened its doors to serve its members, 
families, and communities, offering as its principal service the buying and mar-
keting of coffee produced by associates and nonassociates who live locally. The 
organization grew rapidly, and by 2005, its membership had nearly tripled, in-
cluding 601 associates and reaching 350,000 kilograms of commercialized dried 
parchment coffee.
Such rapid growth created problems in two domains. On the one hand, 
there was no clear notion of cooperativism, and a great many members failed 
to regularly attend meetings or uphold sustainability quotas, putting the orga-
nization’s stability at risk. As a result, the president, with the board of directors 
and representatives of the founding associations, decided to rigorously apply 
internal statutes and regulations to disqualify and sanction those who were not 
meeting their legal obligations. They did not have to wait long for positive re-
sults. By 2006, the number of associates decreased to 381, but the marketing 
volume doubled, reaching 636,634 kilograms of dried parchment coffee. During 
the following two years, OCCICAFÉ marketed 1,660,614 kilograms of dried 
parchment coffee, making ever more patent its stability and maturity.
On the other hand, the rapid initial growth and the commercial activity 
of this OP prompted an immediate favorable response at the various coffee-
buying points across the area, while marketing intermediaries rejected the un-
precedented competition from producers. On several occasions, OCCICAFÉ 
had to invite local, departmental, and national coffee-sector representatives to 
show—by way of statistics as well as tangible results—that the commercial ex-
ercise in which they were participating would benefit everyone.
By centralizing storage in warehouses, the OP freed up private warehouse 
space and reduced labor costs in administration and in the handling of cof-
fee during the intake process. Similarly, the coffee’s transit through the central 
OCCICAFÉ site allowed for its evaluation and classification such that, when 
it was sold, it already carried a quality guarantee for the buyer—an exercise that 
improved odds of organizational sustainability.
From its start, OCCICAFÉ grew under the continued leadership of its pres-
ident: a 40-year-old coffee producer with secondary school education, originally 
from the area, who proved himself a conscientious leader and worker on behalf 
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of those he represented. Leaders like him illustrate three key factors for suc-
cess: (1) fulfillment of policies, norms, and regulations that reflect the work of a 
credible, confidence-building board of directors or administrative council dedi-
cated to organizational principles and teamwork with members; (2) study and 
knowledge of the market acquired through self-motivation and the process of 
understanding the organization’s role within the value chain; and (3) the sense 
of belonging among members and members’ families, in line with the organiza-
tion’s social, technical, economic, and commercial guidelines.
Currently, OCCICAFÉ member services include the following: (a) pur-
chases of coffee at the market base price, fixed daily by the FNC and nego-
tiated according to New York stock market fluctuations and trends through 
time; (b) future supplies and sales; (c) mechanical drying and monitoring of 
coffee through its various postharvest processes; (d) cup quality analysis tests 
and determination of the coffee’s taste profile according to its subregion; 
(e) participation in quality contests; (f ) specialty coffee and surcharge nego-
tiations for identifying origin, for which the coffee is labeled café de origen; (g) 
loans for drying coffee; and (h) loans for sustaining and renovating coffee fields.
The participation of OCCICAFÉ in marketing the various qualities of cof-
fee produced by its associates required developing new evaluation skills to sat-
isfy the demands of its local, national, and international clients. To this end, 
the organization channeled its efforts toward obtaining and sustaining the 
Fair Trade Certified seal as well as the following certifications for individual 
members: Rainforest Alliance Certified, 4C (Common Code for Community 
Coffee), UTZ Certified, and the Starbucks C.A.F.E. (Coffee and Farmer Eq-
uity) Practices verification. Today, the OP has managed to occupy a space in the 
marketing chain that once was limited to private or intermediary marketers.
In terms of negotiation services around high-quality specialty coffee, OC-
CICAFÉ has achieved marketing with considerable price-for-quality differ-
entials for large volumes produced by members, as well as for marketing for 
microlots of exceptional-quality coffee from specific associate farms adopting 
and maintaining agricultural best practices. These microlots were identified 
through cupping tests in the OCCICAFÉ quality laboratory and have gar-
nered considerably higher-than-market prices thanks to the special interest of 
some international buyers. This constitutes a very specific and limited niche in 
the specialty coffee value chain.§
§The high quality of a coffee translates into a good yield factor not higher than  
92.5 kilograms parchment per 70-kilogram bag of green coffee, which is reflected in the 
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During its existence, OCCICAFÉ has carried out various activities in the 
area of social development in conjunction with institutions such as the Co-
mité de Cafeteros del Departamento de Huila and the coffee grower coopera-
tives supported by the FNC, as well as departmental governing entities, coffee 
exporters, and institutions like the Agencia para la Acción Social y la Coop-
eración Internacional and the ACDI/VOCA specialty coffee program, with 
resources from USAID. With support from ACDI/VOCA, OCCICAFÉ car-
ried out additional activities that benefited families in relation to their farms, 
generating economic stability by increasing income, embracing women as farm 
managers, improving sustainability, and promoting best practices in produc-
tion, respect for traditional crop management, food security, and environmental 
conservation. Similarly, sociocultural projects in rural communities led to re-
sistance to internal conflicts and illegal crop growing (see Dávila, this volume).
Finally, it must be noted that in 2010, the department of Huila was recog-
nized as the second-largest producer of coffee in the country. With 105,000 hect-
ares of  coffee cultivation, it garnered a bigger role in determining the FNC budget. 
Without a doubt, coffee growers in producer organizations in Colombia have 
absorbed the lessons of self-management and organization, as evidenced in 
Huila, where the seeds of future leadership have been sown.
final ConsideraTions
Sowing these seeds means, above all, recognizing the worth that producers and 
organizational leaders have in the country’s coffee value chain. They are people 
who, despite a history of marginalization, have clearly proven capable of working 
collectively to make decisions that benefit their families and communities, em-
powering all those who have become proficient at different stages of the value 
chain, including women and young adults. Beyond the national and interna-
tional arenas in which these associations are involved, their principal activity is 
selling what they produce, a goal that shapes the well-being and quality of life 
of their families, along with the stability and progress of the entire community.
table of minimum defects with the analysis of green coffee, a clean cup, and scoring 
on the SCAA quality scale corresponding to specialty coffees higher than 85 points, 
whose standards are accepted internationally and provide a common reference point in 
this market.
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In Colombia and other Latin American countries, such undertakings repre-
sent the historic continuity of associations as instruments of local and regional 
development. None of what we have discussed would be possible through in-
dividual work alone, which is why the grassroots committees, producer com-
mittees, associate groups, associations, cooperatives, federations, and other legal 
denominations for rural OPs have an important reason for existing: community- 
based development.
In a similar fashion, while there are coffee growers in search of opportuni-
ties, so are there international cooperation and development projects, such as 
the one implemented by ACDI/VOCA, that aim to support them. It is impor-
tant to make such project results known since fresh ideas and proposals from 
communities will advance the ongoing and necessary work of organizing rural 
producers in developing countries.
Coffee growers have learned their trade through inherited knowledge and 
practices, and their thinking remains creative, sensitive, and agile. Such was 
the case with those in the department of Huila, who were eager for opportu-
nities and knowledge, and where members’ capacities have known no bounds 
when presented with proposals that fit their vision. This vision fostered clear 
opportunities for creativity in order to achieve results supporting broad devel-
opment and prompting the recognition of civil society and the community at 
large. A shift away from illegal crop production into the specialty coffee busi-
ness through collective action and a value chain approach has liberated families 
from a violent context and has been conducive to the improvement of family 
dynamics, the empowerment of women, and the creation of leadership oppor-
tunities for young adults. The ability of these programs to remain strong re-
quires strong organizations and solidarity at the local and global levels.
A
lthough milk hAs come to form A fundAmentAl pArt of the 
Colombian diet, and milk production an important part of the agri-
cultural economy, such was not always the case. In this chapter, I 
re late the story of how one humble and economically unstable cooperative 
managed to transform itself into a significant economic force and change the 
national milk market. The COLANTA cooperative, using a simple but well- 
executed economic strategy, provides a model for cooperative-led agribusi-
ness development. Its history—and particularly the difficulties it has expe-
rienced because of Colombian agrarian policies—also shows the importance 
of developing a favorable policy context that supports rural producers and 
cooperatives. I draw on COLANTA archives, interviews with COLANTA 
members and neighboring nonmembers, and my experience working with 
other solidarity economy organizations to identify how this cooperative built 
a national market and addressed the challenges of trade liberalization.
IntroductIon
In 1962, a group of 64 small farmers in the Don Matías municipality (depart-
ment of Antioquia) united to create the Colechera cooperative, with support 
from the departmental Secretariat of Agriculture. Their objective was to reverse 
colAntA
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their historical disadvantages in the dairy market, gain collective power by estab-
lishing economies of scale, and build the capacity to negotiate collectively rather 
than as individual producers. At that time, as indicated in the COLANTA his-
torical archives, small milk producers in northern Antioquia faced numerous 
difficulties. Gold mining had stripped the land of its vegetation and fertility, and 
agriculture barely covered the subsistence needs of the families who depended 
on milk sales. Access to the fresh milk market in Medellín, the departmental 
capital, was nearly impossible since the mayor’s office had prohibited sales of 
unpasteurized milk, and a local oligopoly controlled 95 percent of the dairy mar-
ket. For consumers, milk was sold only every other day, and each family faced a 
maximum limit of two liters. Moreover, purchasing milk required long waits at 
neighborhood stores (COLANTA 2012b).
The Colechera cooperative became an object of ridicule in the department, 
derided for its seemingly utopian ideals and the fact that it declared legal bank-
ruptcy three times in its first ten years. After the third bankruptcy, the govern-
ment ordered the liquidation of the cooperative’s debts, and many assumed that 
the story of Colechera was over. However, one year later the cooperative began 
a new cycle under the name COLANTA. Four decades later, COLANTA has 
taken its place as one of the most important dairy cooperatives in the country, 
contributing significantly to the favorable inclusion of smallholders in the na-
tional economy.
cooperatIves and the daIry  
sector In colombIa
To assess COLANTA’s impact on its members, it is important to understand 
the smallholder dairy sector in Colombia, which comprises individual produc-
ers with few resources and little political or economic influence. Land tenure 
patterns in the livestock sector are made up of smallholdings (minifundios), and 
families are heavily reliant on the milk they produce. According to the Colom-
bian Livestock Federation, 82 percent of livestock production units (approxi-
mately 253,930 producers) have fewer than 50 animals (Lafaurie Rivera 2005). 
Dairy herds are even smaller and more fragmented, with an average of fewer 
than 10 animals. It is common to find families that milk 3 cows daily to obtain 
12 liters of milk, and only 13 percent of producers in the country milk 15 cows on 
a daily basis, producing an average of around 50 liters and a monthly income of 
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900,000 Colombian pesos* (the equivalent of one and a half times the legal 
minimum wage in Colombia). These figures clearly illustrate the limited ability 
of dairy earnings to garner a fair wage for producers. Additionally, these small 
producers tend to be geographically dispersed in areas lacking sound public 
infrastructure. This leaves them with limited self-organization and little access 
to processing plants and markets, and thus economically vulnerable.
The dairy commodity chain is highly concentrated and does not favor small 
producers. Currently, there are approximately 140 processing plants in the coun-
try that supply fresh milk and dairy products to domestic consumers and inter-
national markets. Of the 499 milk collection and storage facilities in the country, 
18 percent control more than 95 percent of total volume, and just 10 of these 
facilities account for 65 percent of milk storage (Castillo et al. 2005). This dairy 
processing structure leaves smallholders with minimal negotiating capacity vis-
à-vis processors that deal with daily volumes in excess of 100,000 liters. In this 
context, a few cooperatives have played a key role in generating economies of 
scale, gaining power within the value chain, and stabilizing the household econ-
omies of small and medium-size milk producers. COLANTA has been particu-
larly successful in this role.
While COLANTA members are similar to other Colombian dairy produc-
ers in the sense that the great majority (70 percent) are smallholders who have 
adapted their activities to the demands of the market, they receive a series of 
benefits that provide them significant and relatively unique improvements in 
their quality of life. The cooperative, with the overwhelming support of the 
membership, plays a significant role in ensuring quality standards from even the 
smallest and most geographically distant producers, guaranteeing that those 
small producers can engage in a profitable economic activity without having to 
abandon the countryside to migrate to the city. The support that a cooperative 
like COLANTA gives to the dairy sector is also critical at the macro level since 
the dairy sector has become important nationally, accounting for 4 percent of 
total GDP and 18 percent of food costs (Quintero Ospina et al. 2009).




Since its rocky start, COLANTA grew to become a leader in the dairy sector, 
accounting for about 10 percent of Colombian milk production and managing 
a substantial sales volume at the national and international level (FEDEGAN 
2005). The cooperative has a membership of more than 10,000 producers lo-
cated in almost every region of the country, as well as 4,800 employees, who are 
also members (COLANTA 2012b). COLANTA boasts a line of more than 130 
dairy and meat products and is the top cheese producer in Colombia, produc-
ing 36 percent of the national cheese supply and 48 percent of fresh cheeses 
(COLANTA 2010). In 2008, the cooperative registered $650 million in sales, 
making it the second-largest food company in the country (IAlimentos 2009). 
The economic success of the cooperative is such that, in many places, “going to 
COLANTA” (ir a la COLANTA) is synonymous with “going to the store.” This 
success was achieved through an economic strategy focused on the following 
four principles.
ATTeNTiON TO prOduCT QuALiTy ANd  
prOduCers’ Needs
A central focus of the COLANTA cooperative has been increasing the quality 
of milk produced by its members and, consequently, the well-being of members 
themselves. To guarantee quality, the cooperative promotes the genetic improve-
ment of  Holstein breeds and gives free technical assistance to its membership 
through a technical department made up of veterinary doctors, animal tech-
nicians, agronomists, insemination specialists, and agricultural specialists. The 
cooperative incentivizes quality improvement by giving bonuses based on the 
protein content of milk, and simultaneously generates trust by guaranteeing 
the purchase of all of the milk that members produce. Finally, as the coopera-
tive strengthens milk production, it also supports the economic diversification 
of member households with free business trainings for member families.
verTiCAL iNTegrATiON
The vertical integration of the cooperative has allowed it to extend benefits to 
its members, reduce operational costs, and generate new sources of revenue. For 
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example, the cooperative established a chain of fifty AGROCOLANTA ware-
houses, located strategically throughout Colombia to provide low-cost agricul-
tural inputs and contribute to the broader solidarity economy (Salazar-Díaz 
2009). Similarly, COLANTA makes and sells its own mineralized salts, fertil-
izers, and balanced feed rations. Through these programs, the cooperative has 
turned member needs into commercial opportunities and, at the same time, 
established itself as a recognized and trusted brand at the national level. At the 
other end of the value chain, the cooperative has established more than 100 of 
its own stores in cities across Colombia in order to reach consumers directly, 
without intermediaries. To extend its reach and establish another source of rev-
enue, the cooperative has recently established franchises not only for product 
distribution but also for production itself. This strategy of concessions and fran-
chises has served it well: in 2009, it saw a six-fold increase in earnings.
diversifiCATiON ThrOugh iNdusTriALizATiON
Innovation is the central pillar of COLANTA’s continued business develop-
ment. From its creation, the cooperative has invested heavily in the diversifica-
tion of its dairy products and has used industrialization as a way of adding value 
to members’ products. Currently, it has 38 dairy lines with 196 distinct products, 
22 for meat, and 48 products in the line of soft drinks, juices, and bottled water. 
The cooperative intends to maintain its leadership in the dairy sector by devel-
oping innovative products, such as yogurt with Benecol, a bioactive ingredient 
used to reduce cholesterol (Dinero 2009).
mArkeT expANsiON
Making the most of members’ increases in quality and production and of an ef-
ficient system for processing and transporting pasteurized milk, COLANTA 
managed to supply a previously unmet demand in Medellín, Colombia’s third-
largest city. Even more important for the cooperative, it established new na-
tional and international markets. In the last 40 years, COLANTA has played 
a fundamental role in the increase in Colombian consumption of milk and the 
acceptance of new dairy products. Figures provided by the cooperative indicate 
that Colombian per capita milk consumption grew from 50 liters in 1976 to 
143 li ters in 2008; the country transitioned from importing to exporting dairy. 
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In this period, the cooperative also reached a sales volume of 2.5 million liters 
per day (Colantapoli 2009).
In terms of new market incursion, it has opened doors to Russia, Chile, 
Mexico, Aruba, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Morocco, Bangladesh, and Ven-
ezuela, exporting 1,200 tons of milk powder, yogurt, cheese, and cream each 
year, earning almost $12 million (El Espectador 2010). To access these mar-
kets, COLANTA has achieved or advanced toward a variety of strict inter-
national certifications, including ISO 1991,† the Russian qualifications for 
phytosanitary security (El Colombiano 2010), ISO 14001 for environmental 
management, OSHAS 18001 for occupational health and security, and HACCP 
for food safety. Similarly, COLANTA has been a pioneer in the certification 
project for Grade “A” PMO (Pasteurized Milk Ordinance) Milk Farms, which 
is indispensable for obtaining authorization for export to the United States 
(COLANTA 2012a).
These four economic strategies strengthen the institution and allow it to ful-
fill its social role with members and nonmembers. Faithful to its philosophy of 
guaranteeing total production purchase, COLANTA always has milk surpluses 
that it uses for donations and programs that distribute milk to schools jointly 
with the administration of the municipality of Medellín. In the last five years, 
COLANTA has invested $8 million in support of formal elementary, middle, 
and high school education; infrastructure such as the building of classrooms 
and sports complexes; and cooperative and technical training. Moreover, in the 
various municipalities where the cooperative is present, it has donated more 
than $4 million to support existing programs and activities, among them lit-
eracy programs for members and nonmembers.
Despite the cooperative’s general pattern of growth, the balance sheet has 
occasionally suffered in the past several years. COLANTA lost $3.5 million in 
2002, and it registered losses of $9.1 million in 2005. That same year, the com-
pany lost nearly 8 percent of its net worth, dropping from $71.4 billion in 2004 
to $65.8 billion in 2005 (El Tiempo 2006). Opponents of the cooperative’s ad-
ministration argued that these declines were due to the president dedicating 
excessive time to political activities as a Colombian congressman. With the 
†ISO is the International Organization for Standards, which establishes global 
standards, including food safety, environmental management, and occupational health 
and safety.
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generalized crisis of 2007–8, a small fall in internal demand, and export restric-
tions to Venezuela, the cooperative had to assume the additional costs of stor-
ing the milk it buys from members (Portal Lechero 2010).
In 2010, the mayor of the municipality of San Pedro de los Milagros and 
nine municipal council members attempted to rescind COLANTA’s commerce 
and industry tax exemption, from which the cooperative had benefitted for 
23 years—the full time that the cooperative had been present in the municipal-
ity. According to the mayor, in just the preceding seven years, the municipal 
treasury had forfeited nearly 6 million pesos in revenue through these tax ex-
emptions (Echeverry Marín 2010). The council members argued that the bil-
lions of pesos that COLANTA was exempt from paying each year could be 
invested in the community.
Despite COLANTA’S recent economic setbacks, the national dairy policy 
promoted by the National Council of Social and Economic Policy (Consejo Na-
cional de Política Económica y Social, or CONPES) has adopted COLANTA’s 
path to success. In June 2010, CONPES published a document intended to im-
prove the competitiveness of the Colombian dairy sector by lowering production 
costs, raising productivity, diversifying internal and external markets, and making 
the most of opportunities and comparative advantages within the sector. Among 
its objectives are the promotion of agro-industry, associativism, horizontal and 
vertical integration, processing and sale of products with value added, improve-
ments in quality, and the strengthening of institutional management (CONPES 
2010). Put simply, the new recommendations suggest that everyone should follow 
COLANTA’s model.
the challenge of unfavorable polIcIes
My interviews with cooperative members, ex-members, and people who be-
long to other cooperatives point to a sharp critique of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture for not having developed a national dairy policy that would involve diverse 
stakeholders. Several of those interviewed explained that the government has 
legislated to exercise control, but that in the majority of cases, this has favored 
the country’s large dairy processors with little consideration for the milk pro-
ducer. As I explain below, the COLANTA cooperative, an entity with a double 
identity as both large seller and representative of small producers, has suffered 
as a result of different local and national policies during its history.
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The first policy challenges involved trade liberalization and international 
competition, often under terms that were disadvantageous to Colombian small-
holders. In 1979, the national government authorized the import of 43,000 tons 
of powdered milk at below-market prices—an enormous increase given that 
the historic average between 1967 and 2002 was only 7,518 tons per year. This 
situation reduced the cooperative’s buying capacity and forced it to give away 
glasses of milk since there was no way of getting powdered milk into the mar-
ket (COLANTA 2011). The lack of competitiveness of the Colombian dairy 
sector is linked to low productivity, high production costs, and competition 
with subsidized international markets (Lafaurie Rivera 2009). The cooperative, 
with its guarantee of buying all the milk its members produce, protects small-
holders from the harmful effects of this type of policy, but in the process, the 
institution itself assumes the costs and risks that go along with these policies.
A more recent crisis has to do with the import of whey, which went from no 
imports to an average yearly importation between 1981 and 2002 of 1,184 tons. 
Starting in 2003, the government allowed increases so that by 2010 imports 
had grown five-fold, reaching an average of 7,423 tons (Portafolio 2011). Whey 
powder is used as a sugar substitute in the preparation of baked goods and 
chocolate. Leaders of the dairy sector believe that these imports are unneces-
sary because Colombia has enough supply to satisfy the market, yet these poli-
cies force them to compete with foreign dairy farms.
A second key policy issue has been national price controls for milk. 
COLANTA members are always concerned about prices, particularly because 
the Ministry of Agriculture has repeatedly changed the protocol for paying for 
a liter of milk. For many years, COLANTA had established bonus payments 
for quality linked to protein content. In 2007, the Ministry of Agriculture es-
tablished another way of defining price, according to which the industry was 
to pay producers a composite base price (which was adjusted every six months) 
plus voluntary bonuses for volume, refrigeration, and seasonality, and manda-
tory bonuses for hygienic and sanitary quality. According to COLANTA, this 
new formula minimized the importance of protein and fat—that is, the useful 
parts of the milk—an error that was demonstrated with the decrease in aver-
age protein content, which fell from 3.2 to 3 percent between 2003 and 2009. 
Moreover, the new government pricing ignored the facts that the international 
price of powdered milk varies and that there are periods of rain and drought 
that affect production, supply, and pricing. Spurred by disagreement among 
government analysts, the various livestock unions, and the cooperative sector, 
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the government has passed two other price-control resolutions in recent years, 
increasing farmer concerns and disrupting COLANTA’s financial incentive 
system that rewarded quality and technical improvements.
Finally, the implicit acceptance of informal markets also harms COLANTA 
and its members. According to the Colombian Livestock Federation, the in-
formal milk market enjoys certain advantages in comparison with the formal 
market. It is estimated that the informal market sells 40 percent of the national 
fresh milk supply. The informal sale of fresh milk is a business with a high 
profit margin, characterized by low operation costs and high cost to consumers 
(close to that of pasteurized milk), and it is has benefited from reductions in 
farm-gate prices since consumer prices have never gone down (Lafaurie Rivera 
2005). In September 2008, the Ministry of Agriculture made the problem of 
informal markets worse by reestablishing the sale of raw milk.
conclusIon: challenges for a  
future of free trade
The forty years of work that COLANTA has invested in its strategies for con-
tinual improvement in the areas of productivity, quality, diversification, agro-
industry, and sales have changed the Colombian dairy market. These strategies 
have enabled the cooperative to transform—at least for its members—a sector 
that was once characterized principally by highly dispersed and marginalized 
producers and highly concentrated and powerful dairy processors. This new 
market power, in turn, has allowed the cooperative to make the most of the 
commercial opportunities brought by trade liberalization and economic glob-
alization. Among other indicators of its success, COLANTA stands out as the 
largest dairy cooperative in the country, the result of its constant work to con-
solidate the microeconomies of thousands of small-producer families.
The success of the cooperative is evident despite a number of setbacks re-
lated to state policies that have left small dairy farmers walking a tightrope be-
tween stability and ruin. Moreover, with its large market share and capacity for 
management, the cooperative has recently won the ear of decision makers who 
directly shape the future of the sector. Now the new free trade agreements that 
Colombia has or will put into place will give COLANTA new opportunities 
while simultaneously exposing the cooperative to competition with the largest 
dairy companies in the world.
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Many studies predict the negative impact of free trade on Colombian small-
holders, and, although dairy producers probably will not feel the most serious 
impact, they will not be exempt. According to the Colombian Action Network 
against Free Trade:
It is calculated that, with all the [free trade agreements] that Colombia has  
adopted, some 15,000 tons of powdered milk will be allowed to enter the country 
every year, when during 2009, the national dairy industry maintained invento-
ries of approximately 20,000 tons of unpurchased powdered milk. In addition, 
quotas of whey from Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, the European Union, and 
the United States in the amount of more than 10,000 tons will enter, while the 
demand of the Colombian market is at 2,000 tons and entry quotas in the various 
FTAs were authorized at 5,000 tons. (RECALCA 2010)
Beyond the supply imbalances that these agreements will engender, it cannot 
be ignored that the European Union and the United States provide significant 
subsidies to their producers, which makes any type of international competi-
tion difficult.
Milk producers and unions strongly opposed these free trade agreements. 
In response, the national government committed $282 million to protect and 
strengthen the competitiveness of the dairy sector over the 17 years of transi-
tion to free trade with Europe. CONPES argues that this level of investment is 
insufficient, amounting to only $16 million per year. The Colombian Livestock 
Federation has projected a minimal level of support at $80 million per year in 
order to adapt to the coming economic environment (González 2010).
Still, the COLANTA cooperative insists that it is prepared to meet these 
challenges and that it can successfully enter foreign markets, principally in the 
United States. Perhaps history supports its confidence. Castillo et al. (2005) 
emphasized COLANTA’s success in making the most of the MERCOSUR 
regional market—an achievement due to its historic dedication to quality, pro-
duction, and diversification. While the free trade agreements present many 
difficulties at the national level, the primary difficulty for entering new mar-
kets will be meeting phytosanitary standards. Since COLANTA already has 
or is about to receive the certifications required by several importing coun-
tries, it is well positioned to expand its participation in international markets. 
According to Santiesteban Rojas, “The effects of the FTA [with the United 
States] threaten above all the smallholder or informal agriculture economy 
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whose products are destined for internal sales” (2008, 61). Garay Salamanca 
et al. (2009) also offer some hope. Although the proposed free trade agreement 
clearly favors the United States over the first 15 years, “in the long term, the 
terms agreed for [the dairy] product chain may turn out to be favorable for Co-
lombia, given the relative size of the markets, and the possibility that the Co-
lombian dairy industry may compete successfully in the United States” ( 36). The 
leaders of COLANTA have demonstrated resilience in facing these challenges 
in the past, and they are confident that their strong cooperative foundation and 
commitment will be strong enough to meet the challenges now looming on the 
horizon. What is certain is that, of all the small dairy producers in the coun-
try, COLANTA’s members have the best possibility of surviving and riding this 
new wave of change.
T
he firsT rural savings and loan cooperaTives (Cooperativas 
Rurales de Ahorro y Crédito, or CRAC) in the southern region of the 
department of Santander, located in the northeast mountain range of 
the Colombian Andes, emerged in the 1950s and ’60s. As in other regions 
of Latin America, these first cooperatives were promoted by the Catholic 
Church, which developed a strong policy of inspiring solidarity and a culture 
of savings among the peasantry. Their work was boosted by agricultural trade 
unions that simultaneously drove the formation of agro-industrial coopera-
tives dedicated to production (e.g., dairy cooperatives) or commercialization 
(e.g., coffee and sugarcane).
In the case of southern Santander, support from the Catholic Church was 
offered through the Secretariat of Social Ministry (SEPAS) and later strength-
ened with the creation of the Central Cooperative for Social Promotion 
(COOPCENTRAL). This program, referred to as SEPAS-COOPCENTRAL 
(Coque Martínez 1996, 64), aimed to promote development by establishing a 
cooperative in every municipality in the region. In the words of the Catholic 
priest Ramón González,* the director of SEPAS and the prime mover of the 
*Father González had carried out studies on cooperativism and rural development 
in Belgium, Italy, and Canada at the beginning of the 1960s. He put these studies into 
practice through SEPAS-COOPCENTRAL (Coque Martínez 1996).
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SEPAS-COOPCENTRAL model, the creation of cooperatives “gave the or-
ganization a legal point of departure and, at the same time, stability” (Dávila 
and Silva 1996, 89).
Building on studies carried out by the Solidarity Studies Unit of the School 
of Rural and Environmental Studies at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 
I present the most important development outcomes from five such coopera-
tives supporting the smallholder economy of southern Santander. In so doing, 
I synthesize research on these cooperatives conducted since the 1980s. I analyze 
these cases from the point of view of their contributions to local development, 
focusing on four key elements: local cooperation, social learning processes, so-
cial capital and leadership, and the creation of independent capital.
The SouThern region of SanTander
The southern region of Santander comprises three of the six provinces† that 
make up the department of Santander: Guanentá, Comunera, and Vélez. To-
gether, these cover approximately 12,000 square kilometers with close to 500,000 
inhabitants living in 53 municipalities, of which only 4 have a population greater 
than 50,000 residents. A diverse rural economy predominates in these provinces, 
with small and medium landowners as well as landless peasants (sharecroppers 
and day laborers) who work in production, services, handicrafts, commerce, 
and transportation. These provinces are poorer than the overall departmental 
average. For Santander as a whole, 22 percent of the population is described 
as having unmet needs; however, this percentage rises to 40 percent in Vélez, 
33 percent in Comunera, and 29 percent in Guanentá (Plan de Desarrollo 2008, 
61). Public infrastructure is also limited in southern Santander. While across 
the department, 21 percent of roads are paved, the percentage falls to 12 percent 
for Vélez and 16 percent for Comunera (Ibid., 148).
The provinces served by SEPAS-COOPCENTRAL are located close to the 
Middle Magdalena River Valley and the city of Barrancabermeja, home to the 
largest oil refinery in Colombia. This has been one of the most troubled areas of 
the country, characterized by violent confrontations among paramilitary groups, 
†According to Colombia’s 1991 Political Constitution, provinces are territorial en -
tities made up of municipalities, and municipalities can be subdivided into urban 
neighborhoods (comunas) and rural districts (corregimientos).
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guerrillas, and the national army. These groups are the primary representatives of 
the armed conflict in Colombia, which has lasted for more than forty years. The 
causes of conflict include struggles for land control, social inequality, and drug 
trafficking. It is important to emphasize that, despite the very difficult situation 
facing communities in southern Santander, the three provinces analyzed in this 
study have managed to remain at the margins of the conflict and achieve some 
level of peace and stability. As Coque Martínez explains in a study from 2005, 
cooperative leaders attribute the relative peace of the area to the development 
impacts generated by the cooperatives.
The development process promoted by SEPAS and COOPCENTRAL dur-
ing the 1960s focused on treating provinces as natural development “territories,” 
identifying and training natural leaders, organizing the population through a 
network of grassroots cooperatives, and promoting in people’s minds the notion 
of an achievable utopia (Bucheli 2006). The network of first-tier and second-tier 
cooperatives is currently made up of 17 savings and loan cooperatives (CACs, or 
Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito), of which 13 are located in municipalities with 
fewer than 12,000 inhabitants and are classified as CRACs (Cooperativas Rura-
les de Ahorro y Crédito) since they are in rural areas. As indicated in table 16.1, 
the oldest of these rural cooperatives was created in 1952 and the youngest one 
in 1984; however, the majority arose in the 1960s and ’70s under SEPAS and the 
guidance of Father Ramón González. As seen in table 16.1, the membership has 
increased significantly in all the cooperatives except for Guadalupe. This growth 
reflects the regional development impacts of these cooperatives (Dávila and 
Forero 1997, 29).
Santander has a proportionally large number of the cooperative banking 
institutions nationally. Of the country’s 192 CACs and 7 other financial coop-
eratives, 13 percent are located in Santander, and only Bogotá and Antioquia 
account for more cooperative banks.‡ In terms of the rural savings and credit 
cooperatives (CRACs), the majority are located in the departments of Antio-
quia and Santander (10 CRACs each). These cooperatives serve the needs of 
rural producers, although some of the urban-based CACs also offer services to 
rural members.
‡Whereas CACs are permitted to manage resources only from their associates, 
whether through contributions or savings, the other financial cooperatives can manage 
resources from third parties as well.
Table 16.1. Founding Years of CRACs and Evolution of  
Number of Members, South of Santander
cooperaTive,  MunicipaliTy year nuMber of MeMbers
1985 2005 2009
Barichara Multiservice Cooperative, 
Barichara
1961 1,556 3,800   4,459
Agricultural Cooperative Encino, Encino 1987 N/A 224 226
Multiactive Agricultural Guadalupe, 
Guadalupe
1962 52 2,071 1,843 
Credit and Savings Cooperative La 
Belleza, La Belleza
1961 290 848 1,238 
Integral Agricultural Cooperative La 
Paz, La Paz
1984 29 1,001 1,340 
Multiservice Cooperative Mogotes, 
Mogotes
1952 805 4,367 7,200 
Integral Peasant Cooperative Paramo, 
Paramo
1972 77 657 841 
Puente Nacional Credit and Savings 
Cooperative, Puente Nacional
1969 1,062 1,555 3,381 
Colombian Financial Cooperative for 
Solidarity Development, Socorro
1962 2,136 24,131 62,761 
Credit and Savings Cooperative La 
Granja, Sucre
1974 390 428 690 
Credit and Savings Cooperative Valle de 
San Jose, Valle de San Jose
1967 550 4,416 5,372 
Multiple Services Cooperative of the 
Vélez Province, Vélez
1968 1,494 3,440 6,009
Multiple Services Cooperative  
Villanueva, Villanueva
1969 1,919 8,602 8,896
source Original table, composed with data from CONFECOOP. Data for 1985  
taken from Dávila and Forero 1987, 29.
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TruST, ParTiciPaTion, and SavingS
By comparing trends in internal financial operations, it is possible to assess such 
factors as organizational trust, participation, and member savings with CACs at 
the national and departmental levels, as well as among the thirteen CRACs in 
southern Santander. Changes in the total value of the sector loan portfolio (in 
2008 dollars) are depicted in figures 16.1a, 16.1b, and 16.1c. The component parts 
of the portfolio value are the contributions of members as they join the cooper-
ative and the deposits they make in the form of savings. Increases in the portfo-
lio values indicate a growth in demand for credit, while the higher proportion 
of deposits to contributions reflects a tendency toward savings. Santan-
der’s CACs (fig. 16.1b) have behaved similarly to national CACs (fig. 16.1a) 
but portray a higher rate of growth and a lower deposit-to-contribution ratio. 
Still, the sum of contributions and deposits can cover the full loan portfolio, 
meaning that these cooperatives can finance their activities with low-cost re-
sources, which translates into lower interest rates for members. The portfolio-
deposit-social contribution behavior for the department is similar to that of the 
group of 13 CRACs in southern Santander (fig. 16.1c). In every case, the average 
loan portfolio growth is greater than the average growth of deposits and so-
cial contributions. Nevertheless, the difference between the growth in deposits 
figure 16.1a. Financial operations in CACs across Colombia
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figure 16.1b. Financial operations in CACs across Santander
figure 16.1c. Financial operations in 13 CRACs in southern Santander
and the portfolio is smaller for the Santander area and for the 13 CRACs. The 
strengthening in deposits is fundamental for a CAC because it reflects the level 
of financial savings in a population.
The growth of these financial operations demonstrates the strength and sus-
tainability of these cooperatives. The trust placed in the organization by mem-
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bers is reflected in the deposits as well as in the social contributions, with the 
latter being the fundamental driver of a collective-action organization. The 
loan-to-assets ratio presented in table 16.2 indicates that Colombian CACs 
have a high level of active loans, which is to be expected given that this is their 
primary activity. At the same time, deposits are the largest segment of total 
liabilities. This indicator is higher for the group of 13 CRACs, which is to say 
that they have a lower degree of indebtedness to third parties and may there-
fore be able to provide lower interest rates for their associates. Finally, the ratio 
of member contributions to assets is higher among the provinces compared to 
the national data. Additionally, the ratio of surplus to assets is stronger for the 
group of 13 CRACs as well as for the entire department. Accordingly, it is pos-
sible to conclude that the CAC and CRAC sectors are financially sound and 
present positive economic growth. 
five caSe STudieS in Three ProvinceS
The five most-studied CRACs of the province have been selected as the case 
studies for this chapter: Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Valle de San 
José (COOPVALLE); Cooperativa Agropecuaria Multiactiva de Guadalupe 
(MULTICOOP); Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de la Granja (COAGRANJA); 
Cooperativa Multiactiva de Servicios de Barichara (COOMULSEB); and the 
Table 16.2. Four Indicators of Financial Standing: Ratios of Portfolio to Assets,  









Total CACs  
Colombia
80.6% 79.0% 71.6% 6.9%
Total CACs  
Santander
78.2% 86.8% 62.0% 7.2%
Total 13 CRACs 
Santander
76.9% 92.7% 59.6% 8.7%
source Original table with data from CONFECOOP.
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Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito para el Desarrollo Solidario de Colombia 
(COOMULDESA). The essential indicators of comparison of CRAC perfor-
mance and development success are local cooperation, social learning outcomes, 
social capital and leadership, and independent capital (Dávila 2008; Lobo 2002). 
With these qualities, CRACs can play a key role in processes of  local develop-
ment, being alternative organizations whose purpose is service and quality, whose 
philosophy facilitates reciprocity, autonomy, and loyalty based on trust, and whose 
operations empower stakeholders (Ramírez 2002).
The imPorTance of LocaL cooPeraTion
Development projects are shaped by the historical and cultural contexts of 
each locality, and cooperatives, as collective organizations, have the potential 
to maximize the redistributive impacts generated by the projects in their zones 
of influence (Coque Martínez 1996, 66). CRACs especially contribute to local 
development solutions thanks to three unique features of their organizational 
model: their rootedness in the local social fabric, their building of resource re-
serves, and their promotion of mutual cooperation (Ibid., 67). Based on these 
three factors, CRACs generate the independent capital that consolidates their 
organizations and inserts them into networks that make possible the exchange 
of knowledge and resources that meet the needs of their membership in ways 
that could not be achieved individually.
In the case of SEPAS-COOPCENTRAL, this process began in the 1970s, 
offering managers of affiliated cooperatives training in the areas of auditing, 
consulting, and loan monitoring (Dávila 2002, 71). This initial training allowed 
the CRACs to develop a financial system capable of improving the smallholder 
economies of their members. As Dávila explains:
One of the great strengths shown by CRACs in southern Santander . . . is the 
capacity to link this service provision with the recognition of [local] social and 
economic characteristics, offering services that might be called “tailor-made” ac-
cording to the social and economic characteristics of their members . . . In this 
way, loan services are offered with timeliness, flexibility, and understanding—ele-
ments that traditional financial intermediaries are not always able to offer as they 
serve a vision that does not consider the local cultural context, preferring rather 
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to minimize operational costs or take advantage of economies of scale. (Dávila 
2008, 316)
As López and Peña (2005, 4) have observed, financial services for the small-
holder in Colombia are insufficient, given that a good portion of the munici-
palities with large rural populations have limited access. In fact, almost a third 
of municipalities in the country have no financial services of any kind, and in 
the remaining municipalities, the small-producer population has highly limited 
access to credit. In southern Santander, loan services are provided through local 
CRACs or those in neighboring municipalities where traditional financial in-
termediaries are unavailable. For example, COOMULDESA today has offices 
in 13 municipalities in the region. COAGRANJA is the only financial entity 
in the municipality of Sucre, where its services are appreciated by the commu-
nity because they respond to their needs and are provided more efficiently than 
through the traditional financial institutions (Dávila and Forero 1987, 36).
In addition to providing savings and loan services, these cooperatives have 
developed other services tailored to the needs of associates and to the com-
munity in general. COOPVALLE, for example, offers a line of credit at low 
interest rates and technical assistance for member farm projects. In this way, 
COOPVALLE has been able to support the primary agricultural activities 
in the municipality (cattle raising, pig farming, and panela sugarcane cultiva-
tion). COOMULSEB has contributed to technical changes in bean cultiva-
tion through the acquisition and rental of machinery, including a bean thresher. 
Bean cultivation in the municipality of Barichara is one of the most important 
production activities and has replaced tobacco as the principal cash crop.
MULTICOOP is located in a municipality dependent on dairy cattle, and 
the cooperative provides artificial insemination services and has created the in-
frastructure for marketing milk in a way that guarantees high prices and price 
stability. COAGRANJA established a consumer section that offers wholesale 
and retail consumer products to their membership at attractive prices, thus 
expanding the benefits of collective action. Even when existing commercial 
establishments lowered their prices in response, the local population has pre-
ferred to buy from the cooperative store (Ariza and Lobo 2002, 320). For its 
part, COOMULDESA created the COOMULDESA Foundation in 1997 
when regulations that govern the solidarity economy sector began to limit the 
actions of multiactivity CACs and to require that they follow rules similar to 
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those for banks. Through this foundation, COOMULDESA provides market-
ing services for agricultural products such as corn, beans, and coffee (Bucheli 
2002, 283).
CRACs, on the other hand, tend not to reach the most vulnerable segments 
of the population. Low-income households can find it difficult to raise the 
membership fees and deposit the savings amounts required to join a CRAC. 
These families are therefore served primarily by microfinance mechanisms that 
accept nonmonetary guarantees to provide access to credit for people without 
access to traditional financial institutions.
cooPeraTive SociaL Learning ouTcomeS
The development model of the region has relied on cooperative organization to 
provide the mechanism for enhancing managerial capacities among the mem-
bership. This effort has involved the training of leaders who become cooperative 
managers and the promotion of a culture of participation within management, 
assembly meetings, and everyday decision making. As a result, in each coopera-
tive it is possible to identify members who have taken an interest in learning 
and placed themselves at the disposal of the cooperative.
Some cooperatives, such as COOPVALLE and COOMULSEB, have 
had low turnover among their managerial staff, which has slowed participa-
tion and the growth of managerial skills among the wider membership base. 
COOMULSEB successfully addressed this problem in 1993 by changing lead-
ership election processes in ways that increase participation and decrease the 
concentration of power (Dávila 2002, 230). In the cases of COOMULSEB, 
MULTICOOP, COOMULDESA, and COOPVALLE, managerial capacity- 
building was especially pronounced in the areas of decision making and evalu-
ation, creating what Dávila has called “a permanent process of trial and error, 
a process that has generated efficacy and efficiency in management of the or-
ganization” (Dávila 2004, 70). MULTICOOP has also developed leadership 
capacities, manifested in the enthusiasm with which the manager “has taken 
to directing, orienting, and motivating the creation of new ideas, with the end 
goal of converting them into new services” (Ibid., 105). At COAGRANJA, the 
fact that associates have learned to “do math” stands out, as does the awareness 
of the importance of saving, which resulted in an increase in deposits (Ariza 
and Lobo 2002, 330).
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Women are also increasing their roles in cooperative management. 
COOMULSEB has seen an increase in women’s participation on the Admin-
istrative Council, from 14 percent of council members in 1985 to nearly 67 per-
cent in 1999 (Silva and Dávila 2002, 232). It should be noted that a woman, 
consistently elected since 1975, currently occupies the post of manager. In the 
case of COOPVALLE, an increase in women’s participation was fundamental 
for instituting an inclusionary strategy driven by collective concerns and the 
clear goal of achieving benefits for all associates (Dávila 2004, 80). This change 
is also reflected in the cooperative’s leadership; since 1993, a woman has occu-
pied the post of manager. Women’s participation in the Administrative Council 
remained between 20 and 40 percent for the 1991–2001 period but has increased 
in the assembly of delegates, going from 27 to 46 percent over 10 years.
SociaL caPiTaL and LeaderShiP
Social capital is critical for building values, norms, and networks of trust, and 
cooperatives play a leading role in creating the networks that drive local de-
velopment (Lobo 2002, 138). In all the cases under consideration, management 
has demonstrated its dedication to the values and principles of the cooperative 
doctrine. In this way, it has favored a culture of self-control, honesty, transpar-
ency, and ethics (Bucheli 2002, 278). COOMULSEB, MULTICOOP, and 
COOPVALLE are private organizations where “concern for the general well-
being and for the community reigns” (Dávila 2002, 236). In COOPVALLE, 
there is an awareness of the importance of the role that the cooperative plays in 
the social and economic life of the community, and for that reason it seeks “to 
create favorable conditions for carrying out its production activities and social 
and economic duties under the best possible conditions” (Dávila 2004, 63).
COAGRANJA has contributed to local development by building a ware-
house to reduce the price of farm inputs and increase the availability of finan-
cial services tailored to local needs. It also played an important role in securing 
peace in the town through its participation in a process of changing values and 
behaviors. In October 1997, the La Granja and Sabana Grande parishes de-
clared themselves “peace territories” (Ariza and Lobo 2002, 336). Additionally, 
in association with the Catholic Church, they mobilized the community to ob-
tain a local bus—an important service given the distances and poor quality of 
roads within the municipality (Ibid., 348).
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BuiLding indePendenT caPiTaL
In order to offer loan services, CRACs in southern Santander use the deposits 
and contributions of their members (López and Peña 2005, 42). By drawing 
capital from the cooperative’s own resources—that is, from member fees, de-
posits, and profits—they are able to keep capital costs extremely low. For ex-
ample, membership contributions have a cost to the cooperative approximately 
equivalent to the annual rate of inflation, and savings deposits are cheaper than 
bank loans (via the interest rates that banks charge). Cooperative capital stocks 
have costs. For example, in the third trimester of 2010, the cooperative, through 
a fixed rate of deposit, paid about 5.3 percent for the use of member capital 
(CONFECOOP 2010, 16), well below the cost of capital borrowed from the 
formal banking system.
Independent capital is accrued when cooperatives charge associates fair in-
terest rates in accordance with the cooperative philosophy, although capital is 
often scarce compared with the credit needs of CRAC service beneficiaries. 
Dávila’s (2008) study collected information from 2007 to show that 15 of the 
17 CRACs had approximately $50 million available to provide credit and other 
services to the membership. Thirty percent of the capital came from the mem-
ber contributions (fees), and 70 percent came from member savings deposits, 
of which almost $31 million had been invested (Dávila 2008, 310). With this in-
ternal capital stock, CRACs offered four lines of credit: agricultural, commer-
cial, consumer, and microbusiness—following the priorities established by the 
directives imposed by the Superintendency of the Solidarity Economy (SES), 
which is in charge at the federal level of the supervision and control of solidar-
ity entities (employee, cooperative, mutual, and other funds). It is important to 
emphasize that the SES rules set during the 1990s differ from the established 
credit practices promoted by CRACs, which set credit lines and interest rates 
to respond to membership needs. In all the cases presented here, the average 
interest rate charged by the cooperatives was under the maximum legal level of 
27.4 percent set by SES (López and Peña 2005, 35).
The growth of internal capital stock has been the result of a sustained ef-
fort. It is true that COOMULSEB, COAGRANJA, COOMULDESA, and 
MULTICOOP have experienced periods of financial difficulty marked by in-
sufficient capital to cover the demand for credit. Nonetheless, they have weath-
ered these crises, and the key indicator of sustainability is the fact that these 
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cooperatives have managed to strengthen the loyalty of their members, who 
supported their organizations en masse during the severe crisis of 1997–1999 
in Colombia. During this period, 49 large, primarily urban financial coopera-
tives, along with three cooperative banks, were dissolved as a result of several 
factors, including corruption, poor management, and lack of discipline. The 
lack of intervention by government financial institutions also played a decisive 
role by not facilitating access to the necessary capital to those cooperatives that 
were well managed (Dávila and Bacheli 1998, 31–35). In the case of the southern 
Santander cooperatives, however, there was not a mass exit of members or a loss 
of faith in their organization.
concLuSion
CRACs have played an important development role in southern Santander by 
generating social learning processes, social capital and leadership, and indepen-
dent capital. As these cooperatives have developed internally, they have been 
increasingly able to promote rural development tailored to the communities 
they serve, and they have strengthened community ties and community capaci-
ties. The five CRACs analyzed in this chapter have provided credit services at 
reasonable rates of interest, expanding coverage to meet the demand for credit. 
In addition, each has developed services that address the specific needs of each 
locality, contributing to farm systems, the training of leaders, and the growing 
participation of women in managerial posts. A description of the development 
contributions of each case study is provided in table 16.3.
It is important to emphasize that the successful experience of these five 
CRACs unfolded in a context of (and despite) public policies that tend to limit 
the reach of these cooperatives into their respective communities (Burke and 
Piekielek 2011; Gutiérrez 2014). On the one hand, the regulation of the solidar-
ity sector at the end of the 1990s began to limit the ability of multiactive CACs 
to act, insofar as they are required to honor regulations similar to those struc-
turing the banking industry. On the other hand, high levels of rural poverty 
related to land dispossession and displacement caused by violence do not allow 
the most needy people to have the minimum resources required to be able to 
join a cooperative and access its services.
It should also be remembered that these cooperatives have managed to 
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the conflict suffered in Colombia and particularly in the nearby region of the 
Middle Magdalena River Valley. This provides an important counterpoint to 
research showing that Colombian armed actors use grassroots development 
projects to facilitate violence, land grabbing, dispossession, and the construc-
tion of shadow states (Ballvé 2013). My conclusion is that by working collec-
tively, training leaders, generating social capital and independent capital, and 
making employment and self-employment possible, CRACs strengthen their 
members and communities. Further study should help to deepen our under-
standing of how small-producer cooperatives empower rural communities to 
confront the dominant sources of vulnerability and marginalization.
ConClusion
Cooperatives as Change agents 
in rural latin ameriCa
Synthesizing Experiences Across Countries
Marcela Vásquez-León and Brian J . Burke
l
atin ameriCa has seen signifiCant transformations in the last sev-
eral decades, sparked in large part by nearly 70 years of international 
development, programs of land reform and state-supported rural devel-
opment, the collapse of authoritarian regimes, the advance of increasingly 
inclusive democratization, the rise and fall and rise of left-leaning govern-
ments, and neoliberal policies supporting economic globalization. Rural 
Latin America surely looks different today than it did in the 1950s, or even 
in the 1980s, but underlying structures of inequality are extremely resistant 
to change, and smallholders remain subject to high levels of vulnerability, 
exploitation, and social exclusion. We want to conclude by reminding readers 
that these are not abstract academic concepts but rather conditions that shape 
the everyday lives, experiences, hopes, and expectations of our fellow human 
beings. They are very, very real—the conditions that give meaning to work, 
school, family, childhood, identity, and sometimes even survival. Consider 
these two reflections by Paraguayan small farmers.
We grew corn, cotton, and none of the crops have a good price. We sold them 
and were left without a cent. We hardly had enough to get through the day, and 
there wasn’t enough for the kids to go to school. And our kids left three years ago 
to look for work in Argentina, to do any job that is available. I want my kids 
to come back and work by my side. Even though we don’t have much land, our 
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work with the cooperative is allowing me to keep putting food on the table. My 
kids are now back and if our work with the cooperative continues to succeed, it 
is our hope that the kids will be able to stay. [Farmer 1]
The Brazilians came in, and they’re buying up a lot of land, so we Paraguayans 
are fighting not to lose what we have so we don’t suffer hardships. When some-
one sells the land and gets some money, the money doesn’t stretch, the money 
runs out and the family becomes poor. That’s why everyone has to think, has to 
dialogue with each other to defend our position together as small farmers, so 
that no one has to sell their property. [Farmer 2]
We compiled this volume to explore the hypothesis that for the most mar-
ginalized smallholders in Latin America, cooperatives can become agents of 
change and mechanisms of equitable and sustainable development. Can coop-
eratives fulfill these farmers’ hopes? Can they not only enhance farmers’ incomes 
but also help smallholders keep their land, sustain their way of life, develop power 
within commodity chains, and forge meaningful solidarity? Can they help re-
verse the various axes of powerlessness that make farmers so vulnerable and that 
permit their ongoing exploitation?
The study of smallholder cooperatives is not new by any means; it has passed 
through different periods related to both academic and political trends. During 
the 1960s and ’70s, attention to cooperatives flourished as left-leaning intel-
lectuals, activists, and rural leaders hoped cooperatives might transform society 
by spreading values of equality, solidarity, and participation. The idea was that 
cooperatives, in the words of Orlando Fals Borda (1971, 146), could be envi-
sioned as “active peasant organizations that would challenge the status quo” by 
supporting larger social movements that promoted the interests of the peas-
ant class. His research on Latin American smallholder cooperatives, however, 
led him to the conclusion that cooperatives did not live up to the expectations 
of their champions. At best, cooperatives served as excuses for inaction rather 
than as instruments of socioeconomic change. At worst, they were co-opted 
and eventually reinforced inequality and historical power relations. During the 
1980s and ’90s, structural adjustment reforms and an emphasis on free mar-
kets and the privatization of productive and financial sectors as part of neo-
liberal globalization became the trend throughout the region. As states with-
drew support from smallholder cooperative organizations and accused them 
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of inefficiency, academics and activists lost interest in what appeared to be a 
largely failed undertaking.
In the wake of the neoliberal wave of the 1990s, smallholder cooperatives 
persist and may have become more relevant than ever. Indeed, several of the 
case studies discussed here show promise as palliatives to the poverty, inequal-
ity, environmental decline, and record rural outmigration sparked by neoliberal 
policies. At the same time, these cases reveal the varied and contradictory na-
ture of neoliberalism by illustrating how states continue to provide vital public 
services, technical assistance, and financing that the private sector would never 
have deemed profitable. Perhaps evaluations of neoliberalism must move be-
yond simple dichotomies of the state versus society/corporations to consider 
the diverse ways that state institutions and grassroots organizations interrelate.
This complexity notwithstanding, we would argue that the political and in-
tellectual movement for more equitable societies must remain highly skeptical 
of neoliberal globalization while seeking alternatives with global relevance. The 
lesson from the past is that smallholder cooperatives are not social movements 
in and of themselves, and they do not necessarily guarantee justice or equity. 
As state-sanctioned organizations, they must work within the system that they 
seek to transform, and as such they face enormous contradictions. Coopera-
tives are, however, increasingly part of a larger global movement that focuses 
on alternative development (including, for example, the solidarity economy, fair 
trade, organic farming, land rights movements, and efforts to change global 
trade rules) and that addresses food security, environmental sustainability, and 
long-term quality-of-life concerns for rural populations. One of the interest-
ing common threads among the cases presented here is that these coopera-
tives are significantly transnational and part of a global movement that seeks 
to integrate historically marginalized smallholders into global markets, global 
concerns, and power structures that go beyond communities. In several of these 
case studies we find clear examples of how such transnational work can trans-
form local structures of oppression.
It is also important to highlight that these cooperatives are not linear orga-
nizations; instead they have complex histories. Most have undergone periods of 
crisis and have had the tenacity to develop change strategies that have allowed 
them to persist. The case studies constitute a wide range of experiences that pro-
vide to different degrees a lens through which one can envision smallholder co-
operatives as organizations capable of building more autonomous communities 
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that strive to free themselves from historical patterns of exploitation. Thus, the 
larger question that we ask is, under what circumstances and through what ac-
tions do institutions like cooperatives contribute to smallholders’ access to, on 
the one hand, more productive, sustainable, and satisfying livelihoods, and, on 
the other hand, a genuine forum through which they can participate and en-
gage politically in the transformation of their own communities? The Inter-
national Cooperative Alliance has tried to stress “the cooperative difference” 
as an economic selling point, but what is “the cooperative difference” from the 
perspective of power? What lessons can we draw from these case studies about 
the conditions, dynamics, and functional characteristics that make cooperatives 
useful, active, adaptable, and responsive?
Even though we have found a great deal of diversity among the cooperatives 
that we have examined, each provides valuable lessons and makes an important 
contribution to our current understanding of smallholder agricultural coopera-
tives in Latin America. Reading across cases, we draw a number of conclusions 
and highlight recurring themes.
EConomiC Gains must BE translatEd into 
soCial invEstmEnts that support  
politiCal-EConomiC transformation
In most cases, smallholder cooperative members are multiply marginalized: they 
have little formal education and few productive resources, and they are embed-
ded in long-standing relations of inequality and exploitation with local power 
elites. This situation of vulnerability is exacerbated in the case of women, whose 
potential and needs are frequently ignored in marginal rural settings and who 
are often overburdened by multiple responsibilities. In this context, coopera-
tives can play an important role by investing in human capital, empowering 
producers (men and women), and strengthening the long-term sustainability 
of peasant agriculture in order to decrease the vulnerabilities that reproduce 
dependency. The Manduvirá cooperative in Paraguay stands out for its ability 
to balance economic and social priorities. Despite its tremendous business suc-
cess, the cooperative has continually invested in its membership by providing 
educational opportunities for cooperative members and their children and by 
employing young adults and educating women to occupy leadership positions 
in the cooperative. Participation in fair trade has also generated the funds to 
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provide health care to the community and has allowed the cooperative to build 
strategic external linkages that support the cooperative’s constant search for 
autonomy. After the cooperative declared bankruptcy, Manduvirá was able to 
flourish by leading producers in a common struggle against exploitation by the 
local sugar mill. Importantly, the economics of cooperativism—the pooling of 
resources and ownership for the benefit of all—were essential for peasant po-
litical mobilization that could successfully change long-standing relations of 
inequality. The cooperative continues to flourish because it has been able to 
turn economic gains into human and social capital, impacting not only coop-
erative members but the entire community of Arroyos y Esteros.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is the Brazilian cooperative Amazon-
Coop, which failed to translate economic gains into sustained investments in 
human capital and social or political-economic change. Indigenous members 
of this cooperative were positioned as wards rather than as owners of the coop-
erative, and the model that predominated was highly paternalistic. Cooperative 
members belonged to different ethnic groups and were located at great dis-
tances from one another, and the leadership had little contact with the mem-
bership. Even though members were obtaining significantly higher prices for 
Brazil nuts, the cooperative failed to act as a change agent that would improve 
indigenous people’s position within local power relations. Instead, it re-created 
historical relations of control and exploitation. It is not surprising that this co-
operative eventually collapsed, leaving its members as marginalized as they had 
been when the cooperative started.
The structural marginalization of Latin American peasants, however, is not 
a result only of rural class relationships. There is strong evidence from these 
case studies that democratic cooperatives able to connect popular concerns 
with management expertise are in a good position to identify and address local 
sources of vulnerability and marginalization. For example, the Japanese Brazil-
ian cooperative CAMTA and the Paraguayan cooperative of Capiibary both 
found that environmental degradation was central to local livelihood chal-
lenges, and in the case of Capiibary, these paired challenges were prompting 
widespread land sales, a rural exodus of young farmers, and land concentration 
by agro-industrial soy farmers. Both cooperatives invested in education, pro-
duction, and marketing diversification through agroforestry programs, which 
brought economic stability while addressing soil degradation and deforesta-
tion. CAMTA also strengthened cultural cohesion among Japanese Brazil-
ians by linking the cooperative to Japanese markets and financial capital. In 
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Capiibary, the cooperative has helped reverse the rural exodus that threatened 
to destroy the community by regenerating farmland, making farming more eco-
nomically viable, paying attention to all phases and types of agricultural pro-
duction including those where women have a predominant role, and restoring 
dignity to peasant life.
In some of the cooperatives, the attention paid to programs that benefit 
women has been critical and is reflected in the importance given to the par-
ticipation of women as both cooperative leaders and rural producers. In cases 
where women are included in the cooperative’s strategy of rural development, 
there is an increase in adaptive capacity not only for women themselves but 
for the entire household. In the case of coffee associations in Colombia, for 
example, the inclusion of women has been key in the successful transition from 
illegal crop production, carried out mostly by men, to household participation 
in the specialty coffee value chain. In the savings and credit cooperatives in 
Colombia’s southern Santander, the growing participation of women in mana-
gerial positions has been fundamental to establishing an inclusionary strategy 
determined by collective concerns.
The savings and credit cooperatives in Colombia’s southern Santander re-
gion offer another example of adapting cooperatives to local needs. These co-
operatives have invested in the technological development of members’ farms 
to improve business productivity while simultaneously collaborating with lo-
cal organizations to create “peace territories” and dialogue with armed actors 
to devise conflict resolution strategies. This is absolutely essential in Colom-
bia, where rural violence has fueled an agrarian counterreform via the direct 
displacement of more than 4 million people and the indirect displacement of 
many more who can no longer tolerate the fear and economic instability gener-
ated by armed actors. Given the absence of the Colombian state in the south of 
Santander, cooperatives have played a critical role in building community iden-
tity and cohesion based on principles of trust and solidarity, which ultimately 
ensures that the human rights of their members and the community at large are 
respected.
These cases illustrate that a key task for cooperatives is not to follow ex-
pert models of cooperative success, but rather to develop strategies grounded 
in local conditions. Building on strong community support and democratic 
involvement, cooperatives can develop creative strategies that mobilize prof-
its for the transformation of rural inequality and marginalization. Overcoming 
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the formidable obstacles to change, however, requires deep solidarity, trust, and 
strong cooperative economies.
thE rolE of thE statE is CritiCal in 
institutinG supportivE poliCiEs and 
promotinG an EnvironmEnt of solidarity
All of the cooperatives in this volume have struggled with national policies that 
either directly or indirectly affect cooperative decision making, management, 
investments, and outcomes. To some extent, these cases therefore illustrate the 
importance of a supportive policy environment for cooperatives. In some cases, 
cooperatives have benefited directly from government investments, as in the 
federally funded school lunch program executed by the Manaus Secretariat of 
Education, which purchases pineapple and cupuaçu from ASCOPE. Similar 
policies could provide significant support for smallholders across the continent 
and might be specifically tailored to promote food sovereignty and sustainable 
farming methods. In other cases, policies contradict official government efforts 
to promote cooperatives. A case in point is the disastrous impact of the 1999 
Paraguayan debt forgiveness law on the Coronel Oviedo cooperative, which 
illustrates how policies that may be favorable from a household perspective can 
backfire when they damage community institutions. When the law was issued, 
the cooperative had already paid its public debt and as a result was not obliged 
to forgive members’ debts. Even though the cooperative offered to renegoti-
ate the terms of loans, it lost more than half of its rural members. Similarly, 
COLANTA’s struggles with Colombian dairy policy and free trade agreements 
show that even the largest and most lucrative cooperatives may be challenged 
by global economic policies. One key lesson, then, is that cooperatives must not 
only respond effectively to state-based challenges and opportunities, but must 
also work diligently to create and maintain favorable policy conditions (see also 
Burke and Piekielek 2011).
A second aspect of state influence has to do with effects on cooperative soli-
darity, and this suggests a more inward-looking strategy for cooperative manag-
ers. In Paraguay and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in Colombia, cooperative for-
mation was the direct result of government campaigns to expand the agricultural 
frontier during the 1970s. Cooperatives offered a way to cope with the absence 
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of government services for credit, production assistance, marketing, and infra-
structure. Strong grassroots cooperatives like CAMTA and ASCOPE assumed 
many of the roles of local government, providing basic services such as electric-
ity in the case of CAMTA, and becoming the central vehicle for community- 
wide action in the case of ASCOPE. Not surprisingly, abandonment by the 
state has often strengthened community organization, while community or-
ganizing has often facilitated more effective state support. ASCOPE’s success, 
for example, is largely a function of its ability to maneuver effectively within the 
Brazilian policy environment.
By contrast, cooperatives that have been the direct result of state interven-
tion and have been unable to develop a structure of democratic decision-making 
tend to be the most fragile cooperatives and the ones that lack a strong sense of 
solidarity. In Brazil, AmazonCoop and Produtores do Curupati-Peixe (CPCP), 
the tilapia cooperative, exemplify this. The former was initiated and led by the 
Brazilian state and a transnational corporation, and the latter started after 
forced relocation of the local community following the construction of the 
Castanhão Dam. While the significant economic success at CPCP should not 
be downplayed, many of the cooperative’s members focused on their personal 
incomes and struggled to appreciate that they were owners of the cooperative 
enterprise. This may significantly limit the cooperative’s ability to more broadly 
transform rural inequality.
Of course, dependence need not be a permanent condition. In Paraguay, 
Guayaibi Unido has been highly dependent on state programs, and its de-
velopment strategy is largely dictated by CEPACOOP. However, this coop-
erative took an important step in building solidarity when it was able to use 
mass mobilization to challenge the lack of government support when their ba-
nana shipments were stopped at the Argentina-Paraguay border. Although the 
Manduvirá cooperative has been more successful in its use of strikes and mass 
mobilization, both cooperatives have challenged the political and social system 
to further the interests of their members and communities. By publicly chal-
lenging conditions that threaten members’ subsistence, cooperatives can facili-
tate participation in larger movements that seek structural change and can give 
members a deeper sense of empowerment and agency.
Importantly, our cases show that it is not only abandonment and opposition 
that give rise to solidarity. Cuéllar and Ramirez discuss how Colombian coffee-
producer organizations were able to leverage strong support from USAID (via 
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ACDI/VOCA) and the Colombian government in order to stabilize coffee 
farmers’ livelihoods and establish stronger democratic organizations. Even they 
struggled with conflictual and changing policies, however.
ChanGE stratEGiEs must BE tailorEd to  
(and oftEn must ChallEnGE)  
loCal Cultural pattErns
Smallholder cooperatives in Latin America, particularly in marginal regions, 
develop in a cultural and political context that is marked by social stratification 
embodied in systems of patronage and clientelism. Within this context, co-
operatives may be dominated by local elites or more powerful external agents, 
and grassroots actors may actually contribute to this domination by pursuing 
opportunities offered within the patronage systems. The case of AmazonCoop 
provides, again, an example of an extreme case. The stimulus that created this 
cooperative first came from public officials who felt frustrated at the inability 
of the public sector to meet the needs of their indigenous clientele. But just as 
larger policy toward indigenous peoples in Brazil tends to be highly paternal-
istic, so has been the evolution of AmazonCoop in relation to its indigenous 
membership. In many ways, AmazonCoop reflects the larger institutional and 
legal frameworks that define indigenous-Brazilian relationships.
Other cooperatives, such as Guayaibi Unido, are inadvertently reproducing 
a pattern of social stratification where the more disadvantaged banana pro-
ducers retreat from active participation while top producers continue to grow 
through their linkages to the central cooperative, which plays a critical role in 
determining who benefits from the export market. In this cooperative, manage-
ment success requires a great deal of work in the empowerment of all coopera-
tive members and the just distribution of benefits.
Some cooperatives, like Manduvirá, have made a conscious effort to end 
patterns of exploitation based on social class by directly challenging the power 
of local elites involved in the buying of sugarcane. Manduvirá’s unprecedented 
success has resulted in a membership that feels empowered and capable of 
challenging one of the largest industrial sugarcane producers in Paraguay. 
ASCOPE also offers an interesting example, where a clear ideology of class 
consciousness and social equality has provided a foundation on which the 
212 conclusion
cooperative could develop a successful market-based economic model. Its vi-
sion, however, is economic success without ever re-creating old patterns of ex-
ploitation and social inequality.
Taken together, these cases illustrate the importance of understanding his-
torical power structures and the ways that they shape both economic processes 
and cultural expectations about what types of changes are possible and desir-
able. To be agents of change, cooperatives need to accommodate their work 
to local cultural expectations while simultaneously challenging those cultural 
dynamics that reproduce disempowerment and marginalization.
suCCEssful partiCipation in intErnational 
markEts rEquirEs a flExiBlE stratEGy to  
avoid ovErdEpEndEnCE on thosE markEts
The prevalent trend among the cooperatives studied is to gear production more 
toward international markets through the creation of strategic alliances that 
permit cooperatives to participate in niche markets, including organic-certified 
production and fair trade. This trend is itself a powerful transformation of ru-
ral political economies: it signifies a move away from reliance on local and re-
gional intermediaries and toward vertical integration and industrial process-
ing to keep more profits within the cooperative. As such, it enables small and 
medium-size farmers to seize global market opportunities that, were they to 
operate as individuals, would be beyond their investment capabilities and skill 
sets. Without question, this type of international strategy presents a potential 
growth area for rural cooperatives. It stimulates the development of new kinds 
of collaboration among actors along commodity networks, giving rise to new 
levels of organization with important implications for reducing rural poverty. It 
may also have positive multiplier effects across the rural economy by providing 
local sources of off-farm income, as shown by the Colombian dairy cooperative 
COLANTA and the Colombian rural savings and credit cooperatives.
However, because the mission of cooperatives goes beyond the provision of 
material benefits, the international strategy may also limit cooperatives’ ability 
to fulfill principles of democracy, participation, autonomy, and self-sufficiency. 
Those cooperatives that participate in international marketing networks must 
conform to transnational regulatory frameworks and quality standards that re-
quire increasing production costs and reorganizing cooperatives, with no long-
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term guarantee of more favorable trading conditions. Market and product di-
versification is a key strategy to achieve independence and reduce the risk of 
overreliance on a single marketing network or product.
CAMTA, Capiibary, Manduvirá, and the Colombian specialty coffee as-
sociations have successfully entered commodity markets; the first two have 
worked actively to avoid excessive dependence upon those markets. CAMTA’s 
long experience in international commodity markets has led it to emphasize a 
strategy of diversification and flexibility. To spread risk, CAMTA established 
a mixed agroforestry model that combines marketable native fruits with in-
troduced tropical fruits and native timber species. To reduce dependence on 
uncertain markets, CAMTA has established an agro-industrial processing ca-
pacity. In the case of Capiibary, the cooperative has developed a multipronged 
strategy that has allowed smallholders to participate in markets from which 
they have traditionally been excluded, like soy, and to partner with private com-
panies to process their fruit for sale in national and international markets. At 
Manduvirá, leaders have made substantial efforts to educate themselves in fair 
trade marketing. Even though Manduvirá is becoming increasingly indepen-
dent as it starts its own sugar processing, its strategy of dependence on sugar 
does not have the element of diversification that is critical to creating sustain-
ability. A challenge that the cooperative faces is to be able to manage the coop-
erative’s involvement in certified-trade networks rather than finding its internal 
participatory processes dictated by regulatory and economic dynamics tied to 
fair trade and certification. It is clear that the increasing opportunities opened 
by marketing networks are requiring farmers to become highly specialized in 
terms of agricultural production, marketing, business, and management. The 
leaders of all of these cooperatives and associations have been able to mobilize 
members, create competition, and change the balance of power. They have been 
able to take advantage of the opportunities of globalization, but some remain 
dangerously dependent on those opportunities.
Neoliberal policies of free trade and the establishment of MERCOSUR 
have had positive and negative impacts on cooperatives in all three countries 
that we consider here. For example, in Paraguay, Guayaibi Unido’s alliance 
with CEPACOOP has permitted higher earnings through banana exports to 
Argentina, but at the cost of subjecting farmers to more volatile markets and 
competition with more technified producers. With adequate support, Guayaibi 
Unido has the potential to follow a similar path as the above cooperatives, but 
this requires closing the gap between those who are producing export-quality 
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bananas and those who feel left out when their bananas are not considered 
good enough. In other places—such as the Brazilian and Colombian dairy sec-
tor—the gap between Latin American farmers and large-scale, highly subsi-
dized European and North American farmers may simply be too large to close 
absent significant changes to free trade agreements.
CoopErativEs must aChiEvE EffECtivE 
lEadErship with stronG  
partiCipatory GovErnanCE
Developing and maintaining a sense of ownership, collective identity, and em-
powerment among the membership while promoting an entrepreneurial cul-
ture requires the ability to balance external linkages with internal governance. 
In cooperatives that lack a sense of ownership, leaders and members often make 
a strong us/them distinction. Sense of ownership is related to the historical con-
text in which each particular cooperative developed, as well as to a cooperative’s 
degree of heterogeneity and size. In cases where the cooperative is imposed by 
political bosses, external agents, or the state, the sense of ownership tends to be 
lower. In cases where there is great socioeconomic differentiation among mem-
bers in terms of class, wealth, ethnicity, or access to resources, the sense of own-
ership tends to be lower. That said, a heterogeneous membership can be a useful 
political and economic resource for cooperatives.
In the Paraguayan cooperative Coronel Oviedo, the size of the member-
ship and its dispersal across the agricultural landscape have contributed to a 
sense of separation between management and producers. Rural members tend 
to feel intimidated and unwilling to participate and have little sense of loy-
alty to the cooperative. This is related to the historical emphasis placed on the 
urban sector, which is in turn related to the fact that the board of directors is 
entirely composed of urban members. However, the mix of urban and rural 
members creates opportunities for important economic linkages and new social 
programs, and urban members often subsidize rural ones.
Cooperatives with a high sense of ownership stand in contrast. A particular 
case is CAMTA, the Japanese Brazilian cooperative. A strong sense of owner-
ship in this case can be partly attributed to the ethnic homogeneity underly-
ing cooperative membership and a historical sense of common struggle. This 
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cooperative has been able to effectively deal with crises because of strong loy-
alty from members, who contributed their personal resources to keep the coop-
erative solvent during a difficult period. The case of ASCOPE is also revealing. 
A strong sense of ownership is partly related to a common historical struggle 
for land and a long experience of grassroots mobilization, social consciousness, 
and autonomy. The cooperative’s deep ties to the community are also critical, 
as is the small size of the group and the physical proximity of residents whose 
design of the agro-villa model allows everyone to access basic services.
Nurturing a sense of ownership must also be accompanied by a coopera-
tive management with knowledge of good business practices that promotes an 
entrepreneurial culture. The organization and professionalism in cooperative 
management varies a great deal among the cooperatives studied. As in other 
realms of cooperative organization where a balance between objectives does not 
intuitively coexist, we find that successful internal governance requires the abil-
ity to accommodate the interests of sometimes highly diverse members while at 
the same time developing certain standard procedures and ways of categorizing 
members that allow for the development of a more homogeneous group that 
is easier to manage. This is a particular challenge for cooperatives that are large 
and whose members are widely dispersed, such as Coronel Oviedo, where, as 
already stated, members do not have a strong sense of sharing power in the 
decision-making process. Good governance may also require difficult decisions, 
as in the case of the Colombian coffee associations that had to purge members 
in order to strengthen the cooperative spirit.
For small cooperatives such as Guayaibi Unido and ASCOPE, the prob-
lems of leadership are different. In these two cases, the role of director is not 
distinguished from that of manager, and leadership is more related to charisma 
than professional management skills. This leads to a concentration of decision-
making power and a general sense of lack of transparency and accountability, 
particularly as these cooperatives adopt more business-oriented models and ex-
pand economic activities. Other cooperatives are struggling to professionalize 
their management and maintain well-defined leadership roles in order to as-
sure transparency. Such is the case at Manduvirá. As it expands its activities and 
increases in size, there is a clear awareness that it needs to maintain a group of 
professionals that can tackle different aspects of cooperative organization, from 
computer-based accounting systems to an understanding of world markets and 
prices.
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CAMTA also offers an interesting example of how the cooperative can 
maintain a vital organization. In this case, the “old guard” of  Japan-born leaders 
has been replaced by Japanese Brazilians. This cultural and generational shift 
in leadership contributes to the dynamism of the cooperative and its ability to 
adapt and pursue a sustainable expansion strategy.
The area of planning also relates to organizational management. In this re-
gard, we found few instances of long-term strategic planning and very little 
evidence of monitoring and evaluation of the cooperatives and of short-term 
plans. Even though each cooperative has a vision and some plans to accomplish 
this vision, these are not well-defined or detailed. Strategic planning requires 
the specific definition of agro-industrial projects, including the identification 
of potential difficulties. It also requires a clearly defined path of agricultural 
outreach and the identification of potential markets and activities. Thus, for 
cooperatives to achieve organizational sustainability, a blend of stability, flex-
ibility, and forward planning is required, and the cooperative’s leadership must 
ensure that their organizational structure provides these three elements.
antiCipatinG futurE ChallEnGEs  
and opportunitiEs
Moving forward, some of the most important work for scholars and cooperative 
managers will involve analyzing the social, political, and economic dynamics 
that will impinge on cooperative success, and strategizing around the challenges 
and opportunities of the future. Here we would like to highlight three of these. 
First, there is the on-going leftist shift in regional politics—the so-called “pink 
tide.” This raises valuable opportunities for scholars to interrogate the extent 
to which leftist/populist politics generate favorable conditions for cooperatives, 
and especially to analyze what series of conditions may lead paradoxically to 
unfavorable conditions. For cooperative leaders, the rise of left-leaning govern-
ments and more democratic populism creates a number of political openings. 
For example, anti-imperialist and antiglobalist ideologies dovetail nicely with 
food sovereignty initiatives and crop diversification programs that might reduce 
vulnerability to international markets; popular discourses supporting socialism 
and socially just policies could reinvigorate movements for the more equitable 
redistribution of land and water; and populist appeals could be used to rally 
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support around grassroots cooperatives as part of the people’s economy. A great 
deal of political work will be necessary to ensure that these leftist and populist 
discourses generate truly transformative policies—and current events are not 
promising in this regard—but if cooperatives are able to mobilize members, 
then they may be especially powerful change agents in this regard.
Second, there is the lurking danger of climate change and changing energy 
economies. Climate change is already challenging Latin American farmers, 
and it is likely to have a disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable. Be-
cause climate acts as a “threat multiplier” that exacerbates other vulnerabilities 
(Crate and Nuttall 2009; Eakin 2006; Vásquez-León 2009), any cooperatives 
that help to stabilize rural livelihoods and reduce sociopolitical exclusion will 
have a buffering effect. Cooperatives may also directly contribute to climate 
resilience by integrating “climate-smart” technologies and practices into their 
current mix of technical assistance, and by maintaining the strong social net-
works and community institutions that are necessary for resilience. Savvy co-
operatives may be able to take advantage of new funding opportunities in this 
regard. However, there are many more complex and uncertain aspects to the 
relationship between cooperativism, climate, and energy. For example, any ef-
fective climate change mitigation strategy will require leaving oil in the ground. 
Assuming that countries of the global North do not bear full responsibility for 
this, then some Latin American countries will need to find alternative ways 
of ensuring citizens’ well-being and economic stability in the absence of oil 
revenues. Rural cooperatives may be a key tool for this post-oil transition. Sim-
ilarly, meaningful climate policy will necessarily affect fuel prices and global 
transportation costs, with uncertain effects on international trade and export-
oriented cooperative strategies. Cooperative scholars and leaders will need to 
keep a careful eye on these changes.
Third, land grabbing is becoming widespread. In recent decades, Latin 
America, like other areas of the developing world, has seen a massive and rapid 
wave of land acquisition by national elites and foreign governments and cor-
porations. Driven by food, energy, climate, conservation, and financial crises—
and by the investment opportunities that these crises present—land grabbing is 
“likely to result in widespread reconcentration of land and capital” (Borras et al. 
2012, 867). Land grabbing thus exacerbates the already-prevalent agrarian coun-
terreform prompted by neoliberal economic globalization, which has tended 
to exacerbate rural inequalities by creating “an agriculture of two velocities,” 
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as capitalist farmers have the capital, technical knowledge, economies of scale, 
and marketing skills to benefit from new export markets while peasant produc-
ers suffer from the lack of those assets and opportunities, as well as from the 
withdrawal of state supports and increased competition from cheap, subsidized 
food imports (Kay 2008, 918; Kay 2006). In this context, even policies that 
could favor smallholders—such as the formalization of land tenure arrange-
ments and property markets—have often facilitated the loss of their most basic 
resource: land. Many of the cooperatives we have studied show real promise of 
helping campesinos maintain access to land. They have also helped campesi-
nos resist or even counter key aspects of  “new ruralization,” including semi- 
proletarianization, the feminization of rural work, and out-migration (Kay 
2008). Cooperatives will need to redouble their efforts to support campesino 
livelihoods and long-term resource access as market pressures on land, water, 
and subsoil minerals increase.
ConCludinG thouGhts
Cooperatives are no more a panacea today than they were in the 1970s, when 
engaged scholars such as Orlando Fals Borda and June Nash were investigating 
their potential for ending the long-standing exploitation of the Latin Ameri-
can peasantry. However, they may be more important than ever given grow-
ing inequality in rural Latin America, the associated exclusion of smallhold-
ers from new economic opportunities, and neoliberal policies that withdraw 
state supports while exposing farmers to fierce market competition. Indeed, the 
case studies collected here show that successful cooperatives serve as powerful 
change agents, offering short-term economic and social benefits to member 
households and helping to counter the long-term processes through which ex-
ploitation, marginalization, and vulnerability are reproduced. By making visible 
their separate struggles, we have sought to reveal useful lessons about how to 
empower the most marginalized sectors of contemporary Latin America via 
the simultaneous promotion of equitable development and effective collec-
tive action. We cannot stress enough that these goals must go hand in hand, 
that projects promoting development and well-being must be linked to move-
ments for justice and transformation. And while we have certainly witnessed 
our share of failures—cooperatives that were woefully mismanaged, or that 
never achieved financial solvency, or that were co-opted by the state or local 
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elites—we have concluded that cooperatives are among the institutions most 
capable of advancing these twin goals of development and justice. Finally, we 
hope that by drawing attention to cooperatives’ economic and social goals, their 
participatory and democratic ideals, their strong orientation toward collective 
action, and their progressive notions of ownership and grassroots empower-
ment, this volume will encourage readers to seek new, creative, and concrete 
ways to advance the struggle for a just, equitable, and sustainable world.
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